Opinion
12-09-2015
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Hariz GUZMAN, appellant.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Laura Lieberman Cohen of counsel), for appellant. Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, William H. Branigan, Gregory Radwan, and Ayelet Sela of counsel), for respondent.
Seymour W. James, Jr., New York, N.Y. (Laura Lieberman Cohen of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, William H. Branigan, Gregory Radwan, and Ayelet Sela of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., THOMAS A. DICKERSON, SHERI S. ROMAN, and JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lewis, J.), rendered January 17, 2012, convicting him of robbery in the second degree, grand larceny in the fourth degree, and reckless endangerment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish his guilt of robbery in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt because the People failed to establish that he forcibly stole the complainant's property (see Penal Law §§ 160.00, 160.10 ). However, that issue is not preserved for appellate review, as he made only a general motion to dismiss at the close of the People's case (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ; People v. Martinez, 116 A.D.3d 983, 983, 983 N.Y.S.2d 839 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant's contention that the testimony of the complainant was incredible as a matter of law is also unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Hewitt, 82 A.D.3d 1119, 1121, 919 N.Y.S.2d 204 ; People v. Carlucci, 80 A.D.3d 621, 622, 914 N.Y.S.2d 663 ). In any event, the complainant's testimony was not incredible as a matter of law, as it was not manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory (see People v. Mitchell, 68 A.D.3d 1019, 1019, 892 N.Y.S.2d 442 ; People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88, 353 N.Y.S.2d 500 ).
In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the factfinder's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt of all counts was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).