Opinion by JUDGE BERGER ¶1 We disagree with People v. Gwinn , 2018 COA 130, 428 P.3d 727, and People v. Quezada-Caro , 2019 COA 155, ––– P.3d ––––, and hold that the prior convictions required to convict a person of felony driving under the influence (DUI) are elements of the offense and must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse Kevin Wayne Viburg's conviction for felony DUI because his prior convictions were not proved to a jury.

¶11 At the time of Crabtree’s trial, there was only one published appellate decision in Colorado addressing whether the fact of a defendant’s relevant convictions in a felony DUI case is an element of the offense that must be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Gwinn, 2018 COA 130, ¶¶ 39–56, 428 P.3d 727, 736–39. In Gwinn, a division of the court of appeals answered the question in the negative, concluding that this fact was merely a sentence enhancer that could be proved to a judge by a preponderance of the Evidence.

Before our 2020 decision in Linnebur, multiple divisions of the court of appeals had reached the same conclusion. See People v. Quezada-Caro, 2019 COA 155, ¶¶ 24, 31, 490 P.3d 507, 513-14; People v. Gwinn, 2018 COA 130, ¶¶ 49-50, 428 P.3d 727, 737-38. ¶23 Accordingly, we conclude that double jeopardy principles don't preclude the prosecution from retrying Viburg for felony DUI.

Divisions of this court are split as to whether prior convictions constitute sentence enhancers or elements of the felony DUI or DWAI offense. The divisions in People v. Jiron , 2020 COA 36, ¶ 14, ––– P.3d ––––, People v. Quezada-Caro , 2019 COA 155, ¶¶ 10-31, ––– P.3d ––––, and People v. Gwinn , 2018 COA 130, ¶¶ 49-50, 428 P.3d 727, held that prior DUI convictions constitute a sentence enhancer that can be proved to the court by a preponderance of the evidence. A division of this court in People v. Viburg , 2020 COA 8M, ––– P.3d ––––, however, departed from Gwinn and Quezada-Caro , and held that prior convictions are an element of the felony offense that must be proved to a jury (if the defendant asks for one) beyond a reasonable doubt.

Before our 2020 decision in Linnebur , multiple divisions of the court of appeals had reached the same conclusion. See People v. Quezada-Caro , 2019 COA 155, ¶¶ 24, 31, 490 P.3d 507, 513–14 ; People v. Gwinn , 2018 COA 130, ¶¶ 49–50, 428 P.3d 727, 737–38. ¶23 Accordingly, we conclude that double jeopardy principles don't preclude the prosecution from retrying Viburg for felony DUI.

¶ 90 "[W]hether to give a particular instruction lies within the trial court's discretion, and [an appellate court] will not disturb the court's ruling absent a showing that the court abused its discretion in rejecting a particular instruction." People v. Gwinn , 2018 COA 130, ¶ 31, 428 P.3d 727. An appellate court reviews the question of whether a trial court accurately instructed the jury on the law de novo.

III. Proof of Prior Convictions ¶ 38 In September 2018, a division of our court held in People v. Gwinn , 2018 COA 130, ¶¶ 39–56, 428 P.3d 727, that in a prosecution for felony DUI, the fact of a defendant's prior convictions is merely a sentence enhancer that need not be submitted to a jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. During Crabtree's March 2019 trial, Gwinn remained controlling and settled law.

¶ 43 Several divisions of this court have determined that such prior convictions operate as sentence enhancers, not as elements, and therefore don't have to be decided by a jury. See People v. Ambrose , 2020 COA 112, ¶ 40, ––– P.3d –––– ; People v. Jiron , 2020 COA 36, ¶ 14, ––– P.3d –––– ; People v. Quezada-Caro , 2019 COA 155, ¶ 24, ––– P.3d –––– ; People v. Gwinn , 2018 COA 130, ¶ 49, 428 P.3d 727. We agree with those divisions and disagree with another division's holding to the contrary.

¶ 8 "A statutory provision is a sentence enhancer when the defendant may be convicted of the underlying offense without any proof of the prior conviction." People v. Gwinn , 2018 COA 130, ¶ 44, 428 P.3d 727. In contrast, elements of a crime are "the legal components that are necessary to establish criminal liability."

A court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or contrary to law. Sandoval , ¶ 26 ; People v. Gwinn , 2018 COA 130, ¶ 31, 428 P.3d 727 ("[A] court abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law."). ¶32 To determine whether a court's illustration lowered the prosecution's burden of proof, in violation of a defendant's due process rights, and thus constitutes error, we consider the illustration's nature, scope, and timing.