People v. Handy

9 Citing cases

  1. Andrews v. People

    800 P.2d 607 (Colo. 1990)   Cited 12 times

    In Colorado, the choice of evils defense has been upheld as an affirmative defense to prison escapes when the inmate faced a choice between escape and imminent death or homosexual rape. See Strock, 623 P.2d at 42; People v. Handy, 198 Colo. 556, 603 P.2d 941 (1979). We have narrowly construed the statute and have required that threats of murder or homosexual rape must be specific with imminent threats of injury to the inmate that provide no reasonable alternative under the circumstances but escape.

  2. People v. Speer

    255 P.3d 1115 (Colo. 2011)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that the federal Department of Homeland Security and Transportation Safety Administration were not public law enforcement agencies under the statute

    We have consistently construed our own statute, with its requirement that the threatened force exceed any objectively reasonable ability to resist, as making the defense of duress, like the closely related defense of necessity or choice of evils, unavailable in the absence of a specific and imminent threat of injury under circumstances leaving the defendant no reasonable alternative other than to violate the law for which he stands charged. See Bailey, 630 P.2d at 1068; People v. Handy, 198 Colo. 556, 559, 603 P.2d 941, 943 (1979); accord People v. Trujillo, 41 Colo.App. 223, 225, 586 P.2d 235, 237 (1978); Robertson, 36 Colo.App. at 369, 543 P.2d at 535; cf. People v. StrOCk, 623 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo. 1981) (choice of evils). And in a variety of settings, we have found it proper for courts to deny an instruction on one or the other of these related defenses based on the existence of undisputed evidence of reasonable legal alternatives.

  3. State v. Moore

    577 A.2d 348 (Me. 1990)   Cited 10 times

    In order to generate the defense there must be evidence that the defendant's conduct was necessary because of a specific and imminent threat of injury to the defendant or another leaving no reasonable alternative other than violating the law. Kee, 398 A.2d at 386; see also People v. Handy, 603 P.2d 941, 943 (Colo. 1979). 17-A M.R.S.A. § 103(1) (1983) provides in pertinent part as follows:

  4. People v. Dover

    790 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1990)   Cited 9 times

    Although there is no case law interpreting section 42-4-1001(8)(a), cases interpreting section 18-1-702(1) require a defendant, in order to raise the statutory choice of evils defense, to show a specific threat of injury and no reasonable alternative other than commission of the offense. People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42, 44 (Colo. 1981); People v. Handy, 198 Colo. 556, 559, 603 P.2d 941, 943 (1979). Because the language of the two statutes is nearly identical, we conclude that the General Assembly intended that defendants who assert the emergency justification defense provided by section 42-4-1001(8)(a) must present some credible evidence as to a specific threat of injury and no reasonable alternative other than violation of section 42-4-1001(1).

  5. State v. Tuttle

    730 P.2d 630 (Utah 1986)   Cited 11 times
    Recognizing that in 1973 our legislature "repealed wholesale all the prior substantive criminal statutes . . . and enacted a sweeping new penal code that departed sharply from the old common law concepts"

    These courts differed in the rationale given for their action. See Wells v. State, 687 P.2d 346, 349 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984) (legislative intent allowed courts to define common law specifics of statutory necessity defense); State v. Wolf, 142 Ariz. 245, 248, 689 P.2d 188, 191 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1984) (public policy considerations require more of duress defense than statute requires when applied to escape); People v. Handy, 198 Colo. 556, 559, 603 P.2d 941, 943 (1979) (additional element read into statutory duress defense as applied to escape); Johnson v. State, 379 A.2d 1129, 1132 (Del. 1977) (earlier unreported trial court case required evidence to meet Lovercamp test); State v. Horn, 58 Haw. 252, 253, 566 P.2d 1378, 1379 (1977) (relied on Lovercamp analysis); People v. Unger, 66 Ill.2d 333, 342, 5 Ill.Dec. 848, 362 N.E.2d 319, 323 (1977) ( Lovercamp elements are relevant factors for jury to consider); State v. Boleyn, 328 So.2d 95, 97 (La. 1976) (relied on Lovercamp analysis). With this background in mind, we consider the instant instruction.

  6. People v. McKnight

    626 P.2d 678 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 35 times
    In People v. McKnight, 200 Colo. 486, 626 P.2d 678 (1981), we contrasted the language of Crim. P. 16 I (a)(1)(I) with that of Crim. P. 16 I (a)(1)(II), which requires disclosure of "Any written or recorded statements and the substance of any oral statements made by the accused...."

    "[C]onduct which would otherwise constitute an offense is justifiable and not criminal when it is necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no conduct of the actor, and which is of sufficient gravity that, according to ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the desirability and urgency of avoiding the injury clearly outweigh the desirability of avoiding the injury sought to be prevented by the statute defining the offense in issue." The choice of evils defense may be available to justify a prison escape if the facts of the case, as a matter of law, satisfy the conditions stated in section 18-1-702, C.R.S. 1973. See, e.g., People v. Handy, 198 Colo. 556, 603 P.2d 941 (1979), and cases cited therein. See also People v. Strock, 623 P.2d 42 (Colo.

  7. People v. Strock

    623 P.2d 42 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 11 times

    We now reverse the court of appeals and remand to the court of appeals with directions to affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed in the district court. The defendant's trial in the district court of Fremont County and his appeal to the court of appeals were completed prior to the time that our decision in People v. Handy, 198 Colo. 556, 603 P.2d 941 (1979) was announced. A simple answer to the defendant's claim that he was denied the right to a choice of evils defense would be to declare that he did not comply with the surrender requirements of People v. Handy, supra.

  8. People v. Brante

    232 P.3d 204 (Colo. App. 2009)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that voluntary absence by pro se defendant who refused to participate and left courtroom did not result in Sixth Amendment violation; trial court not required to force standby counsel to present a defense in his absence

    Brante's speculative fears that the departure of Shannon and her sons was imminent, that they might be harmed in Egypt, or that he would be unable to find them after they departed, do not rise to the level of an impending injury demanding immediate action. See People v. Handy, 198 Colo. 556, 559, 603 P.2d 941, 943 (1979) ("The threats must be shown to be definite, specific, and imminent; mere speculation is not enough."); Brandyberry, 812 P.2d at 679 ("Evidence of a generalized fear of future injury is not sufficient to warrant the invocation of a choice of evils defense."). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on the choice of evils defense.

  9. People v. Brandyberry

    812 P.2d 674 (Colo. App. 1990)   Cited 15 times
    Disapproving choice-of-evils instruction where defendants failed to seek assistance of law enforcement officials after abducting victim from cult

    See U.S. v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980); People v. Hocquard, 64 Mich. App. 331, 236 N.W.2d 72 (1975). In addition, a defendant who seeks to assert a choice of evils defense must offer evidence that his conduct did not exceed that reasonably necessary to avoid the impending injury. See People v. Handy, 198 Colo. 556, 603 P.2d 941 (1979). Here, even if we were to assume that defendants rationally perceived that the victim's membership in the church posed a threat of an imminent injury to her, they failed to show that the remedy they elected to pursue (knowing violation of criminal laws) was the least harmful option available to them for avoiding the threatened injury.