Opinion
NO. 5-12-0100
06-05-2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTINE HANELINE, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE
Decision filed 06/05/13. The text of this decision may be changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for Rehearing or the disposition of the same.
NOTICE
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Massac County.
No. 00-CF-99
Honorable
Joseph M. Leberman,
Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE WELCH delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Chapman and Wexstten concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court's order denying the defendant's petition for postconviction relief is affirmed where the circuit court's order dismissing the defendant's first-stage postconviction petition was timely and where the petition was not supported by proper documentation and failed to state the gist of a constitutional claim. ¶ 2 The defendant, Christine Haneline, appeals from the trial court's order denying her petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 to 122-7 (West 2010)). She asserts that her cause should be remanded for second-stage proceedings, as the trial court failed to enter a dismissal order within 90 days of the notice of the recharacterization of her petition, rendering the dismissal order void. The defendant also asserts that the trial court erroneously dismissed her petition at the first stage, as it presented the gist of a constitutional claim. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the trial court. ¶ 3 On September 15, 2000, the defendant was arrested and charged with aggravated battery of a child based on her actions against her son, Tylen Haneline. On September 22, 2000, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder after Tylen died. The defendant's boyfriend, Terry Vaughn, was also charged with first-degree murder for his participation in the battery. ¶ 4 The defendant's counsel filed a motion for fitness examination on February 1, 2001, stating that the defendant had low intellectual functioning and had expressed an inability to concentrate, remember, or understand information regarding the case. The defendant was found unfit for trial and was committed to the Department of Human Services on September 4, 2001. On November 29, 2001, the Alton Mental Health Center noted that the defendant was considered to be restored to fitness. At a hearing on December 10, 2001, the court found the defendant fit for trial. ¶ 5 On March 7, 2002, the State filed supplemental information charging the defendant with an additional count of murder under an accountability theory. At the hearing that day, the State noted that the defendant had agreed to a plea of guilty to this charge and that the State would move to dismiss the other charges pending against her and would not recommend a period of incarceration in excess of 42 years. The court inquired about the defendant's medication, her ability to communicate, and her understanding of a jury trial. The court then explained the ramifications of the choice to plead guilty, and the defendant indicated that she understood her decision and that she entered the guilty plea freely and voluntarily. The State then presented the factual basis for the charge, including the statement by the defendant's daughter that the defendant had participated in the abuse by punching Tylen in the mouth. When asked for her response to the factual basis set out by the prosecution, the defendant disputed its veracity, stating that she was there when Tylen was battered by Vaughn, but did not participate in the abuse. The court asked if she understood that she had a duty to intervene in Vaughn's beating of Tylen, and the defendant responded that she did, but that at the time, she had been scared and did not know what to do. She stated that she did not assist Vaughn in beating Tylen, but that she did not make any effort to stop him. The court then took a recess to speak to counsel. Upon resuming the hearing, the defendant indicated that she had spoken with her counsel and that she still wished to proceed with her plea of guilty. The defendant confirmed that she understood that she should have done something to try to protect Tylen or stop Vaughn. The court accepted the signed plea of guilty and waiver of a jury. At a hearing held on April 29, 2002, the defendant was sentenced to 28 years' imprisonment with a 3-year period of mandatory supervised release and credit for time served in presentence custody. ¶ 6 The defendant did not file a direct appeal. On July 27, 2009, the defendant filed a pro se "motion to attack the validity of judgement" [sic](hereinafter "July 27, 2009, petition"). The defendant alleged that she did not knowingly and voluntarily enter her plea, arguing that she (1) had received ineffective assistance of counsel, as her attorney coerced her into her guilty plea by threatening her with a sentence of life imprisonment if she did not so plead, knowing of her limited intellectual functioning, (2) was denied due process, as the trial court should not have accepted her guilty plea when she remained unfit for trial due to her limited mental capacity, and (3) was not accountable at law for Tylen's death, as she lacked the requisite criminal intent. On July 28, 2009, the trial court denied the motion, finding that it was untimely and that it did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court improperly recharacterized her motion as a petition for postconviction relief under the Act without providing her with the proper admonishments, and that the petition did state the gist of a constitutional claim. The State filed a confession of error. On June 28, 2011, this court reversed and remanded the trial court's summary dismissal of the petition, with directions to provide the proper admonishments, but declined to address whether the defendant's petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim. People v. Haneline, No. 5-09-0412 (2011) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). ¶ 7 On remand, the circuit court entered an order on September 29, 2011, stating that it intended to recharacterize the defendant's July 27, 2009, petition as a postconviction petition under the Act, that the defendant was advised that this recharacterization means that any subsequent postconviction petition would be subject to the restrictions on postconviction petitions as stated in the Act, and that the defendant was advised that she had 45 days from the entry of that order to withdraw the motion, amend the motion, or proceed on the motion as filed. The court then stated that "the defendant is advised and admonished that if no response by the Defendant is received by the Circuit Court within the 45-day time period, the Circuit Court will proceed on the motion as filed." ¶ 8 On February 2, 2012, the defendant filed a document entitled "Pro Se Post Conviction Petition" (hereinafter "February 2, 2012, petition"), alleging that she (1) had received ineffective assistance of counsel where her attorney encouraged her to plead guilty, despite knowing of her history of trial unfitness, low intelligence, and refusal to admit to the State's factual basis, and (2) was denied due process and equal protection where the trial court accepted her guilty plea despite knowing of her history of trial unfitness, low intelligence, and refusal to admit to the State's factual basis. ¶ 9 On February 14, 2012, the trial court entered a written order stating that it had considered the February 2, 2012, petition to be a modification of the defendant's July 27, 2009, motion; thus, it considered the July 27, 2009, motion to be withdrawn and would proceed only on the February 2, 2012, petition. ¶ 10 On the merits, the trial court found that the defendant's allegations did not present the gist of a constitutional violation. As to the defendant's refusal to admit facts presented by the State, the court noted that even if taken as true, this was not ineffective assistance of counsel by the defendant's attorney because the defendant did not present facts indicating that her attorney's representation fell below the necessary standard or was otherwise ineffective in the representation. The court also noted that even if taken as true, the defendant's refusal to admit facts was not a due process or equal protection violation because she did not present facts indicating the trial court violated her due process rights or in some way treated the defendant differently than others. As to the defendant's allegations that her attorney and the trial judge were aware of her history of unfitness and lowered intellectual functioning, the trial court noted that this was true, as those issues were required to be considered at the fitness hearing. However, the court stated that the defendant had been found fit to stand trial after a full and fair hearing and that the defendant did not allege that she was unfit to stand trial at the time of her plea or of her sentencing, and it noted that "[i]f defendant's allegation that mere knowledge of a defendant's history of unfitness and/or lowered intellectual functioning gave rise to a constitutional violation, then no plea or judgment could stand once a defendant had [been] previously found to be unfit, regardless of the defendant later being found fit to stand trial." As to the defendant's allegation that her attorney "encouraged" her to plead guilty and agree to a sentencing cap, the court noted that even if true, the defendant did not allege force, threats, coercion, or that her will was overborne, and that it is normal and customary for an attorney to make recommendations to a client. The trial court concluded that the defendant's allegations were patently without merit and dismissed the petition. The defendant appeals. ¶ 11 First, the defendant asserts that her July 27, 2009, petition was fully recharacterized as a postconviction petition by way of the trial court's September 29, 2011, order, and therefore the trial court failed to enter its February 14, 2012, dismissal order within 90 days of the notice of the recharacterization of her petition. For this reason, the defendant argues that the order dismissing her petition is untimely and therefore void. The State responds that the 90-day time period began on November 12, 2011, the date on which the trial judge's 45-day amendment-or-withdrawal time period expired, and that it was renewed when the defendant filed her February 2, 2012, petition. Under the facts of this case, we agree with the State. ¶ 12 The Act sets forth a procedural mechanism through which a defendant can claim that "in the proceedings which resulted in his or her conviction there was a substantial denial of his or her rights under the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Illinois or both." 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2010). At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the circuit court must examine the petition within 90 days of filing and docketing and determine whether it is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2010); People v. Swamynathan, 236 Ill. 2d 103, 113 (2010). If the petition is not dismissed pursuant to this section, the court shall order the petition to be docketed for further consideration. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2010). We review de novo the trial court's summary dismissal of a defendant's postconviction petition. People v. Townsend, 333 Ill. App. 3d 375, 376 (2002). ¶ 13 If a trial court determines that the recharacterization of a pro se pleading as a postconviction petition is appropriate, the court must take certain steps to ensure that the defendant is admonished of the consequences. See People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45, 57 (2005). The court is required to "(1) notify the pro se litigant that the court intends to recharacterize the pleading, (2) warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent postconviction petition will be subject to the restrictions on successive postconviction petitions, and (3) provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the pleading or to amend it so that it contains all the claims appropriate to a postconviction petition that the litigant believes he or she has." Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 57; People v. Pearson, 216 Ill. 2d 58, 68 (2005); Swamynathan, 236 Ill. 2d at 112. However, "the Act's 90-day rule could not apply to a recharacterized petition until the defendant [is] fully admonished under Shellstrom and recharacterization [is] fully completed." (Emphasis added.) Swamynathan, 236 Ill. 2d at 113. ¶ 14 In Swamynathan, the defendant filed an untimely motion to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his sentence. Id. at 107-08. Over the course of several hearings, the trial court indicated to the defendant that it intended to recharacterize his motion as a postconviction petition, but the defendant did not receive the Shellstrom admonishments until a hearing that was held several months later. Id. at 108-10. When the defendant asserted that the trial court had failed to dismiss his petition within the 90-day time frame, our supreme court held that a pleading does not become a postconviction petition until a defendant is fully admonished under Shellstrom and recharacterization is fully completed; therefore, it would follow, then, "that the provisions of the Act cannot apply to pleadings that are not postconviction petitions until those pleadings are properly recharacterized as such." Id. at 115. The court noted that examination of a recharacterized petition prior to full Shellstrom admonishments would be futile, as it would require the review of claims that are likely to be altered. Id. at 115. The court found that the recharacterization was fully completed on the day the defendant received his full Shellstrom admonishments, and thus agreed that the trial court's summary dismissal was properly executed within the 90-day period. Id. at 113, 117. ¶ 15 We think the supreme court's rationale in Swamynathan extends to the facts of this case. Here, there is no question that the trial court's September 29, 2011, order fully admonished the defendant under Shellstrom. However, the trial court explicitly stated that "if no response by the Defendant is received by the Circuit Court within the 45-day time period, the Circuit Court will proceed on the motion as filed." Though in Swamynathan, the reason that the defendant's recharacterization was not "fully completed" was because he had not received the complete Shellstrom admonishments, Swamynathan's reasoning implied that a "fully completed" recharacterization is not necessarily synonymous with "receiving full Shellstrom admonishments." Also indicative of this conclusion is the court's observation that reviewing a petition without the inclusion of potential amendments would be futile; it would also be a waste of judicial time and resources. Applying this reasoning to the facts before us, we find that the trial court's mandatory 90-day dismissal period began not on September 29, 2011, the day that the defendant received her full Shellstrom admonishments, but rather 45 days later, on November 13, 2011, the day on which the court could be satisfied that recharacterization was "fully completed" and the defendant wished to proceed on her petition as filed. ¶ 16 This brings us to the expiration of the 90-day time period, which occurred on February 11, 2012. Though it would initially appear that the trial court's February 14, 2012, dismissal occurred outside the mandatory time frame, the defendant filed her February 2, 2012, petition, which the trial court interpreted as an amendment to her original petition. When a defendant files an amended postconviction petition, the 90-day period in which the court must examine the defendant's petition and enter an order is calculated from the filing of the amended petition. People v. Watson, 187 Ill. 2d 448, 451 (1999). The trial court's consideration of the defendant's February 2, 2012, petition as an amended postconviction petition and it accepting it as such was a reasonable and perfectly appropriate response, as a court, in its discretion, may allow for a withdrawal of the petition and for any amendments "as shall be appropriate, just and reasonable." 725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2010); People v. Watson, 187 Ill. 2d 448, 451, 453 (1999). ¶ 17 In summary, we find that recharacterization of the defendant's July 27, 2011, petition was fully completed pursuant to Swamynathan on November 13, 2011; the defendant's February 2, 2012, petition was properly interpreted as an amendment to her recharacterized petition; and the February 2, 2012, petition renewed the 90-day dismissal time period pursuant to Watson. Thus, we conclude that the trial court's February 14, 2012, order dismissing the defendant's postconviction petition was timely. ¶ 18 Turning to the merits of the petition, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in dismissing her petition at the first stage because her guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made due to her mental illness and mental limitations, specifically, her history of trial unfitness, low intelligence, and refusal to admit to the State's factual basis. The defendant argues that her petition's allegations have a basis in law and fact and thus state the gist of a constitutional claim. After review of the record, we disagree. ¶ 19 First, we note that the allegations in the defendant's postconviction petition must be supported by affidavits, records, or other evidence, or must contain an explanation as to why they are not attached. 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2010); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 380 (1998). The failure to attach the necessary affidavits, records, or other evidence or explain their absence is fatal to a postconviction petition and by itself justifies the petition's summary dismissal. People v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 66 (2002). A petition not supported by affidavits or other supporting documents is generally dismissed without an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations stand uncontradicted and are clearly supported by the record. People v. Waldrop, 353 Ill. App. 3d 244, 249 (2004). ¶ 20 In the instant case, the defendant attached no documentation to her petition. Thus, her petition can survive only if her allegations are uncontradicted and clearly supported by the record. Our review of the record reveals no support for the defendant's claims. As to the defendant's mental illness, the fact that a defendant may have had a prior history of mental illness does not make him incompetent to enter a guilty plea. People v. Daubman, 190 Ill. App. 3d 684, 694 (1989). The defendant was found fit to stand trial after a full and fair hearing, and further, she did not allege that she was unfit to stand trial at the time of her plea or sentencing. As to the defendant's low intelligence, the record again contradicts the defendant's allegation that she did not understand to what she was pleading guilty. At the plea hearing, the trial court inquired as to the defendant's understanding of the charges to which she was pleading and carefully explained the ramifications of the choice to plead guilty. The defendant agreed that she understood the trial court's explanation and her decision, and that she entered it freely and voluntarily. As to the defendant's claim that she did not knowingly plead guilty because she refused to admit to the State's factual basis, we again note that the trial court carefully explained to the defendant the theory of accountability and gave the defendant time to consult with her attorney when she contested the State's factual basis. The defendant confirmed that she was present during Tylen's beating and did nothing to stop it, and that she understood that pleading guilty to accountability meant that she was responsible for Vaughn's actions, regardless of her own inaction, and reaffirmed her desire to plead guilty to the charge under an accountability theory. In sum, the defendant's claims, which hinge on the voluntariness of her guilty plea, are contradicted and unsupported by the record. ¶ 21 Finally, we note that even if the proper documentation had been attached to the defendant's petition, we agree with the trial court that her allegations do not present the gist of a constitutional violation. We reiterate that at the first stage of postconviction proceedings, the circuit court must determine whether a postconviction petition is frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2010). A petition is considered frivolous or patently without merit where the allegations in the petition, taken as true and liberally construed, fail to present the "gist" of a constitutional claim. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244 (2001). A petition is considered frivolous or patently without merit if it "has no arguable basis either in law or in fact," meaning it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation." People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2009). A claim completely contradicted by the record is an example of an indisputably meritless legal theory. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 16. ¶ 22 As noted above, the defendant's claims are contradicted by the record and thus are patently without merit. We therefore agree with the trial court's conclusion in its February 14, 2012, order dismissing the defendant's petition. ¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. ¶ 24 Affirmed.