The appellate court then proceeded and affirmed the conviction in the original proceeding. People v. Harris (1969), 105 Ill. App.2d 305. The post-conviction petition alleged that the defendant was unlawfully arrested and that his confession was obtained through deception and coercion and should have been suppressed. It also suggested that Lolita Davis and Mable Hines, who testified against the defendant, testified falsely at the trial when they stated that they had not been promised leniency for their testimony.

While mere presence or negative acquiescence at the scene of an offense does not make a person a party to that offense, one may aid and abet the offense without actively participating in the overt act; circumstances may demonstrate a common design to commit the offense, upon which guilt may be predicated. ( People v. Greene (1975), 27 Ill. App.3d 1080, 328 N.E.2d 176.) An accused's presence and his lack of opposition to the offense may be considered with all other evidence in determining whether he is accountable for the offense. People v. Harris (1969), 105 Ill. App.2d 305, 245 N.E.2d 80, aff'd (1973), 55 Ill.2d 15, 302 N.E.2d 1. • 4 In the instant case, the evidence adduced at trial tended to establish defendants' unexplained presence in the service station's office at approximately 2:30 a.m., that one of their number was armed with a .45-calibre pistol used to kill Ollie Bell, their failure to assist the victim or report the offense and their flight from the scene.

( People v. Ramirez (1968), 93 Ill. App.2d 404, 410, 236 N.E.2d 284.) While mere presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime or negative acquiescence is not sufficient to make a person a principal to a crime ( People v. Bowman (1971), 132 Ill. App.2d 744, 747, 270 N.E.2d 285; People v. Washington (1970), 121 Ill. App.2d 174, 181, 257 N.E.2d 190), one may aid and abet without actively participating in the offense. ( Bowman, at 747; People v. Harris (1969), 105 Ill. App.2d 305, 315, 245 N.E.2d 80). • 6 If the evidence shows that defendant was present at the crime without disapproving or opposing it, the trier of fact may consider that conduct in connection with other circumstances and thereby conclude that such person assented to the commission of the criminal act, lent his countenance and approval, and thereby aided and abetted the crime.

His presence and lack of opposition may be considered together with other facts and circumstances in determining whether he was a participant. People v. Harris (1969), 105 Ill. App.2d 305, 245 N.E.2d 80, aff'd, 55 Ill.2d 15 (1973). • 1 In the trial court's opinion and in ours, Dubose aided and abetted Hunter in the robbery.

A defendant need not actively assist in the commission of a crime to be accountable for the offense and his "presence and lack of opposition [to the commission of a crime] may be considered together with other facts and circumstances in determining whether he approved the crime and abetted its commission." People v. Harris, 105 Ill. App.2d 305, 315, 316, 245 N.E.2d 80, aff'd., 55 Ill.2d 15, 302 N.E.2d 1. • 2 John Peters' contention that he was an innocent bystander defies credibility.

The dual issue which arose from this motion to suppress was the legality of defendant's arrest and the relationship of that arrest to his later written statement. (But cf. People v. Harris (1969), 105 Ill. App.2d 305, 245 N.E.2d 80.) The voluntary character of defendant's statement was not there placed in issue, nor should it properly enter into a consideration of that motion.

• 1 We cannot accept the State's view of the nature of the hearing on the motion to suppress. In the first place, it is clear that defendant's motion to suppress statements was not expressly predicated upon a violation of the Miranda standards. Furthermore, although it is true that defense counsel devoted most of his examination at the hearing to questions concerning the voluntariness of defendant's statements and the officer's compliance with Miranda, the record clearly indicates that the first questions asked the arresting officer by defense counsel at the hearing directly related to the circumstances surrounding defendant's arrest and not to his later statements. (Compare People v. Harris (1969), 105 Ill. App.2d 305, 245 N.E.2d 80.) Moreover, in light of the manner of appointment of defense counsel, we are reluctant to impose the doctrine of waiver. (See People v. Montgomery (1972), 51 Ill.2d 198, 282 N.E.2d 138.) The trial court was well within its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a continuance, but appointed counsel obviously had only a brief time to consult with his client and to become acquainted with the facts.

We judge, therefore, that the issue has been waived. People v. Nilsson, 44 Ill.2d 244, 255 N.E.2d 432; People v. Harris, 105 Ill. App.2d 305, 245 N.E.2d 80. Waiver aside, we judge that the respondent's position is untenable.

In Washington, however, the identity of the particular defendant was doubtful, vague and uncertain, and the complaining witness in that case was unable to make a positive identification. In People v. Harris, 105 Ill. App.2d 305, 245 N.E.2d 80, the defendant offered an instruction which the court refused, requiring the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant actively assisted in the commission of the crime by aiding, abetting, or assisting in its commission. The court there held that it was not error to refuse the instruction and stated at page 315: "While mere presence or negative acquiescence is not sufficient to make a person a principal to a crime, one may aid and abet without actively participating in the offense; circumstances may show that there was a common design to commit an offense and if this is so one may be guilty of the offense without actively assisting in its commission.

Defendant might well be barred from raising the issue of "probable cause" on appeal since he failed to include it in his written pre-trial motion and never directed arguments thereto when the court was preparing to rule on the motion. See People v. Nilsson, 44 Ill.2d 244, 246, 247, 255 N.E.2d 432; People v. Harris, 105 Ill. App.2d 305, 312, 313, 245 N.E.2d 80. Nevertheless we shall consider the legality of defendant's arrest without a warrant.