Opinion
A166311
01-10-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. VENANCIO DIZON DE GUZMAN, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. FCR340869
Mayfield, J. [*]
A jury convicted defendant Venancio De Guzman, Jr. of committing numerous sexual felony offenses against his three stepdaughters and the trial court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term. Defendant raises a single claim of evidentiary error on appeal. He claims his convictions must be reversed because the court prejudicially erred in allowing the victims to testify about uncharged acts of physical and emotional abuse. (Evid. Code, §§ 1101, 352.) We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Defendant married M.T. in 1997. They had one biological child, J.D., who they raised together with M.T.'s three daughters from a prior relationship, C.L., D.L., and H.L. M.T. filed for divorce in 2018, soon after learning about defendant's sexual abuse of her daughters.
I. Charges
In 2018, the prosecution charged defendant with the following sexual offenses committed over the span of nearly two decades: one count of continuous sexual abuse (Pen. Code, § 288.5 [count 1, J.D]); nine counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child-rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2) [counts 2-6, C.L; counts 19-22, H.L.]); one count of rape (§ 269, subd. (a)(1) [count 7, C.L.]); five counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child-oral copulation (§ 269, subd. (a)(4) [counts 8-12, C.L.; count 18, H.L.); one count of forcible oral copulation (§ 288, subd. (c)(2)(A) [count 13, C.L.]); and four counts of lewd acts on a child (§ 288, subd. (a) [counts 14-17, D.L.]). Multiple victim allegations were made as to all counts.
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
II. In Limine Proceedings
Before trial, the prosecution requested an order allowing the named victims to testify to uncharged acts of physical and emotional abuse by defendant. The prosecution argued this evidence was relevant to explain the victims' delay in reporting, as well as to establish the elements of force and fear in the charged offenses. The defense argued the proffered evidence was irrelevant as much of the complained-of conduct occurred after the sexual abuse charges, other conduct was pure disposition evidence, and all such conduct was impermissibly prejudicial.
After hearing argument, the trial court ruled the evidence was relevant and admissible to prove the force, fear, or duress elements of the rape and aggravated sexual assault charges. (See §§ 261, subd. (a)(2); 269, subd. (a)(1), (4).) The court also found the evidence was relevant to rebut the defense's argument that the victims' delay in reporting made their testimony less credible. The court further ruled the risk of undue prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of the evidence.
III. Evidence at Trial
C.L.
C.L. was 31 years old at the time of trial. C.L. remembered defendant spanking her and her sisters with his hands or a belt until they were bruised and unable to walk. Other times, defendant made C.L. and her sisters stand, holding heavy books, for an hour or more until they urinated on themselves.
Defendant began molesting C.L. when she was in elementary school; at the time her mother was pregnant with J.D. C.L. remembered being in bed and defendant forcing her to touch his penis with her hands. Defendant raped C.L. when she was around nine years old; C.L. felt "frozen," unable to yell or make any noise. On many occasions, defendant touched C.L.'s breasts while she was sleeping.
In 2001, the family moved to a new house; C.L. picked a bedroom closest to the bathroom so she could lock herself in the bathroom if defendant tried to molest her. Defendant had a key to the bathroom and would often walk in while C.L. was in the shower.
"Countless times" C.L. would wake up in her bed and find defendant lying next to her with his penis inside her vagina. Sometimes C.L. would "pretend [she] was still sleeping because [she] didn't know what else to do." Other times C.L. would yell at defendant to "get away." Defendant slapped C.L. once when she yelled at him to get out. C.L. remembered being raped "almost every weekend." Once, when she was in middle school, defendant said he needed to "teach" her "how to use a condom."
C.L. described an incident when defendant took her and her sisters to an amusement park while their mother was in the Philippines. They stayed in one hotel room with two queen-sized beds. C.L.'s sisters shared one bed and C.L. shared a bed with defendant. Defendant touched C.L.'s breasts and vagina and attempted to rape her.
The rapes continued into her freshman year of high school. C.L. remembered defendant holding her down and pinning her hands against a metal bed frame while he raped her in her bedroom. Defendant also orally copulated C.L. and forced her to orally copulate him several times. Eventually the sexual abuse stopped after C.L. began menstruating.
Defendant was violent; he yelled constantly, and once punched a hole in the wall. Defendant repeatedly took C.L.'s phone as punishment; one time, he smashed C.L.'s phone with a brick. Another time, defendant broke C.L.'s car window. Defendant subjected his daughters and wife to verbal abuse, calling them "sluts," "ho's," "whore," "gold-digger," and "bitch."
H.L.
H.L. was 30 years old at the time of trial. Defendant began groping H.L. when she was 10 years old. Defendant would force H.L. to sit on his lap and would touch her breast. She remembered defendant waking her up for school by hitting her butt in a way that felt "inappropriate," or by touching her breast. Defendant would also wake H.L. up by touching her vagina over her pajamas. Other times, defendant watched H.L. while she was in the shower.
Sometimes H.L. woke up during the night and found defendant's hands underneath her clothing touching her breasts and vagina. H.L. remembered waking up during the night and part of her pants were pulled down. Defendant would be standing with his hands on her, and sometimes he would be touching himself. On one occasion, defendant called H.L. into his bedroom and told her to lock the door. Defendant touched H.L. while she was laying on the bed watching a movie with him. Defendant touched her over and under her clothes. Defendant asked H.L. to take off her pants; H.L. was scared. Defendant touched himself and would not let H.L. leave. She pretended to fall asleep. Defendant then attempted to have intercourse with H.L. She felt him "trying to stick his penis into [her] vagina." H.L. started to cry because it was painful. Defendant also grabbed H.L.'s hand and tried to get her to touch his erect penis.
The next time defendant touched H.L., she was asleep in her bed. Defendant touched her under her clothes, as he tried to pull her pants down and have sex with her. H.L. stopped defendant before he ejaculated and told him to "[g]et off." H.L. remembered two or three incidents where defendant put his penis inside her vagina.
H.L. was afraid of defendant because "he was controlling and mean and he already beat" her and her sisters. One time defendant slapped H.L. and pushed her into a table, causing her nose to bleed. H.L. was unable to go to school for a week because she had a bruise on her face. She said defendant would beat her if she protested his advances. Defendant called H.L. degrading names such as "slut." H.L. remembered the abuse continuing into her freshman year of high school; she believed it stopped once she had a boyfriend. H.L. did not tell anyone about the childhood abuse because she was afraid of the aftermath.
D.L.
D.L. was 28 years old at the time of trial. Defendant forced D.L. to hold a heavy briefcase, or stand on one foot, and would spank her with a belt. Defendant began sexually abusing D.L. when she was in fifth grade. Defendant would call D.L. into his bedroom and have her lay on top of him while he hugged her too tightly, touching her butt or hips; during these incidents, defendant was in his underwear and D.L. could feel him rubbing against her. This happened a couple of times a month. D.L. tried to push him away or cover her breasts and genitals with her hands; she began wearing over-sized clothes to hide her body. Defendant touched D.L.'s breasts and butt under and over her clothes; he slid off her bottoms and rubbed her hand against his penis. She cried until he pulled her pants back up. During one occasion, she felt the tip of his penis touch her vagina. These incidents continued for two or three years.
Defendant also hugged D.L. too tightly in public. He would go into the bathroom and leave the door slightly open when D.L. showered. D.L. did not tell her sisters or mother; she was afraid of ruining the family's lifestyle and her mother's marriage.
J.D.
J.D. was 23 years old at the time of trial; she recalled defendant using terms like "slut" to refer to her sisters when they were between 13 and 17 years old; he also made remarks about their bodies. Defendant would ask J.D. to "cuddle" with him in his bedroom. Defendant would press his genitals into J.D.'s body; his penis would be "stiff." Defendant would hold J.D.'s body still, as he "wiggl[ed]" his body. Defendant touched J.D. a couple of times a week from the time she was four or five years old until she was 18 years old.
One time, when defendant caught J.D. looking at pornography, defendant said, "Is this what you want to see," and exposed his penis to J.D. Defendant also said, "Do you want me to show you how to do that." J.D. was afraid of defendant; he slapped her sisters in the face, sometimes knocking them to the ground. When she was 18 years old, defendant slapped J.D.'s face after her boyfriend left the house, calling J.D. his" 'property.'" He also hit her legs and thighs with a wooden stick. On other occasions, defendant kicked J.D. in the face.
IV. Verdict
During deliberations, the jury asked for and received a readback of C.L.'s testimony regarding oral copulation. The jury also requested and received a readback of D.L.'s testimony regarding the time period and ages when she alleged the lewd acts occurred. The jury next asked for and received a readback of C.L.'s testimony regarding the allegations when she was in high school.
The jury found defendant guilty of 16 felonies, including: one count of rape (count 7, C.L.); nine counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child-rape (counts 2-6, C.L. &19-22, H.L.); one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child-oral copulation (count 8, C.L.); two counts of the lesser included offense of attempted aggravated sexual assault of a child-oral copulation (counts 9-10, C.L.), and three counts of lewd acts on a child (counts 14-16, D.L.). The jury was unable to reach verdicts on count 1 (continuous sexual abuse of J.D) and count 17 (lewd acts between May 22, 2005 and May 21, 2006 against D.L.); the trial court declared a mistrial and dismissed these counts. The jury found defendant not guilty of two counts of aggravated sexual assault-oral copulation (counts 11-12, C.L.) and one count of forcible oral copulation (count 12, C.L.). The jury was unable to agree on the multiple victim finding.
Count 18 was dismissed pursuant to section 1118.1.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his physical and emotional abuse of the victims. He argues this evidence was inadmissible character evidence, irrelevant, and/or unduly prejudicial. We review the court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and conclude there was none. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 405.)
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a) prohibits the use of character to prove conduct. However, this provision does not preclude introduction of evidence of a person's prior bad acts for a different purpose (id., subd. (b)), including "to support or attack the credibility of a witness" (id., subd. (c)). "If an uncharged act is relevant to prove some fact other than propensity, the evidence is admissible, subject to a limiting instruction upon request." (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 406.)
The court instructed the jury that evidence of other criminal acts could not be considered for any purpose other than evaluating the credibility of the witnesses. (See CALCRIM No. 375.)
Even if uncharged acts evidence is otherwise admissible, relevant evidence may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will require undue time consumption, will confuse or mislead the jury, or poses a substantial risk of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Defendant argues evidence of physical abuse was not relevant because none of the charged offenses-with the exception of section 288, subdivision (a)-required proof of sexual intent and, in any event, evidence of physical violence was not relevant to whether he harbored the requisite lewd intent. He further claims this evidence was irrelevant because none of the charged crimes required proof of force, fear, or duress beyond that attested to by the victims. Thus, he argues the challenged evidence was irrelevant and/or prejudicial. We disagree.
Evidence that defendant physically and verbally abused the complaining witnesses bolstered their credibility by explaining why they delayed in reporting the sexual abuse and by refuting the defense theory that the sexual abuse claims were fabricated to break up defendant's marriage to M.T. (See Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (c); see also People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 31 [evidence of defendant's violent altercations tended to show witness had reason to fear him].) By pleading not guilty, defendant placed in issue all of the elements of the charged offenses (see People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 407), including the applicable force or fear elements (see §§ 261, subd. (a)(2), 269, subd. (a)(1), (4)-(5), 288, subd. (c)(2)(A)). The challenged evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101.
Defendant also argues the court erred in finding the challenged evidence was relevant to the "state of mind" of the witnesses. We need not address this claim. "Our task is to review the trial court's ruling not its reasoning." (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 807.) The court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence.
Defendant's argument that the evidence was unduly prejudicial also fails. Under Evidence Code section 352, trial courts have discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will, among other things, create substantial danger of undue prejudice. The jury heard graphic testimony from four young women who recounted decades-long childhood sexual abuse. Evidence of defendant's temper, emotional abuse, and physical punishments paled in comparison to evidence pertaining to the charged offenses. (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 405 [prior bad act's prejudicial effect is "decreased" if it is "no more inflammatory than the testimony concerning the charged offenses"].) The challenged evidence was not likely to evoke improper bias or an emotional response on part of the jurors. (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 408.) Indeed, the jury's verdict reflects no such prejudice was afoot. Had the jury been overtaken by bias or emotion it would have found defendant guilty of all the charges and found true the multiple victims allegations. Instead, the record reflects the jury, after carefully deliberating, including numerous requests to readback testimony, could not reach a verdict as to counts 1 and 17; found defendant not guilty of counts 11, 12, and 13; concluded he was guilty of two lesser included offenses in counts 9 and 10; and could not determine the truth of the multiple victims allegations.
For these same reasons, defendant's constitutional challenges fail. Defendant contends his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated by the "quantity and quality" of the evidence admitted regarding the uncharged physical abuse. Again, we disagree. Whether viewed as a matter of state law subject to the "reasonable probability" test (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836) or the stricter "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard applicable to federal constitutional errors (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24), any error in admitting the challenged evidence was harmless.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Richman, Acting P.J., Miller, J.
[*]Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.