Opinion
C083781
05-07-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SEAN MICHAEL HANSEN, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16F402)
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, defendant Sean Michael Hansen pled no contest to carrying a concealed firearm upon his person and misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance: methamphetamine. He also admitted he had a prior concealed weapon conviction. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for three years with various terms and conditions, including the condition he serve 120 days in county jail.
On appeal, defendant's sole contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts are taken from the suppression hearing. Additional background information relevant to the motion to suppress is discussed post.
Around 6:20 a.m. on January 17, 2016, Deputy Jesse Gunsauls and Deputy Houston of the Shasta County Sheriff's Department were dispatched to a suspected burglary in progress in the area of Lupine Drive and Airport Road in Shasta County. Dispatch advised Deputy Gunsauls that the suspected burglar had been inside a fenced-in area behind a business.
The record does not disclose Deputy Houston's first name.
When Deputy Gunsauls arrived at the scene, he spoke with the reporting party -- the property owner. The reporting party explained that he had seen a person in dark clothing, with a dog, inside the cabs and utility beds of several trucks. The reporting party did not know if any items had been stolen but said it was possible the person had taken some hand tools from the trucks. The reporting party stated that the person ran away from the area with the dog toward Lupine Drive.
Shortly after speaking with the reporting party, Deputy Gunsauls saw a Suburban driving toward him on Lupine Drive. As the Suburban slowly approached his location, both he and Deputy Houston asked the driver, later identified as defendant, if they could speak with him. In response, defendant stopped his vehicle and asked the deputies what was going on. Deputy Gunsauls approached the driver's side window and had a discussion with defendant. When Deputy Gunsauls asked defendant whether he had been behind the business, defendant indicated he had not.
While speaking with defendant, Deputy Gunsauls noticed that the female passenger, later identified as Trinity Martin, had wet hair and wet clothes. He also noticed that there was a wet dog in the backseat. Because it had been raining that morning, Deputy Gunsauls concluded that Martin and the dog had been "exposed to the elements." When asked, Martin admitted she had been behind the business earlier that day. She explained that she had "cut through" the fenced-in area behind the business on her way to Lupine Drive.
At this point, Deputy Gunsauls believed that Martin was involved in the suspected burglary. He explained that his belief was based on the information he learned from the reporting party, including that the suspect ran away from the area with a dog toward Lupine Drive. His belief was also based on the close proximity in time from when the suspected burglary occurred to when he made contact with defendant and Martin on Lupine Drive.
After defendant declined Deputy Gunsauls's request for permission to search the Suburban for stolen property, Deputy Gunsauls asked defendant to step out of the vehicle so it could be searched. As defendant was doing so, Deputy Houston noticed that he had a fixed-blade knife sticking out of his rear pants pocket. After Deputy Houston relayed this information to Deputy Gunsauls, Deputy Gunsauls retrieved the knife and detained defendant in handcuffs for carrying a concealed dirk or dagger.
A search of the Suburban did not reveal anything connected to the suspected burglary. Following the search, defendant was advised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, Deputy Gunsauls told him that he was going to be booked into jail, and that it was a felony to possess contraband at the jail. In response, defendant admitted he had an "eight-ball" in his jacket pocket. Deputy Gunsauls retrieved the "eight-ball" (which he understood to mean methamphetamine) and then asked defendant if he had any other contraband. After defendant admitted he had a gun in his boot, Deputy Gunsauls retrieved a loaded .22-caliber revolver from defendant's boot.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 .
Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed firearm upon his person, carrying a concealed dirk or dagger, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), and driving on a suspended license. As to the concealed firearm charge, it was alleged that the firearm and unexpended ammunition were in the immediate possession of, and readily accessible to, defendant and the firearm was not registered to defendant. As to the suspended license charge, it was alleged that defendant had been convicted of driving under the influence within the last seven years.
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, an amended information was filed, adding a prior conviction allegation as to the concealed firearm charge. The amended information alleged that defendant had been convicted of a crime against a person or property, or of a narcotics or dangerous drug violation.
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, defendant pled no contest to carrying a concealed firearm and possession of a controlled substance. At sentencing, the trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed him on probation for three years with various terms and conditions, including the condition he serve 120 days in county jail.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. His request for a certificate of probable cause was granted.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. He concedes the initial encounter with the deputies was consensual but argues that Deputy Gunsauls did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him or probable cause to search his vehicle. We conclude the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress.
Prior to entering into a written plea agreement, defendant filed a motion to suppress. He argued that the evidence obtained and the statements he made following his initial contact with the deputies must be suppressed because the evidence and statements were the tainted product of an unlawful detention and warrantless search.
The prosecution filed a written opposition, arguing that the deputies' initial contact with defendant was not a detention but rather a lawful consensual contact, and that the subsequent detention of defendant -- asking him to step out of the Suburban -- was permissible because Deputy Gunsauls had reasonable suspicion to believe he was involved in a crime. The prosecutor further argued that the arrest of defendant was permissible because there was probable cause to believe he had committed a crime, as he had a fixed-blade knife in his pocket. The prosecutor also argued that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement justified the search of defendant's Suburban because there was probable cause to believe it contained contraband based on the information known to Deputy Gunsauls at the time of the search.
Following the testimony at the suppression hearing, defense counsel conceded that defendant's initial contact with the deputies was consensual but argued, among other things, that the detention of defendant (asking him to get out of the Suburban) and subsequent search of the Suburban were unlawful because Deputy Gunsauls did not have probable cause to believe the Suburban contained evidence of criminal activity. The prosecutor disagreed, arguing that there was sufficient probable cause to detain defendant and search the Suburban.
The trial court denied defendant's motion, concluding that defendant's initial contact with the deputies was consensual, and that the detention of defendant and search of the Suburban were lawful because Martin admitted to being with a dog in the area where the suspected burglary occurred and defendant and Martin were found in the area of the suspected burglary shortly after it was reported. The court also concluded that the search of defendant's person to recover the knife and defendant's arrest were lawful, and that the subsequent searches of defendant's person to recover the methamphetamine and gun were lawful.
" 'Our review of issues related to the suppression of evidence seized by the police is governed by federal constitutional standards.' [Citations.] 'In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court's factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' " (Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1223.)
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement personnel. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; People v. Diaz (2011) 51 Cal.4th 84, 90, overruled on another ground in Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. ___ [189 L.Ed.2d 430, 451-452].) Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable, " 'subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' " (Diaz, at p. 90.)
" '[T]he Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits the warrantless search of an automobile with probable cause.' [Citation.] Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, '[w]hen the police have probable cause to believe an automobile contains contraband or evidence they may search the automobile and the containers within it without a warrant. [Citation.]' [Citations.]" (People v. Waxler (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 712, 718.) Probable cause to search exists "where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a [person] of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found." (Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696 [134 L.Ed.2d 911, 918].) Said another way, "[p]robable cause for a search exists where an officer is aware of facts that would lead a [person] of ordinary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously to entertain, a strong suspicion that the object of the search is in the particular place to be searched." (People v. Dumas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 871, 885.) We apply the totality of the circumstances test to determine whether there was probable cause for the warrantless search. (Illinois v. Gates (1983) 462 U.S. 213, 230-231, 238 [76 L.Ed.2d 527, 543-544, 548].)
We conclude the magistrate properly denied defendant's motion to suppress. The automobile exception applies here and justified the warrantless search of the Suburban. Under the totality of the circumstances, Deputy Gunsauls had probable cause to believe the Suburban contained stolen items. Upon his arrival at the location of the suspected burglary, the reporting party told Deputy Gunsauls that he had seen a person with a dog inside the cabs and utility beds of several trucks in the fenced-in area behind his business. The reporting party also told Deputy Gunsauls that the person ran off with the dog toward Lupine Drive. Shortly after Deputy Gunsauls spoke with the reporting party, he saw defendant's Suburban driving toward him on Lupine Drive. After defendant stopped the Suburban, Deputy Gunsauls noticed that the female passenger (Martin) and the dog in the backseat were both wet, which indicated to him that they had recently been outside, as it had been raining that morning. When asked, Martin admitted she had been inside the fenced-in area where the suspected burglary occurred earlier that day. On this record, the Fourth Amendment was not violated. In view of our conclusion, defendant's fruit of the poisonous tree argument fails.
Our conclusion that the search of the Suburban was justified under the automobile exception obviates the need for us to address defendant's contention that Deputy Gunsauls did not have reasonable suspicion to detain him by ordering him to step out of the Suburban. --------
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Robie, J. We concur: /s/_________
Raye, P. J. /s/_________
Duarte, J.