Opinion
F076453
07-19-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. DAUNTE HALL, Defendant and Appellant.
Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein and Tia M. Coronado, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. F17904606)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Don Penner, Judge. Lynette Gladd Moore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel B. Bernstein and Tia M. Coronado, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Detjen, J. and Franson, J.
-ooOoo-
On August 15, 2017, defendant Daunte Hall was convicted by no contest plea of leaving the scene of an accident (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a), a felony). He admitted having suffered two prior strike convictions within the meaning of the "Three Strikes" law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court denied defendant's Romero motion to strike the prior felony conviction allegations under section 1385, and the court sentenced him to two years eight months in prison: the lower term of 16 months, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to strike the prior felony convictions. We affirm.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). A defendant's request for this type of leniency is commonly referred to as a "Romero motion," although defendants do not actually have a right to make motions under section 1385, subdivision (a). (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375, 379 (Carmony).)
FACTS
On August 7, 2017, defendant's vehicle ran into the back of a motorcycle stopped at an intersection, causing the victim to be thrown onto the roadway and sustain multiple injuries. Defendant fled the scene. When found, he said he swerved and hit something near the intersection, but he did not call 911 because he did not have a telephone.
After his arrest, defendant was taken to the hospital for medical clearance. He then became combative and refused to be transported to jail. He dragged the gurney he was cuffed to until officers were able to cuff both of his hands. Then he refused to sit in the patrol vehicle. Officers had to put him on the ground, restrain him further, and place him in the vehicle for transport to jail.
DISCUSSION
Section 1385 grants trial courts the discretion to dismiss a prior strike conviction if the dismissal is in furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subd. (a); Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.) " 'A court's discretion to strike [or vacate] prior felony conviction allegations [or findings] in furtherance of justice is limited. Its exercise must proceed in strict compliance with ... section 1385[, subdivision] (a).' " (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 158.) The Three Strikes law "was intended to restrict courts' discretion in sentencing repeat offenders." (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528; People v. Garcia (1999) 20 Cal.4th 490, 501 ["a primary purpose of the Three Strikes law was to restrict judicial discretion"].) The Three Strikes law establishes " 'a sentencing requirement to be applied in every case where the defendant has at least one qualifying strike,' " unless the sentencing court finds a reason for making an exception to this rule. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) There are "stringent standards that sentencing courts must follow in order to find such an exception." (Ibid.) In order to dismiss a prior strike conviction, "the court in question must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant's] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams, supra, at p. 161.)
The defendant bears the burden of clearly showing the trial court's decision not to strike a prior felony conviction allegation was arbitrary or irrational. Absent such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.) "[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court was not 'aware of its discretion' to dismiss [citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss [citation]. Moreover, 'the sentencing norms [established by the Three Strikes law may, as a matter of law,] produce [] an "arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd" result' under the specific facts of a particular case. [Citation.] [¶] But '[i]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree about whether to strike one or more' prior conviction allegations. [Citation.] ... Because the circumstances must be 'extraordinary ... by which a career criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to attack' [citation], the circumstances where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary. Of course, in such an extraordinary case—where the relevant factors ... manifestly support the striking of a prior conviction and no reasonable minds could differ—the failure to strike would constitute an abuse of discretion." (Id. at p. 378.)
Defendant's prior convictions included the following: in 2001, possession of a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359), for which he received 16 months in prison; in 2003, false imprisonment (§ 236) with personal use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), misdemeanor assault (§ 240), and misdemeanor exhibiting a deadly weapon other than a firearm (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)), for which he received three years in prison; in 2005, a parole violation, for which he was returned to prison; in 2008, residential burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)), for which he received four years in prison; in 2012, driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (b)), for which he received 180 days in jail, plus time in the adult offender work program; and in 2016, misdemeanor disorderly conduct and misdemeanor theft in Nevada, for which he received time in community service and a bench warrant after his failure to appear.
The 2003 false imprisonment with personal use of a deadly weapon and the 2008 residential burglary convictions formed the basis of the two prior strike conviction allegations.
The probation report noted that the current offense was defendant's fourth felony conviction. In the current offense, he inflicted physical harm on the victim and then failed to render aid or call for assistance, fleeing the scene instead. In light of the severity of the current offense and defendant's significant criminal record, the probation officer recommended a prison term of the middle term of two years, doubled to four years. Defendant stated to the probation officer he was sorry and glad no one got hurt. He said he needed a substance abuse program and wanted to become an alcohol and drug counselor.
Defendant's Romero motion argued that his two strike convictions were remote, his current offense was not serious or violent, the Three Strikes punishment would be disproportionate to the severity of the current offense, he had not suffered any felony convictions since 2007, and his current offense was of a different type than his strike offenses. Defendant now adds that he was outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law because his current offense was not a repeat residential burglary or a violent crime, and a 16-month sentence would have been more appropriate for his current offense.
Defendant argues in his opening brief that he had not suffered any felony convictions since 2007, but the record establishes that the conviction referred to occurred in 2008. --------
In denying the motion, the trial court stated:
"As I stated I have read the Romero invitation, which was filed by the defense. I'm denying the requested relief under Romero. I do believe the defendant comes within the purview of the voters when they passed Three Strikes and subsequently amended it. His first strike conviction involved a threat of harm by the defendant against the victim. The second involved a residential burglary, the current offense involved injury to another individual and in 2012 he has a DUI conviction for a misdemeanor,
which also carries a potential for injury to another motorist. For those reasons I'm denying Romero relief and probation is denied."
On this record, we cannot call the trial court's denial of the motion an abuse of discretion, even if reasonable people might differ as to whether defendant's criminal history brought him within the spirit of the Three Strikes scheme or whether he deserved a shorter sentence. Defendant's prior convictions are not so remote to suggest he has otherwise led a crime-free life. (See People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809, 813 [remote carries the connotation of a crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation after a defendant has had the opportunity to reflect on the error of his ways].) Furthermore, although his current offense may not have been violent, it was dangerous and it caused harm to the victim. And a criminal career need not have consisted entirely of violent or serious felonies to bring the defendant within the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (See People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 340.) Lastly, we note that defendant's sentence was not inappropriately severe. Indeed, it was more lenient than that recommended by the probation officer. We conclude this case was not extraordinary, and the court's decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. We see no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.