This state statute has been upheld by the New York State Appellate Division. See People v. Campbell, 827 N.Y.S.2d 768 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2007) (rejecting defendant's argument that VTL § 511(3) is constitutionally infirm); People v. Guszack, 654 N.Y.S.2d 845, 846 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 1997) (noting that "the statutory scheme [of VTL § 511(3)(a) suffers no constitutional infirmity"); see also People v. Cintron, 622 N.Y.S.2d 662, 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) ("[S]ection 511 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law must be characterized a recidivist statute which meets constitutional requirements . . . ."). Accordingly, plaintiff s request for declaratory relief must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B).
We disagree. Defendant did not commit the crime of aggravated harassment of an employee until he engaged in the prohibited conduct in February 1998, well after Penal Law § 240.32 was enacted, and he clearly had fair warning that his throwing of urine at a correction officer would result in criminal liability. Defendant's preexisting condition or status as an inmate does not result in an ex post facto violation (see, People v. Guszack, 237 A.D.2d 715). ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 300 A.D.2d 377, 751 N.Y.S.2d 530 (2nd Dept, 2002) [SORA, sexual offender registration changes found not to violate ex post facto prohibition.]. See also People v. Guszack, 237 A.D.2d 715, 654 N.Y.S.2d 845 (3rd Dep't, 1997) [“Defendant appeals, primarily contending that, as applied to him, Vehicle and Traffic Law § 511(3)(a) constitutes an ex post facto law because it provides for enhanced punishment as the result of a preexisting condition, i.e., the revocation of his driver's license in 1984. We disagree.”], and People v. Kearns, 253 A.D.2d 768, 677 N.Y.S.2d 497 (2nd Dep't, 1998) (sexual offender registration).