Opinion
4-23-0198
06-21-2023
In re S.R., a Minor v. Gustavo R., Respondent-Appellant. The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County No. 20JA480 Honorable Francis M. Martinez, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice DeArmond and Justice Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
HARRIS, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The trial court's unfitness finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 2 Respondent, Gustavo R., appeals from the trial court's judgment finding him to be an unfit parent and terminating his parental rights as to his minor child, S.R. (born in November 2020). On appeal, respondent challenges only the court's fitness determination. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 A. The Neglect Petition, Adjudication, and Disposition
¶ 5 On November 10, 2020, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging S.R. was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)) because S.R.'s mother, Tiffany M., (1) had a substance abuse problem (count I), (2) used illegal drugs while pregnant with S.R. (count II), and (3) had S.R.'s siblings removed from her care and was unable to correct the conditions that led to their removal (count III). The State subsequently filed an amended petition, alleging S.R. was neglected because her "umbilical cord test results tested positive with drugs in the system" (count IV). Respondent stipulated to the allegation in count IV, and the trial court entered an adjudicatory order finding S.R. was neglected. On March 30, 2021, the court entered a dispositional order finding respondent unfit to care for S.R. and making her a ward of the court. The court indicated in its order that respondent had been admonished he was prohibited from using marijuana "without further order of the court."
¶ 6 B. The Petition for Termination of Parental Rights
¶ 7 On November 17, 2022, the State filed a petition seeking a finding of respondent's unfitness and termination of his parental rights as to S.R. The State alleged respondent was an unfit parent within the meaning of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (D) (West 2022)) because he failed to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that led to S.R.'s removal during the nine-month period from "8/23/2021 to 5/23/2022 and/or 1/7/2022 to 10/7/2022" (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)) (count I) and (2) make reasonable progress toward S.R.'s return during the same period alleged in count I (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)) (count II).
¶ 8 1. The Fitness Hearing
¶ 9 The trial court conducted a fitness hearing on November 28, 2022, and December 13, 2022. At the outset, the court took judicial notice of the neglect petitions, the adjudicatory order, the dispositional order, and the permanency review orders without objection.
¶ 10 a. Mariah Huntley
¶ 11 The State called as its first and only witness Mariah Huntley, S.R.'s caseworker since October 2021. Huntley testified that respondent participated in an integrated assessment, and a service plan was created based on the results of the assessment. Huntley identified the integrated assessment and four service plans, which were admitted into evidence without objection. Huntley testified that respondent's service plan required him to engage in and successfully complete the following services: "Cooperation [with the agency], visitation, mental health, and substance use."
¶ 12 Regarding cooperation with the agency, Huntley testified she was unable to contact respondent between October 2021 and January 2022. However, according to Huntley, after January 2022, respondent maintained consistent contact with the agency and attended all required appointments and meetings. As for visitation and parenting services, Huntley testified respondent regularly attended visits with S.R. and he was always appropriate with her during the visits. Respondent also successfully completed a parenting class called "Helping Abusive Parents." With respect to the mental health services, Huntley testified respondent completed a mental health assessment in January 2021 and was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Respondent was referred to individual counseling to learn ways to cope with the symptoms of his PTSD. According to the final service plan, respondent was making some progress in counseling but was still "struggling] to get into his window of tolerance and continue[d] to use marijuana to self[-]medicate as opposed to the coping skills provided by [the counselor]." As for substance abuse services, Huntley testified that respondent was required to abstain from all substances and comply with random drug screenings. Huntley testified that respondent completed all the requested drug screenings but tested positive for marijuana each time. Huntley explained that the agency's overall concerns with respondent's ability to safely care for S.R. were "based on the seriousness of his traumatic responses, inability to emotionally regulate, and his use of marijuana, specifically his use of marijuana as a coping skill and a dependency."
¶ 13 On cross-examination, Huntley acknowledged that respondent had obtained a medical marijuana card in July or August 2021 and provided her with a copy of it. Huntley also explained that the reason respondent did not communicate with the agency from October 2021 to January 2022 was because the holiday season "was extremely triggering and difficult for him." Specifically, one of respondent's children had died of sudden infant death syndrome in October 2000 or 2001 and S.R.'s mother had died of a suspected overdose in December 2020. Huntley testified that respondent "self-reported that he kind of shuts down and has a really, really difficult time functioning during those time periods because they're extremely emotionally difficult for him."
¶ 14 b. Respondent
¶ 15 Respondent testified he used marijuana approximately once per week to cope with his anxiety. He explained that he used it when his "chest starts to hurt because I am starting to have anxiety attacks because I am worried about *** this court system taking my child from me." Respondent testified that when he obtained his medical marijuana card, the doctor did not provide him with instructions on how and when it was appropriate to use marijuana to cope with the symptoms of his PTSD. Thus, respondent stated he used marijuana as a form of "self-medication." He testified he believed he was using marijuana appropriately to treat his PTSD. Respondent refused to take prescription medication to treat his anxiety because he had known people who were prescribed medication and ultimately became addicted to various drugs and overdosed. Respondent further testified he was able to abstain from marijuana use for six months when he was on parole for a firearm offense in 2016. When asked why he was able to comply with the terms of his parole but not the trial court's directive in this case, he explained that the former situation "wasn't an emotional thing" for him so he did not experience the same anxiety and need to cope by using marijuana. Respondent also testified that he believed he was making some progress in his individual counseling sessions, "but not probably as fast as what others probably assumed I am doing."
¶ 16 c. The Trial Court's Ruling
¶ 17 Following the arguments of the parties, the trial court concluded the State had proven both counts in its termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. The court noted that it found respondent had "testified reasonably credibly." The court then provided the following reasoning for its unfitness finding:
"THE COURT: The problem with this case is-the main problem- perhaps not the only issue ***, but certainly the major elephant in the room was [respondent's] continued use of [marijuana] to self-medicate for issues such as anxiety. ***
And it's concerning to the Court because continued testing positive inhibited his ability to graduate to unsupervised visitation and eventual reunification. And the reason the Court is concerned is that medical marijuana *** is not treated like other controlled substances ***. Once a person achieves a medical marijuana card, there's no regulation as to intake, there's no prescription, there's no dosage recommended, there's no control. The Court cannot distinguish between someone who is legitimately-
And I'm not casting doubt on [respondent], but in general the reason we treat this this way is the Court has no way to ascertain whether a person is responsibly using medical marijuana or not. Therefore, the Court prohibits its use and seeks other methods to deal with issues of anxiety or other mental health issues.
In this case[,] that continued use of [marijuana] inhibited and prevented [respondent] from making progress. The efforts that he failed to make are efforts to engage in some type of medication or therapy that would substitute for [marijuana]. He testified very sincerely as to his reasons, but those reasons are not sufficient to overcome the Court's findings in this case."
¶ 18 2. The Best-Interest Determination
¶ 19 Following a best-interest hearing, the trial court found termination of respondent's parental rights was in S.R.'s best interest.
¶ 20 This appeal followed.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 On appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred in finding him to be an unfit parent. In support of his argument, respondent points to his successful completion of several of the requirements in his service plan and that, contrary to the court's finding, "there was sufficient evidence that supports [his] responsible use of marijuana." The State disagrees, arguing respondent "cannot pick and choose" the services with which to comply." 'A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's fitness finding unless it was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning that the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from a review of the record.'" In re A.L., 409 Ill.App.3d 492, 500 (2011) (quoting In re Jordan V., 347 Ill.App.3d 1057, 1067 (2004)).
¶ 23 In a proceeding to terminate parental rights, the State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit. In re DonaldA.G., 221 Ill.2d 234, 244 (2006). In making such a determination, the court considers whether the parent's conduct falls within one or more of the unfitness grounds described in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re D.D., 196 Ill.2d 405, 417 (2001). Under the Adoption Act, an unfit parent includes, in relevant part, any parent who fails to make reasonable progress toward his or her child's return during any nine-month period following the neglect adjudication. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022). In addressing section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act, our supreme court has stated the following:
"[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent's 'progress toward the return of the child' under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the parent's compliance with the service plans and the court's directives, in light of the condition which gave rise to the removal of the child, and in light of other conditions which later become known and which would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent." In re C.N., 196 Ill.2d 181, 216-17 (2001).
This court has described reasonable progress as "an 'objective standard,'" which exists "when 'the progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child returned to parental custody.'" (Emphasis in original.) In re F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88 (quoting In re L.L.S., 218 Ill.App.3d 444, 461 (1991)).
¶ 24 Here, we cannot say the trial court's unfitness finding with respect to reasonable progress was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence presented at the fitness hearing shows that respondent completed a mental health assessment and the "Helping Abusive Parents" parenting class, maintained largely consistent communication with the agency, regularly attended visitation with S.R. and acted appropriately during the visits, and regularly attended individual counseling sessions. However, the evidence also demonstrates that despite respondent's regular attendance at the counseling sessions, he was still struggling to use the coping mechanisms discussed in those sessions to manage his anxiety and PTSD, and he instead relied on marijuana to "self-medicate." Further, despite the court's clear admonishment that he was prohibited from using marijuana "without further order of the court," respondent continued to use marijuana throughout the duration of this case. In fact, he tested positive for marijuana at every drug screening. Thus, while respondent undoubtedly made some progress with respect to his service plan, his refusal to abstain from marijuana use resulted in the court finding it would not be able to return S.R. to his care in the near future. We are unable to say this finding was error. See id. (noting reasonable progress must be of such a quality that the trial court would be able to return the minor to the parent's care in the near future).
¶ 25 Simply because respondent disagreed with the rationale behind the requirement that he abstain from using marijuana would not have somehow invalidated the directive or have excused him from complying with it during the period alleged by the State. Moreover, he has failed to cite to any authority on appeal in support of his position that a parent's "responsible use of marijuana" allows a reviewing court to overlook the fact that the parent nonetheless failed to comply with their service plan or violated a trial court's directive. See Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (providing that an appellant's failure to cite to authority in support of an argument results in forfeiture of that argument). Accordingly, we reject respondent's argument that the trial court's unfitness finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and we need not address his remaining argument with respect to reasonable efforts. See In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 349 (2005) ("A parent's rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence.").
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 28 Affirmed.