First, the presentment agency must "demonstrate that the showup was reasonable under the circumstances. Proof that the showup was conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime will generally satisfy this element of the [presentment agency's] burden" (People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d at 537; see Matter of Shan M., 137 AD3d at 1145; People v Guitierres, 82 AD3d 1116, 1117). Second, the presentment agency must produce "some evidence relating to the showup itself, in order to demonstrate that the procedure was not unduly suggestive" (People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d at 537; see Matter of Shan M., 137 AD3d at 1145).

First, the presentment agency must "demonstrate that the showup was reasonable under the circumstances. Proof that the showup was conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime will generally satisfy this element of the [presentment agency's] burden" ( People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337 ; see Matter of Shan M., 137 A.D.3d at 1145, 28 N.Y.S.3d 101 ; People v. Guitierres, 82 A.D.3d 1116, 1117, 919 N.Y.S.2d 211 ). Second, the presentment agency must produce "some evidence relating to the showup itself, in order to demonstrate that the procedure was not unduly suggestive" ( People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337 ; see Matter of Shan M., 137 A.D.3d at 1145, 28 N.Y.S.3d 101 ).

First, the People must “demonstrate that the showup was reasonable under the circumstances. Proof that the showup was conducted in close geographic and temporal proximity to the crime will generally satisfy this element of the People's burden” (People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337; see People v. Guitierres, 82 A.D.3d 1116, 1117, 919 N.Y.S.2d 211). Second, the People must produce “some evidence relating to the showup itself, in order to demonstrate that the procedure was not unduly suggestive” (People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337). Here, the presentment agency met its initial burden of establishing the reasonableness of the police conduct and the lack of undue suggestiveness (see People v. Jerry, 126 A.D.3d 1001, 1002, 4 N.Y.S.3d 317; People v. Charles, 110 A.D.3d at 1095–1096, 973 N.Y.S.2d 763; People v. Calero, 105 A.D.3d 864, 864–865, 962 N.Y.S.2d 665).

Showup identification procedures, while disfavored, are permissible in the absence of exigent circumstances when the People demonstrate that it was reasonable under the circumstances, such as by being in close temporal and geographic proximity to the crime, and by not being performed in a manner that is unduly suggestive (see People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d 533, 537; People v Ward, 116 AD3d 989, 991; People v Calero, 105 AD3d 864; People v Johnson, 104 AD3d 705, 706). Here, the People established that the showup identification of the defendant occurred within close spatial and temporal proximity to the commission of the crime (see People v Ortiz, 90 NY2d at 537; People v Duuvon, 77 NY2d 541, 544; Matter of Russell F., 118 AD3d 874; People v Guitierres, 82 AD3d 1116). The identification occurred within two blocks of the crime, approximately 10 minutes after its occurrence.

Showup identification procedures, while disfavored, are permissible in the absence of exigent circumstances when the People demonstrate that it was reasonable under the circumstances, such as by being in close temporal and geographic proximity to the crime, and by not being performed in a manner that is unduly suggestive ( see People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337; People v. Ward, 116 A.D.3d 989, 991, 984 N.Y.S.2d 123; People v. Calero, 105 A.D.3d 864, 962 N.Y.S.2d 665; People v. Johnson, 104 A.D.3d 705, 706, 960 N.Y.S.2d 206). Here, the People established that the showup identification of the defendant occurred within close spatial and temporal proximity to the commission of the crime ( see People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337; People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 544, 569 N.Y.S.2d 346, 571 N.E.2d 654; Matter of Russell F., 118 A.D.3d 874, 987 N.Y.S.2d 626; People v. Guitierres, 82 A.D.3d 1116, 919 N.Y.S.2d 211). The identification occurred within two blocks of the crime, approximately 10 minutes after its occurrence. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the identification procedure utilized by the police was not unduly suggestive in the manner of its performance.

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the showup procedure by which the complainant identified him was reasonable under the circumstances, having been conducted in close spatial and temporal proximity to the incident ( see People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 544, 569 N.Y.S.2d 346, 571 N.E.2d 654;Matter of Dashawn R., 114 A.D.3d 686, 979 N.Y.S.2d 680;People v. Guitierres, 82 A.D.3d 1116, 1117, 919 N.Y.S.2d 211;Matter of Kassan D., 282 A.D.2d 747, 724 N.Y.S.2d 334). Furthermore, there was no evidence of undue suggestiveness ( see People v. Guy, 47 A.D.3d 643, 644, 850 N.Y.S.2d 476;Matter of Louis C., 6 A.D.3d 430, 431, 774 N.Y.S.2d 567;People v. Yearwood, 197 A.D.2d 554, 602 N.Y.S.2d 206). Accordingly, the Family Court properly denied suppression of the identification testimony. Viewed in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( see Matter of David H., 69 N.Y.2d 792, 793, 513 N.Y.S.2d 111, 505 N.E.2d 621), the evidence was legally sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the appellant's identity and that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of burglary in the second degree, petit larceny, and criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree ( see People v. Daddona, 81 N.Y.2d 990, 599 N.Y.S.2d 530, 615 N.E.2d 1014;Matter of Uriah M., 107 A.D.3d 997, 999, 966 N.Y.S.2d 874;Matter of Trayvond W., 71 A.D.3d 683, 894 N

ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Contrary to the appellant's contentions, the showup procedure by which the complainant identified him was reasonable under the circumstances, having been conducted in close spatial and temporal proximity to the incident ( see People v. Guitierres, 82 A.D.3d 1116, 919 N.Y.S.2d 211; Matter of Kassan D., 282 A.D.2d 747, 724 N.Y.S.2d 334). Furthermore, there was no evidence of undue suggestiveness ( see People v. Guy, 47 A.D.3d 643, 850 N.Y.S.2d 476; Matter of Louis C., 6 A.D.3d 430, 774 N.Y.S.2d 567). The appellant contends that his right to a speedy fact-finding hearing was violated ( seeFamily Ct. Act § 340.1[2]; Matter of George T., 99 N.Y.2d 307, 756 N.Y.S.2d 103, 786 N.E.2d 2; Matter of Frank C., 70 N.Y.2d 408, 413–414, 522 N.Y.S.2d 89, 516 N.E.2d 1203).

05[2]; People v. Acevedo, 84 A.D.3d 1390, 925 N.Y.S.2d 523;People v. Lago, 60 A.D.3d 784, 875 N.Y.S.2d 178;People v. Carter, 44 A.D.3d 677, 843 N.Y.S.2d 381). In any event, the contentions are without merit ( see People v. Guitierres, 82 A.D.3d 1116, 919 N.Y.S.2d 211;People v. Negron, 238 A.D.2d 444, 656 N.Y.S.2d 355). As the defendant failed to rebut the People's initial showing that the police conduct was reasonable and that the pretrial identification procedure was not unduly suggestive, the People were not required to establish an independent source for the proffered in-court identification ( see People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 335, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608). We find unpersuasive the defendant's contention in his pro se supplemental brief that the County Court erred in denying, without a hearing, that branch of his omnibus motion which was to controvert a search warrant and to suppress certain physical evidence seized in its execution.

As an alternative holding, we find that the officer's statement simply cautioned the victim against making an identification unless he was certain. This did not render the identification suggestive ( see People v. Guitierres, 82 A.D.3d 1116, 1117–1118, 919 N.Y.S.2d 211 [2d Dept.2011] ). Instead, it tended to reduce the risk of misidentification.

Finally, defendant's claim that the showup evidence should have been suppressed is also without merit. Although generally disfavored, showup procedures are permitted “where ... employed in close spatial and temporal proximity to the commission of the crime for the purpose of securing a prompt and reliable identification” ( People v. Guitierres, 82 A.D.3d 1116, 1117, 919 N.Y.S.2d 211 [2011];see generally People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d 533, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337 [1997];People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 569 N.Y.S.2d 346, 571 N.E.2d 654 [1991] ). “[T]he limits of an appropriate time between the alleged crime and a showup identification may vary from case to case” ( People v. Johnson, 81 N.Y.2d 828, 831, 595 N.Y.S.2d 385, 611 N.E.2d 286 [1993];see also People v. Brisco, 99 N.Y.2d 596, 597, 758 N.Y.S.2d 262, 788 N.E.2d 611 [2003] ). While the People “must demonstrate that the showup was reasonable under the circumstances,” it is defendant's “ultimate burden of proving that a showup procedure is unduly suggestive and subject to suppression” ( People v. Ortiz, 90 N.Y.2d at 537, 664 N.Y.S.2d 243, 686 N.E.2d 1337).