Such evidence, however, may be admitted if it is relevant for any other purpose, such as to establish motive, intent, identity, the existence of a common plan or design, or modus operandi. People v. Hansen, 313 Ill. App. 3d 491, 500 (2000). In order to be introduced, the other-crimes evidence must have some threshold similarity to the crime charged.

As pointed out, Nautica apparel is readily available, common and sold throughout the city and, therefore, is not distinct or unusual. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing other crimes evidence to establish modus operandi where the purported similarities between the cases are not so distinctive when considered together as to earmark the alleged offenses as the handiwork of defendant. Cf. People v. Hansen, 313 Ill. App. 3d 491, 729 N.E.2d 934 (2000). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this matter for a new trial.

Thus, according to defendant, he presented no theory on intent at all. Defendant compares this case on the facts to People v. Illgen , 145 Ill.2d 353, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515 (1991), where the admission of other-acts evidence was upheld, and to People v. Hansen , 313 Ill.App.3d 491, 246 Ill.Dec. 283, 729 N.E.2d 934 (2000), People v. Bobo , 278 Ill.App.3d 130, 214 Ill.Dec. 1057, 662 N.E.2d 623 (1996), and People v. Gibbs , 226 Ill.App.3d 1068, 169 Ill.Dec. 60, 590 N.E.2d 979 (1992), where the admission of other-acts evidence was reversed. Defendant claims that this case is closer factually to Hansen , Bobo , and Gibbs than to Illgen .

Such evidence may be admissible, however, when it is relevant to show motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake or accident, modus operandi, or the existence of a common plan or design. People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 135-36, 824 N.E.2d 191, 196 (2005); People v. Hansen, 313 Ill. App. 3d 491, 500, 729 N.E.2d 934, 942 (2000). Indeed, other-crimes evidence is admissible to prove any material fact other than propensity that is relevant to the case.

Such evidence may be admissible, however, when it is relevant to show motive, intent, identity, absence of mistake or accident, modus operandi, or the existence of a common plan or design. People v. Wilson, 214 Ill. 2d 127, 135-36, 824 N.E.2d 191, 196 (2005); People v. Hansen, 313 Ill. App. 3d 491, 500, 729 N.E.2d 934, 942 (2000). Indeed, other-crimes evidence is admissible to prove any material fact other than propensity that is relevant to the case.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Hansen, 313 Ill. App. 3d 491, 506 (2000). ¶ 36 Where common features may be insufficient to raise the inference of modus operandi on an individual basis, the combination of such features may indicate a distinctive combination so as to suggest the work of the same individual. Colin, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 127.

In that appeal, this court found that certain evidence had been improperly admitted at trial and, as a consequence, reversed the defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial. People v. Hansen, 313 Ill.App.3d 491, 246 Ill.Dec. 283, 729 N.E.2d 934 (2000). In light of our remand for a new trial, the defendant's appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition was rendered moot.

On direct appeal, this Court, finding that certain evidence had been improperly admitted at trial, reversed the defendant's convictions and remanded the case to the circuit court for a new trial. People v. Hansen, 313 Ill. App.3d 491, 729 N.E.2d 934 (2000). On remand, the trial judge denied the State's motions in limine to admit certain evidence.

(Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Harris, 36 Wash. App. 746, 751, 677 P.2d 202 (1984); see also People v. Hansen, 313 Ill. App. 3d 491, 505, 729 N.E.2d 934 (2000) ("In determining whether multiple crimes have been committed as part of a common design, scheme, or plan, we find it far more sensible to focus on the defendant's state of mind or purpose in committing the offenses than on the factual similarities of the offenses. Our conclusion in this regard is supported by the fact that similarities between crimes is the focus for determining the admissibility of other-crimes evidence to establish the existence of modus operandi.

We also note that more than one half of the jurisdictions in the country similarly have rejected a heightened standard of proof for the admission of such evidence. See Akin v. State, 698 So. 2d 228, 235 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996); Ayagarak v. State, 2003 Alaska App. Lexis 73, *12-13 (April 23, 2003); State v. Gano, 92 Haw. 161, 172, 988 P.2d 1153 (1999); State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 515, 927 P.2d 897 (1996); People v. Hansen, 313 Ill. App. 3d 491, 500, 729 N.E.2d 934 (2000); Clemens v. State, 610 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. 1993); State v. Jones, 464 N.W.2d 241, 243 (Iowa 1990); Daniel v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Ky. 1995); State v. Dean, 589 A.2d 929, 933 (Me. 1991); Commonwealth v. Wotan, 37 Mass. App. 727, 732-33, 643 N.E.2d 62 (1994), rev'd on other grounds, 422 Mass. 740, 665 N.E.2d 976 (1996); People v. Miller, 198 Mich. App. 494, 496, 499 N. W.2d 373 (1993); Lester v. State, 692 So. 2d 755, 779 (Miss. 1997); State v. Bickham, 917 S.W.2d 197, 198-99 (Mo.App. 1996); State v. Paulson, 250 Mont. 32, 38, 817 P.2d 1137 (1991); State v. Dukette, 145 N.H. 226, 229, 761 A.2d 442 (2000); State v. Delgado, 112 N.M. 335, 340, 815 P.2d 631 (1991); State v. Haskins, 104 N.C. App. 675, 679-80, 411 S.E.2d 376 (1991); State v. Knight, 131 Ohio App. 3d 349, 352, 722 N.E.2d 568 (1998); State v. Hayward, 327 Or. 397, 408-409, 963 P.2d 667 (1998); Commonwealth v. Odum, 401 Pa. Super. 8, 13, 584 A.2d 953 (1990); State v. Wright, 593 N.W.2d 792, 798 (S.D. 1999); State