Opinion
A099375.
7-22-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. MICHAEL B. HALL, Defendant and Appellant.
Appellant Michael Hall was convicted after a court trial of transportation of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and transportation of a controlled substance for sale in a noncontiguous county (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (b)). He was sentenced to an aggregate term of three years in prison for his offenses, to be served concurrently with his five-year sentence in People v. Hall (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC064036). Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss the information pursuant to Penal Code section 995 because California lacked jurisdiction over his criminal conduct. We disagree and affirm.
I. Background
A resident of Arizona, appellant managed a business in that state named Inova Products (Inova). Inova sold the chemical compound gamma butyrolactone (GBL), often used as a "date-rape drug."
In March 2000, California Department of Justice, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement agents learned of a planned 55-gallon shipment from Inova, via Roadway Express, to one James Stauffer at a Redwood City, California address. An official with Roadway Express revealed that the 55-gallon drum of GBL was picked up from Inova in Phoenix on March 9, 2000, and had a scheduled delivery date of March 15, 2000. Working undercover with Roadway Express, Bureau of Narcotic Enforcement Agent Dan Schillaci delivered the shipment to Stauffer. This shipment led to the judgment from which appellant now appeals.
II. Discussion
Penal Code section 778 sets the jurisdictional reach of California courts where a crime is the result of foreign planning and local perpetration: "When the commission of a public offense, commenced without the State, is consummated within its boundaries by a defendant, himself outside the State, through the intervention of an innocent or guilty agent or any other means proceeding directly from said defendant, he is liable to punishment therefore in this State in any competent court within the jurisdictional territory of which the offense is consummated." ( § 778.)
That section 778 confers jurisdiction in this case is clear. Appellant commenced his crime in Arizona; while in that state, he reached an agreement with Stauffer to ship GBL to California. Appellant then consummated his crime within California. Specifically, he contracted with Roadway Express to transport the GBL to California. For these reasons section 778 gives California courts jurisdiction over appellant. Appellant nevertheless makes several arguments to the contrary. Each is meritless.
Appellant first contends that section 778 does not grant California jurisdiction over him because Roadway Express was not his agent. He claims that a common carrier cannot be an agent under section 778. We need not reach the merits of this argument because section 778 confers jurisdiction over a defendant who consummates a crime through use of an agent "or any other means proceeding directly from said defendant." ( § 778.) The means of transporting GBL here, Roadway Express, proceeded directly from appellant.
Appellant next claims that California lacks jurisdiction because he never entered the state. However, section 778 does not require a defendant to be in California at any time. Indeed, the statute bestows jurisdiction where the crime is both "commenced without the State," and consummated while a defendant is "himself outside the State." ( § 778.) According to appellant, section 778 affords jurisdiction over a defendant out of state during a crimes commencement and consummation, but only if that defendant has been within the state sometime in between. No authority supports this contention and it is untenable under the plain language of section 778.
Appellant relies next on the Supreme Courts reasoning in People v. Morante (1999) 20 Cal.4th 403, 975 P.2d 1071. In Morante, the court found jurisdiction proper over a defendant whose crime was consummated in another state but substantially planned in California-a situation different than the one here and covered by section 778a, not section 778. In so doing, the court noted that section 778as allowance of jurisdiction was valid because the defendants activities in California "endangered its citizens and placed a burden on courts and on law enforcement agencies within this state . . . ." (Id. at pp. 428-429.) Appellant contends that because he, unlike the defendant in Morante, had no contacts with California, we must find jurisdiction lacking. He is mistaken.
The fact that Morante found jurisdiction proper where a defendant had contacts with California but consummated the crime elsewhere does not preclude jurisdiction over a defendant that consummates his or her crime in California but has no other contacts with the state. Appellant cites no authority that suggests otherwise. Moreover, Morante relies heavily on the notion that public policy supports finding jurisdiction over a defendant who places California citizens in danger and burdens our law enforcement and judicial resources. (People v. Morante , supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 428-429.) In this regard Morante contradicts appellants position. Appellants shipment of 55 gallons of a narcotic to California put California citizens in danger and consumed law enforcement resources here to prevent its eventual distribution.
III. Conclusion
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Reardon, J., Sepulveda, J.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.