Opinion
D073197
11-20-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MAUTIEF RYLAND HAMLETT, Defendant and Appellant.
Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. SCD268505) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Sharon B. Majors-Lewis and Margie G. Woods, Judges. Conditionally reversed with instructions, and remanded. Ava R. Stralla, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Andrew Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
An information charged defendant Mautief Ryland Hamlett of possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1), count 1); carrying a concealed weapon in a vehicle (§ 25400, subd. (a)(1), count 2); possession of body armor by a felon (§ 31360, subd. (a), count 3); and unlawful possession of tear gas (§ 22900, count 4). The information further alleged defendant had served four prior prison terms (§§ 667.5, subd. (b) & 668) and had suffered three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 668, & 1170.12). As discussed post, counts 1, 2, and 4 involved a stop and search of defendant and his vehicle on August 18, 2016, whereas count 3 involved defendant's arrest and search of his person and vehicle on August 6, 2015.
Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Defendant filed three pretrial motions on June 20, 2017: a motion (i) to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 ; (ii) to compel discovery of communications regarding defendant among officers of the San Diego Police Department (SDPD) and between SDPD and other law enforcements agencies; and (iii) for discovery of police personnel files and records, based on Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess) and Evidence Code section 1043.
Defendant does not challenge on appeal the August 6, 2015 search, in which police recovered a "ballistic helmet" and a "ballistic groin protector" in the trunk of his vehicle in connection with count 3, possession of body armor by a felon. (§ 31360, subd. (a).)
The court on July 28, 2017, denied defendant's Pitchess motion on the basis it was overbroad, without reviewing the personnel records of the two officers involved in the August 18 stop and detention of defendant.
In response to defendant's discovery motion, the People requested the court conduct an in camera review to determine if certain information sought by defendant was protected from disclosure pursuant to section 1054.7 and Evidence Code section 1040 among other statutes. The court on July 31, 2017, conducted a closed hearing and ruled good cause existed not to disclose such information, and ordered the transcript of that hearing sealed.
The trial court on September 18, 2017, denied defendant's motion to suppress under section 1538.5. A few days later, defendant pleaded guilty to count 1 and admitted the prior conviction allegations. The court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison.
In response to defendant's request on appeal, we have independently reviewed the sealed transcript of the July 31 hearing concerning defendant's motion to compel discovery. As we discuss post, we conclude on this record that the court properly exercised its discretion when it found that under section 1054.7 "good cause" prevented disclosure of information sought by defendant pursuant to his discovery motion.
Defendant on appeal contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and his Pitchess motion. As we also discuss, although on this record we conclude the court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress, because we also conclude the court erred in denying defendant's Pitchess motion with respect to the two officers who made the initial stop of defendant on August 18, we conditionally reverse the judgment to allow the court on remand to conduct a new Pitchess hearing.
If the new Pitchess hearing results in discoverable information, the remedy should include reconsideration of defendant's suppression motion, which was heard after the court denied defendant's Pitchess and discovery motions. However, if no new information is discoverable after the Pitchess hearing, the court is directed to reinstate the judgment.
Nothing in this opinion prevents the trial court from also reconsidering defendant's discovery motion, including if it finds discoverable information in the officers' personnel records in connection with the new Pitchess hearing.
DISCUSSION
The factual overview of the case is principally derived from the testimony given at the suppression hearing.
I
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
A. Overview
Count 3
On or about August 6, 2015, Deputy Adam Groff of the United States Marshals Service was working as a member of the San Diego Regional Fugitive Task Force conducting investigations and attempting to apprehend persons wanted on felony arrest warrants. Deputy Groff testified that he was asked by another task-force officer to assist in locating defendant for a postrelease community supervision (PRCS) warrant violation, after defendant removed his GPS device without authorization and failed to report.
After determining the three-page felony arrest warrant issued on July 22, 2015, was valid, and knowing defendant was subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver, Deputy Groff and another deputy located a black-colored Jaguar registered to defendant. Along with about 10 to 12 other agents, Deputy Groff contacted defendant in a park, near some bathrooms. After his arrest, defendant's person and vehicle were searched, leading to the discovery of body armor in the truck of defendant's vehicle, as charged in count 3.
Counts 1, 2, and 4
San Diego Police Officer Kyle Williams and his partner Mathew Knutson were working for the gang suppression unit on August 18, 2016. Officer Williams testified that they were directed to make a traffic stop of defendant. Over objection, Officer Williams testified that he "believe[d]" that "A.T.F." (i.e., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives) requested the stop and detention of defendant and the search of his vehicle; that before the stop, SDPD had information regarding the general area where defendant and his vehicle could be located; that the area where defendant's vehicle was located was industrial, as it was near North Torrey Pines Road in San Diego; and that the officers also knew the type of vehicle defendant would be driving.
As they waited on a side street, as expected Officer Williams saw a black, four-door Jaguar drive past them a little after 7:00 p.m. Officer Knutson immediately pulled out and drove the marked patrol car behind defendant's vehicle. As they followed defendant, Officer Williams noticed a "tinted" cover over the rear license plate of defendant's vehicle. Officer Williams testified that this "plastic" cover made it "very difficult" to read the license plate number; that the cover violated (former) Vehicle Code section 5201; and that as a result, he activated their police cruiser's overhead lights and initiated a stop of the vehicle.
According to Officer Williams, as defendant's vehicle "started pulling over" Officer Williams was "actually able to read the license plate clearly to conduct the records check on the vehicle." Earlier in the suppression hearing, however, Officer Williams testified he was unable to read the vehicle's license plate number until the vehicle was actually stopped, as they then had a better "angle" to view the plate. When asked if officers had the license plate number of defendant's vehicle before they initiated the stop, Officer Williams testified, "I don't recall. I believe we might have. I'm not — I can't be 100 percent" certain. As it was stopping or once stopped, Officer Williams ran a check of the vehicle and determined its registration had expired in January 2016, in violation of Vehicle Code section 4000.
Officer Williams testified that San Diego Police Officer Matthew Ruggiero arrived after the stop of defendant's vehicle; that Officer Ruggiero also had been "assigned to this particular task of pulling [defendant] over"; that Officer Ruggiero conducted a records check of defendant and found he "was on probation for auto theft" with "a valid Fourth waiver condition with his probation"; that when asked during the hearing if he knew defendant had a valid Fourth Amendment waiver before they initiated the stop, Officer Williams stated, "I was told he was on probation" from San Bernardino County, adding "A.B. 109"; that Officer Williams did not personally run any information on defendant to determine if defendant had a valid Fourth Amendment waiver; and that at some point later in the detention, the three officers were joined by Sergeant Kelly Davis. Once defendant was handcuffed and placed in the patrol car, officers searched defendant's vehicle and found the items leading to the charges in counts 1, 2, and 4.
Assembly Bill No. 109 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) enacted realignment, which " 'significantly changed the sentencing and supervision of persons convicted of felony offenses.' " (People v. Torres (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1154, fn. 3.)
Defense Evidence
The record shows the court at the suppression hearing denied the defense's request to call as a witness defendant's supervising probation officer in August 2016, Sarah Grabowski from San Bernardino Probation. The defense's offer of proof with respect to this witness was its belief that she had communication with SDPD regarding defendant. The defense argued this inquiry would go to the credibility of the police officers who made the stop and who contacted San Bernardino Probation to report defendant's arrest.
The court found the inquiry regarding defendant's probation was irrelevant to the section 1538.5 motion, noting, "Well, why does it matter? Either they observed the traffic violation or they didn't. I assume you're not going to be presenting any evidence that the registration was not expired." The court then added, "And apparently that [i.e., the expired registration] was determined before the contact with the defendant and before the search, so really the probation as to the August 2016 date wouldn't have any relevance. So I don't see that this witness has any relevant information" regarding the August 18 search.
Defendant testified at the suppression hearing. He claimed that he pleaded guilty in 2014 to "stolen property or vehicle theft"; that he understood when he pled that, after serving time in state prison, he would be on parole, as opposed to being supervised on PRCS by probation; and that when he signed the supervision conditions, which included the Fourth Amendment waiver, he did so under duress because "if [he] didn't . . . sign it, then [he] was under the understanding that [he'd] go back to jail." It was for this reason defendant used the notation "DTC" when he signed the supervision conditions, which acronym he stated stood for "duress, threat and coercion."
Regarding the August 18 stop, defendant testified the cover on the rear license plate of his vehicle was "clear" and "barely" tinted; that the numbers on the plate were visible through the cover; that he "regularly" cleaned the license plate cover; that the August 18 stop was the first time he had ever been pulled over for such a violation; and that when he was pulled over, he did not believe he was on a valid Fourth Amendment waiver because he had signed the supervision conditions for PRCS under duress.
Hearing and Ruling
The record shows that, in connection with the August 18 stop and search, the defense at the suppression hearing argued it was "quite troubling" because the pictures taken by the officers of the cover over the rear license plate of defendant's vehicle showed the numbers were "clearly" visible; that the officers who conducted the stop and detention "basically just [came] up with a reason to pull [defendant] over"; and that, even if the court found defendant's Fourth Amendment waiver valid, the stop was "arbitrary," "capricious," and harassing. The defense further argued the police had already turned their lights on and initiated the stop before they determined the registration on defendant's vehicle was expired. As such, the defense argued the probable cause to make the stop was fabricated and unlawful.
The prosecutor argued that the August 18 stop of defendant was "objectively reasonable" based on (former) Vehicle Code section 5201, which required that a vehicle not have any kind of covering on the license plate with certain exceptions, none of which applied to defendant; that even if the license plate cover was not tinted or barely tinted, it was still a Vehicle Code violation; that Officer Williams was credible when he claimed he initially could not read the license number plate while their police cruiser was following behind defendant; and that when they finally could read the license number, they found the vehicle registration was expired, which was yet another reason to support the legality of the stop. The prosecutor also argued that, prior to stopping defendant, the officers "knew he was on probation, they knew he was a Fourth waiver or at least subject to conditions — search conditions as information related to him."
After hearing argument, the court ruled the issue of whether defendant signed the supervision conditions for PRCS under duress was "collateral" and thus irrelevant; that in defendant's case, his PRCS was an alternative to parole, not probation; that the "law has long been that all parolees are subject to search, and there's plenty of case law that discusses that, whereas there's some conflicting case law with regard to probationers"; and that defendant was subject to search based on his PRCS status, regardless of whether he agreed to a Fourth Amendment waiver under duress.
Focusing on the August 18 stop and search, the court ruled as follows: "I think it's an interesting question. I'm not sure that the People could get a conviction on the Vehicle Code violation. [¶] In a way, however, it's somewhat moot in the sense that shortly after they observed the plate, they ran the license and found it was expired, and clearly, that's a basis for detention. I don't think there can be any argument about that. Turning the lights on does not complete the detention. It's only when the defendant fully submits to that show of authority that the detention occurs. [¶] . . . So by the time the defendant was fully stopped, the police already knew that there was an indisputable violation of law, mainly, a registration violation." The court thus found the officers' stop of defendant's vehicle was "legitimate" and denied defendant's suppression motion.
B. Guiding Principles and Analysis
Under section 1538.5, subdivision (a), a defendant may move to suppress evidence gathered in violation of the state or federal Constitution. The California Constitution bars the exclusion of evidence obtained as a result of an unreasonable search or seizure unless this remedy is required by the federal Constitution. (People v. Camacho (2000) 23 Cal.4th 824, 830 [noting the "California Constitution ' "thus forbids the courts to order the exclusion of evidence at trial as a remedy for an unreasonable search and seizure unless that remedy is required by the federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court" ' "].) "The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures by police officers and other government officials. [Citation.] This constitutional proscription is enforced by an exclusionary rule, generally prohibiting admission at trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. [Citations.]" (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 75, overruled on another ground as stated in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 139.)
When reviewing a ruling on an unsuccessful motion to exclude evidence, we defer to the trial court's express and implied factual findings, upholding them if they are supported by substantial evidence, but we then independently review the court's determination that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 563.) In evaluating the legality of the search, we examine "the correctness or incorrectness of the trial court's ruling, not the reasons for its ruling. [Citations.]" (People v. Dimitrov (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 18, 27 (Dimitrov).)
Because traffic stops such as in the instant case constitute "investigatory detentions," the key issues concern whether a defendant was lawfully detained. (See People v. Durant (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 57, 63 (Durant).) Generally, a police officer may detain a person in order to investigate possible criminal behavior. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 27.) The officer's conduct is assessed under an objective standard. (Id. at p. 21.) "[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Under these principles, officers conducting the investigation of a traffic violation are held to specific objective standards. (People v. Suff (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1013, 1053-1054; People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926 (Miranda).) "[A] police officer can legally stop a motorist only if the facts and circumstances known to the officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. [Citations.]" (Miranda, at p. 926.) An actual violation of a Vehicle Code is not, however, required to make a lawful traffic stop. "When assessing the reasonableness of a traffic stop, the question is not whether appellant actually violated the Vehicle Code, but whether there was some ' "objective manifestation" that [he or she] may have' violated the Vehicle Code." (Durant, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.) Thus, a lawful traffic stop requires only a reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation or other criminal activity and need not amount to the "probable cause" necessary for an arrest. (People v. Hernandez (2008) 45 Cal.4th 295, 299; see Durant, at p. 63.)
Here, the focus of our inquiry is whether the officers had a reasonable basis or suspicion to suspect that defendant may have violated former Vehicle Code section 5201. As relevant here, subdivision (b) of former Vehicle code section 5201 provided: "A covering shall not be used on license plates except as follows: [¶] (1) The installation of a cover over a lawfully parked vehicle to protect it from the weather and the elements does not constitute a violation of this subdivision. A peace officer or other regularly salaried employee of a public agency designated to enforce laws, including local ordinances, relating to the parking of vehicles may temporarily remove so much of the cover as is necessary to inspect any license plate, tab, or indicia of registration on a vehicle. [¶] (2) The installation of a license plate security cover is not a violation of this subdivision if the device does not obstruct or impair the recognition of the license plate information, including, but not limited to, the issuing state, license plate number, and registration tabs, and the cover is limited to the area directly over the top of the registration tabs. No portion of a license plate security cover shall rest over the license plate number." (Italics added.)
Section 5201 of the Vehicle Code was amended effective January 1, 2017. (Stats. 2016, ch. 90 (A.B. 516), § eff. Jan. 1, 2017.) The provision at issue in this case, subdivision (b) of this statute, was unchanged by the amendment.
In construing statutes, we determine the legislative intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute, and the first place we look for an expression of intent is the statutory language. (People v. Overstreet (1986) 42 Cal.3d 891, 895.) If there is no ambiguity in the words of the statute, then the legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the language's plain meaning governs. (People v. Walker (2002) 29 Cal.4th 577, 581.)
Here, the record shows the court accepted the testimony of Officer Williams that the cover over the rear license plate of defendant's vehicle made it very difficult to read the numbers on the plate. We note, however, that the language of former Vehicle Code section 5201, subdivision (b), is clear and unambiguous in that it prohibits any covering over a license plate number. There is an exception for a security cover, but such a cover is limited to the registration tabs and cannot cover the license plate number. As such, we conclude on this record that the plain language of former section 5201, subdivision (b) of the Vehicle Code provided the officers with a lawful basis upon which to stop defendant's vehicle and detain him for a suspected Vehicle Code violation.
Our conclusion on this issue also resolves defendant's contention that photographs taken of the cover over his license plate show the license number was "clearly visible." In any event, this contention is no more than a request by defendant of this court to reweigh the evidence, which is contrary to the settled standard of review. (See People v. D'Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 293 [noting a court of review neither reweighs the evidence nor reevaluates witness credibility nor reverses a judgment merely because the evidence could be reconciled with a contrary finding].)
Moreover, the subjective motivation of the officers — to stop defendant and search him and his person as instructed by another law enforcement agency — does not vitiate the legality of the traffic stop for a Vehicle Code violation. "Not only have we never held, outside the context of inventory search or administrative inspection[,] . . . that an officer's motive invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the contrary." (Whren v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 812; see People v. Uribe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438.)
In light of our decision, we deem it unnecessary to determine whether the court was correct in finding the officers' stop of defendant was, in any event, lawful because, when they ran his license plate and found his vehicle registration was expired, defendant allegedly had not yet "fully submitted" to the officers' authority. (See Dimitrov, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 27 [noting we review the correctness or incorrectness of the trial court's ruling, not the reasons for its ruling].) Nor do we decide on this record whether the officers knew defendant had a valid Fourth Amendment waiver before they initiated the stop, which knowledge may have provided yet another lawful basis to stop and search defendant and his vehicle. (See People v. Watkins (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1409 [noting a "search pursuant to a parole or probation search condition is normally valid only if the officer knew of the condition when he [or she] did the search"].)
II
RECORDS REVIEW
As noted, the defense moved for discovery of information regarding communication about defendant among SDPD officers and/or between SDPD and other law enforcement agencies in connection with the August 18 stop and search of defendant and his vehicle. The defense argued the People had failed to provide such discovery as previously requested and as required under section 1054.5 (governing procedures to compel the disclosure or production of information from prosecuting attorneys and law enforcement agencies which investigated or prepared the case against a defendant).
As also noted, the prosecutor requested the court review in camera the information subject to disclosure, noting such information was potentially not discoverable under section 1054.7. The court subsequently conducted such a review, heard the testimony of two witnesses including that of Officer Williams, and found "good cause" existed under this statute and under Evidence Code section 1040 to prevent the disclosure of the information.
"Any exculpatory evidence" as well as all "[r]elevant written or recorded statements of witnesses or reports of the statements of witnesses whom the prosecutor intends to call at the trial" are subject to disclosure. (§ 1054.1, subds. (e) & (f).) However, section 1054.7 gives the trial court discretion to deny, restrict, or defer such disclosure for good cause. A showing of good cause may be made in camera, and a "verbatim record" of the in camera hearing must be made available on appeal. (§ 1054.7.)
Orders issued under section 1054.7 are subject to review for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 263 [finding good cause based on evidence witness's life had been threatened and detective declared disclosure would compromise witness's safety and integrity of investigation]; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 458 [finding good cause based on credible allegations defendant had conspired to kill witness].)
The Attorney General has no objection to our reviewing the sealed transcript of the July 31, 2017 in camera hearing, and we have done so. We find on this record no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding of "good cause" under section 1054.7. As such, we conclude the court properly exercised its discretion when it prevented the disclosure of communication about defendant among SDPD officers and/or between SDPD and other law enforcement, in connection with the August 18 stop, detention, and search of defendant and his vehicle, on the basis such disclosure could possibly compromise other investigations by law enforcement, as set forth in section 1054.7.
In light of our conclusion, we do not address whether the court also properly found the information sought by defendant was protected from disclosure under Evidence Code section 1040, subdivision (b)(2), which allows a public entity to assert a privilege to prevent disclosure of "official information" when such disclosure "is against the public interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice."
III
PITCHESS
Although not addressed by the parties, we note the ruling on a Pitchess motion is generally not reviewable after a guilty plea. (People v. Hunter (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 37, 42-43.) However, section 1538.5 provides an exception to the general rule when, such as in the instant case, the "Pitchess motion [is] intertwined with litigating the legality of [a] search." (People v. Collins (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 137, 151.) In such cases, the "trial court's denial of that motion is cognizable on appeal." (Ibid.) As noted ante, defendant filed three motions on the same day, including a Pitchess motion and a motion to suppress. Clearly, his Pitchess motion was intertwined with the legality of the August 18 stop, detention, and search, which was a basis of his suppression motion.
1. Additional Background
Defendant's Pitchess motion sought discovery of any evidence of false arrests, omissions in reports, false statements in reports, false claims of probable cause, false testimony, and other evidence of dishonesty or unlawful behavior by SDPD officers Williams, Knutson, Ruggiero, and Davis. Defendant sought multiple categories of evidence including any records and reports pertaining to such dishonest conduct by the four officers; the names and addresses of persons who have complained about any such conduct; copies of any statements made in connection with any investigation into such conduct; information regarding any discipline imposed as a result; information pertaining to the four officers' previous employment in law enforcement; and information regarding any internal investigation involving the instant case.
In support of defendant's Pitchess motion, defense counsel declared under penalty of perjury his belief that the four officers "fabricated probable cause in their reports"; that the reports "included material misrepresentations" and "omitted material facts"; and that they "conducted an illegal detention" and "an illegal search" of defendant and his vehicle, among many other allegations.
Defense counsel's declaration also included specific allegations regarding his belief that the officers fabricated probable cause, including that the officers "had no reason to pull [defendant] over"; that they "falsely claimed" defendant violated the Vehicle Code; that they fabricated the fact that it was "hard to see [defendant's] license plate" when the numbers were "clearly visible"; that they were "lying" when they claimed it was hard to read the license plate number because "they also claimed they ran his license plate as they pulled him over"; that they "conducted a traffic stop in order to unlawfully detain and search" defendant; and that they "omitted the true reason that they pulled [defendant] over," among many other allegations. Lodged as an exhibit to his Pitchess motion was the police report of the incident prepared by Officer Williams, including pictures of the cover on the rear license plate of defendant's vehicle, and an SDPD property report.
Officer Williams's report described the stop of defendant as follows: "On 08-18-16, Officer Knutson #6692 and I were in full police uniform and in a marked police vehicle. We [were] currently assigned to the Gang Suppression Team (GST). While assigned to GST we noticed a vehicle (CA #6YKA059) driven by [defendant] traveling westbound on 3000 Callan Road. When we were behind the vehicle I noticed there was a tinted license plate cover on the rear license plate of the vehicle. This made it hard to read the license plate. The vehicle was in violation of [former section] 5201 (B) [of the Vehicle Code]. Officer Knutson and I conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle at 10900 N. Torrey Pines Road. I ran the license plate to the vehicle and saw the registration was expired since 01/08/2016. The vehicle was in violation of [section] 4000A1 [of the Vehicle Code].
"Officer Knutson and I walked to the vehicle and began speaking with [defendant] who was the driver of the vehicle. Officer Knutson obtained [defendant's] basic information. Officer Ruggiero # 6118 arrived and conducted a records check on [defendant]. Officer Ruggiero informed us [defendant] was on probation with a valid [F]ourth waiver for possession of a stolen vehicle. Officer Ruggiero also told us [defendant's] driver's license was suspended.
"Based on the above we handcuffed [defendant] inside of the vehicle. Once [defendant] was removed from the vehicle Officer Ruggiero and I searched [defendant's] vehicle based on his [F]ourth waiver status. Officer Knutson searched [defendant's] person."
The City Attorney's Office, on behalf of the four officers and SDPD, opposed defendant's Pitchess motion, arguing it was overbroad and lacked a showing of good cause. Specifically, the City Attorney argued the Pitchess motion lacked good cause because "probable cause existed for the traffic stop," noting that defendant had admitted that his rear license plate was covered and "only question[ed] whether it was difficult to see through the cover." As such, the City Attorney argued defendant was in violation of then-applicable Vehicle Code section 5201.
The City Attorney also argued that none of the examples of false statements alleged by the defense "actually contradict[ed]" the contents of the arrest report. Lastly, the City Attorney argued defendant had not established good cause for the review of personnel files of Officers Knutson, Ruggiero, and Davis because none of the examples of false statements included in defense counsel's declaration were made by these officers.
At the Pitchess hearing, the defense reiterated the pictures of the rear license plate cover showed the numbers on the plate were "quite readily viewable" and thus, the officers were "fabricating probable cause" in order to pull defendant over and search his person and vehicle. The defense argued the officers' credibility, or lack thereof, would be relevant to the pending section 1538.5 suppression motion.
The City Attorney argued there were no allegations of misconduct with respect to Officers Ruggiero and Davis, as neither officer was at the scene when Officers Williams and Knutson initiated the stop, nor did either officer express an opinion regarding whether the numbers on the license plate were difficult to read as a result of the cover. In addition, the City Attorney reiterated that the cover was a violation of the Vehicle Code, regardless of whether the license plate number was visible.
In ruling on the motion, the court noted the stop of defendant on August 18 was a "routine motor vehicle stop" based on a "plastic cover." The court further noted once the vehicle was stopped, but before the officers ran the plate and found the vehicle's registration was expired, a detention had occurred. The court thus found the only issue before it was officer honesty, as there was no allegation of force. In addition, the court observed the motion was overbroad to the extent it included SDPD officers other than Williams.
With respect to his report and the alleged omission(s), the court stated, "The material omission that's stated [in defense counsel's declaration] I am presuming is, at least the way I am interpreting the pleadings, is that somehow the officer knew that there was a Fourth Amendment probation condition out of San Bernardino before they initiated the stop.
"I see no evidence to that regard other than a blanket statement, a blanket search. As an editorial comment, if they knew he was a Fourth Amendment waiver, why fabricate the probable cause for the stop[?] They could just simply search him, unless it was done for purpose of harassment or abuse or things along those lines.
"This is a rare instance, but I don't think there has been enough made out in the declaration, so I'm going to deny the motion."
2. Guiding Principles and Analysis
To obtain discovery of a peace officer's personnel file, the defendant must file a noticed motion supported by a good cause affidavit setting forth (1) the materiality of the request to the pending litigation, and (2) a reasonable belief that the agency has the records or information. (Evid. Code, § 1043; Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1019 (Warrick).) "This two-part showing of good cause is a 'relatively low threshold for discovery.' [Citation.]" (Warrick, at p. 1019.)
"[A] showing of good cause requires a defendant seeking Pitchess discovery to establish not only a logical link between the defense proposed and the pending charge, but also to articulate how the discovery being sought would support such a defense or how it would impeach the officer's version of events." (Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1021.) Good cause may be established by "a specific factual scenario of officer misconduct that is plausible when read in light of the pertinent documents." (Id. at p. 1025.) "[A] plausible scenario of officer misconduct is one that might or could have occurred. Such a scenario is plausible because it presents an assertion of specific police misconduct that is both internally consistent and supports the defense proposed to the charges." (Id. at p. 1026.)
If good cause is shown, the trial court conducts an in camera examination of the records to determine whether there is any relevance to the issues presented by the litigation. (Evid. Code, § 1045; Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019.) These procedures balance the confidentiality of peace officers against the defendant's need for disclosure to pursue his or her defense. (City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 85-86.)
It is axiomatic that we review a trial court's ruling on a Pitchess motion for abuse of discretion. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1286; accord Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, 657.) The failure to comply with our high court's requirements in connection with a Pitchess motion is considered an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Johnson (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 292; Abatti v. Superior Court (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 39.)
Here, defendant contends he presented a sufficient factual basis of officer misconduct in his Pitchess motion to warrant an in camera inspection of the personnel records of the SDPD officers who were involved in his traffic stop (i.e., Williams and Knutson), and his further detention and search of his person and vehicle (i.e., Ruggiero and Davis, in addition to Williams and Knutson). Specifically, defendant argued Officers Williams and Knutson pulled defendant over not because of the alleged Vehicle Code violation, but because SDPD was instructed to do so by other law enforcement. As such, defendant further argued that SDPD fabricated the probable cause to stop defendant.
The record shows when the court heard defendant's Pitchess motion, it had not yet had the benefit of Officer Williams's testimony at the suppression hearing, which as noted took place about two months after the court denied the Pitchess motion. At the motion to suppress hearing, Officer Williams testified that SDPD had been instructed by other law enforcement to stop defendant and search his vehicle; that SDPD knew defendant's general location where the stop was to be made, the make of his vehicle, and perhaps even the license plate number of his vehicle; that SDPD knew defendant was on probation from San Bernardino when it made the stop, although it is not clear from Officer Williams's testimony whether SDPD knew the conditions of defendant's probation, including whether he was subject to a valid Fourth Amendment waiver; and that there was a conflict in the testimony regarding whether Officer Williams ran the license plate information of defendant's vehicle while defendant was pulling over, but had not yet stopped (and perhaps was detained, as one court found and another court seemed to reject), or whether Officer Williams ran the license plate information after defendant had stopped his vehicle.
We note that much of this information from the suppression hearing was not included in the arrest report prepared by Officer Williams. In fact, a fair reading of the statement in the arrest report suggests that Officers Williams and Knutson were on routine patrol when they happened to come upon defendant's vehicle and noticed a plastic cover over his rear license plate, giving rise to probable cause to stop the vehicle. Although the timing of defendant's various motions prevented the court at the Pitchess hearing from having the benefit of this information, it now will.
Although not a model of clarity, we conclude (even without the benefit of this "new" information) that defendant's Pitchess motion met the "relatively low threshold" for discovery (see Warrick, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 1019) with respect to Officers Williams and Knutson, who were involved in the initial stop and detention of defendant, but not with respect to Officers Ruggiero and Davis, who were not involved in such activity. As such, we further conclude the trial court should have conducted an in camera review of the personnel files of Officers Williams and Knutson to determine whether they contained reports, complaints, or investigations of the officers for dishonesty, as defendant requested, and as relevant to the issue of probable cause and his argument the officers lacked credibility.
As discussed ante in connection with defendant's motion to suppress, there was a conflict in the evidence whether officers knew before the stop that defendant was subject to a valid Fourth Amendment waiver as a result of his PRCS supervision conditions, or whether they learned this information for the first time only after Officer Ruggiero arrived on scene and ran a records check of defendant, as Officer Williams's arrest report suggests.
The remedy here, however, "is not outright reversal, but a conditional reversal with directions to review the requested documents in chambers on remand." (People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 180.) In this case, if the new Pitchess hearing results in discoverable information, the remedy should include an opportunity for defendant to present evidence and argument that he was unable to present at the motion to suppress hearing, inasmuch as the issue of the officers' alleged misconduct may be pertinent to that hearing, including whether probable cause to make the stop and search of defendant and his vehicle was fabricated. Thus, defendant's motion to suppress should be reconsidered in light of any discoverable evidence which is disclosed during the new Pitchess proceeding.
As we noted ante, nothing in this opinion prevents the court on remand to revisit its ruling on defendant's discovery motion in light of, or in connection with, the new Pitchess hearing.
DISPOSITION
Defendant's judgment of conviction is conditionally reversed to allow the court on remand to conduct a new Pitchess hearing to review in camera the personnel files of Officers Williams and Knutson, who were involved in the initial stop and detention of defendant. If the new Pitchess hearing results in discoverable information, the remedy should include an opportunity for defendant to present evidence and argument that he was unable to present at the suppression hearing. However, if no new information is discoverable after the Pitchess hearing, the court is directed to reinstate the judgment of conviction.
BENKE, Acting P. J. WE CONCUR: HALLER, J. AARON, J.