Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County No. FVI026223. John M. Tomberlin, Judge.
Neil Auwarter, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RICHLI J.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant repeatedly assaulted a gas station attendant with his fists after spewing profanities at her. The victim suffered facial cuts and chipped and loosened teeth.
Following the preliminary hearing, defendant was charged by information with assault likely to cause great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)), with an enhancement allegation of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7). The information also alleged that defendant had suffered two prior strike convictions (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The information was later amended to add a second count of battery with serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)).
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
Subsequently, prior to trial, defendant, represented by counsel, pled guilty to both substantive counts and admitted the great bodily injury enhancement. Defendant also admitted that he had sustained one prior strike conviction and admitted all three prior prison term allegations. In return, the second prior strike allegation was dismissed, and defendant was promised a stipulated prison term of 16 years in state prison. Additionally, defendant expressly waived any claim that consecutive sentences for the assault and battery offenses violated section 654. Defendant then agreed to immediate sentencing and was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement as follows: the middle term of eight years for the assault, plus an additional three years for the great bodily injury enhancement; a consecutive two-year term for the battery; and three 1-year terms for each of the three prior prison term enhancements.
Defendant appealed, failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause, and upon his request, this court appointed counsel to represent him. Counsel has filed a brief under the authority of People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 [87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493] setting forth a statement of the case, a summary of the facts, and potential arguable issues and requesting this court to undertake a review of the entire record.
We offered defendant an opportunity to file a personal supplemental brief, and he has done so. In his supplemental brief, defendant makes numerous general arguments related to the representation he received during the entire proceedings. He asserts (1) his counsel was ineffective during the preliminary hearing when counsel allowed the prosecution to use the surveillance videotape; (2) his counsel was ineffective during arraignment when counsel failed to investigate the three-strikes allegations; (3) his counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the charges against him; (4) he pled guilty due to pressure and duress from his trial counsel; and (5) his trial counsel was generally incompetent.
II
ANALYSIS
“Other than search and seizure issues specifically reviewable under section 1538.5, subdivision (m), all errors arising prior to entry of plea of guilty or nolo contendere are waived by the plea, except those based on ‘reasonable constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds going to the legality of the proceedings . . . .’” (People v. Shults (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 714, 718-719, and cases cited therein; see also § 1237.5, subd. (a).) Issues relating to a defendant’s guilt or to the procedure in establishing guilt are not cognizable on appeal following a change of plea. (People v. DeVaughn (1977) 18 Cal.3d 889, 896; People v. Wakefield (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 67, 69-71.) The reason for the rule is that a guilty (or nolo contendere) plea “admits all matters essential to the conviction.” (DeVaughn, at p. 895; see also People v. LaJocies (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 947, 956, and cases cited therein; § 1016.) “Obtaining a certificate of probable cause does not make cognizable those issues which have been waived by a plea of guilty.” (People v. Kaanehe (1977) 19 Cal.3d 1, 9.) Defendant here pled guilty to the charges on the eve of trial, and therefore waived any claims to matters occurring prior to the entry of plea of guilty.
Moreover, defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal “from any motion [he] may have brought or could [have brought] and from the conviction and judgment” and his failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause foreclose his contentions. (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 85-86; People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1100.) It is well settled that “a challenge to a negotiated sentence imposed as part of a plea bargain is properly viewed as a challenge to the validity of the plea itself.” (Panizzon, at p. 79.) A defendant, therefore, is required to obtain a certificate of probable cause to attack a negotiated sentence on appeal. (Ibid.)
In addition, we reject defendant’s claim that he pled guilty merely because of pressure or duress by his trial counsel. A defendant’s “assertion he would not have pled guilty if given competent advice ‘must be corroborated independently by objective evidence.’” (In re Resendiz (2001) 25 Cal.4th 230, 253.) Here, defendant has failed to corroborate his bare assertion with independent, objective evidence demonstrating a likelihood that he would have insisted on going to trial. The record is clear that defendant pled guilty to avoid a possible sentence of 25 years to life.
We have now concluded our independent review of the record and find no arguable issues.
III
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: McKINSTER Acting P.J., GAUT J.