The rule in Illinois was the traditional one prior to the adoption of this statute. People v. Harris (1972) 6 Ill.App.3d 487, 285 N.E.2d 583, 584. New Mexico and Montana have somewhat similar statutes. Cf., State of New Mexico v. Reinhart (1968) 79 N.M. 36, 439 P.2d 554; Barrows v. State of Montana (1970) 155 Mont. 522, 474 P.2d 145.
People v. Williams (1975), 60 Ill.2d 1, 332 N.E.2d 819; People v. Willingham (1976), 38 Ill. App.3d 612, 349 N.E.2d 120. The State argues, however, that defendant is bound by his choice in 1973 to be sentenced under the old law when such credit was not mandatory. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 117-3(d); People v. Harris (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 487, 285 N.E.2d 583.) This contention finds some support in the cases.
However, the sentence imposed upon revocation must be for the original crime and should not be a sentence for any possible crime committed after probation. ( People v. Clyne; People v. Harris (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 487, 488.) In imposing punishment for violation of probation, the trial judge should not undertake to punish offenses subsequent to the granting of probation. ( People v. Lewis (1971), 3 Ill. App.3d 144, 146.) If the subsequent conduct constitutes another offense, the defendant should be tried for such offense and sentence should be imposed therefor under orderly criminal processes.