Opinion
A147347
01-11-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOHN HENRY GUYTON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Napa County Super. Ct. No. CR174344)
Defendant John Henry Guyton pleaded no contest to felony assault upon a peace officer, felony battery with injury on a peace officer, and felony resisting an executive officer. He was sentenced to 12 years 8 months in prison. Defendant now appeals from the trial court's order denying him presentence custody credits for time served. The Attorney General concedes this point. We find defendant's arguments have merit and reverse the trial court's ruling as to presentence custody credits.
I. BACKGROUND
In September 2013, defendant was charged in Alameda County Superior Court with failure to register as a sex offender. (Pen. Code, §§ 290.012, subd. (a), 290.018, subd. (b).) Defendant was found to be mentally incompetent within the meaning of section 1368, and on July 24, 2014 the court committed him to the Department of Mental Health at the Napa State Hospital (NSH).
All statutory references are to the Penal Code. --------
On February 3, 2015, an NSH nurse asked defendant to submit a blood sample. Appellant cursed at the nurse and lunged at her with closed fists. The hospital police were called, and several officers arrived on the scene. Defendant produced two socks containing rocks, which he swung while saying "come get it." Defendant struck the officers as they tried to subdue him.
In connection with the above incident, defendant was charged by information in Napa County Superior Court with the following offenses: felony assault upon a peace officer (§ 245, subd. (c); count one); felony battery with injury on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2); count two); felony resisting an executive officer (§ 69; count three); and misdemeanor battery upon an officer (§ 243, subd. (b); count four). As to counts one through three, it was further alleged defendant had suffered prior serious or violent felony convictions. (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i).)
It appears defendant continued to be held in NSH until he was found competent to stand trial, at which point he pleaded no contest to counts one through three and admitted a prior strike in exchange for a prison sentence of 12 years 8 months. On December 23, 2015, the probation department submitted a sentencing report recommending the court award defendant 673 days of credit, which included 337 days of credit for actual presentence custody from February 3, 2015 through January 5, 2016, and 336 days of credit for good conduct in custody.
On January 5, 2016, the trial court sentenced defendant to serve 12 years 8 months in state prison. The prosecutor objected to defendant receiving any credit because he was in custody based on a hold in the unrelated Alameda County case. The court agreed and denied defendant all credit, though the court did find defendant had spent 340 days in custody.
On March 21, 2016, the Alameda County Superior Court granted the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the charges against defendant related to his alleged failure to register as a sex offender. In the minutes of the hearing, the clerk stated: "Defendant sentenced to 12 years 8 months [in] state prison in Napa County. [¶] This case is dismissed pursuant to that disposition. Defendant released in this action only."
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant asserts that, in light of the dismissal of the charges in the Alameda County case, it was error to deny him presentence credits in connection with the instant action. The Attorney General agrees. So do we.
Section 2900.5 provides: "(a) In all felony and misdemeanor convictions, either by plea or by verdict, when the defendant has been in custody, including . . . any time spent in a jail . . . all days of custody of the defendant, including days served as a condition of probation in compliance with a court order, credited to the period of confinement pursuant to Section 4019, . . . shall be credited upon his or her term of imprisonment . . . . If the total number of days in custody exceeds the number of days of the term of imprisonment to be imposed, the entire term of imprisonment shall be deemed to have been served. . . . [¶] (b) For the purposes of this section, credit shall be given only where the custody to be credited is attributable to proceedings related to the same conduct for which the defendant has been convicted. Credit shall be given only once for a single period of custody attributable to multiple offenses for which a consecutive sentence is imposed."
The application of section 2900.5 is straightforward when a defendant is arrested for an offense and held in custody solely for that same offense. In that case, the defendant is unquestionably entitled to credit against his sentence for the time in custody from arrest until sentencing. (See In re Watson (1977) 19 Cal.3d 646, 651.) Applying section 2900.5 is also clear-cut where a defendant is serving a sentence for one offense and is charged with another, unrelated offense. In that case, the defendant is not entitled to credit because "the pending proceeding has no effect whatever upon a defendant's liberty." (In re Rojas (1979) 23 Cal.3d 152, 156.)
Between these two ends of the spectrum, application of section 2900.5 becomes more complicated. Nevertheless, as the Attorney General points out, our Supreme Court has found the statute applies in cases analogous to this one. In In re Marquez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 14 (Marquez), the defendant was convicted of burglary in Monterey County and convicted of an unrelated burglary in Santa Cruz County. (Id. at pp. 17-18.) Marquez had been in custody continuously since his arrest for the Santa Cruz County burglary. (Id. at p. 17.) He was sentenced for the Santa Cruz County burglary before being sentenced for the Monterey County burglary. (Id. at p. 18.) Eventually, the Sixth Appellate District reversed and dismissed the Santa Cruz County conviction. (Ibid.)
Subsequently, Marquez sought credit for time spent in custody from the time he was sentenced in the Santa Cruz County case until he was sentenced in the Monterey County case. (Marquez, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 18.) Marquez argued that once the Santa Cruz County conviction was reversed and dismissed, his confinement was attributable to the Monterey County case. (Id. at p. 19.) The Supreme Court agreed, holding this approach was consistent with the plain meaning of section 2900.5, subdivision (b). (Marquez, at p. 20.) Since the Santa Cruz County charges were dismissed, there was no threat of awarding defendant the windfall of double credits. (Id. at p. 23.) "The choice is instead between granting petitioner credit once for his time in custody between December 11, 1991, and April 2, 1992, [the time between sentencing in the Santa Cruz County case and sentencing in the Monterey County case] or granting him no credit at all for this period of local custody." (Ibid.)
In this case, the trial court's determination defendant was not entitled to dual presentence credit for this case and the Alameda case was reasonable. However, once the charges in the Alameda case were dismissed, defendant became entitled to the credit in this case. As in Marquez, there was no longer any chance of defendant receiving double credits for the time spent in custody. Moreover, if the trial court's ruling were permitted to stand, defendant would receive no credit at all for his time served. This result would be contrary to the law.
III. DISPOSITION
We reverse the trial court's decision denying defendant presentence custody credit. Defendant shall be awarded 340 days of credit for actual presentence custody and 340 days of credit for good conduct in custody, for a total of 680 days of credit. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.
/s/_________
Margulies, J. We concur: /s/_________
Humes, P.J. /s/_________
Dondero, J.