In examining Gill's argument, the Illinois appellate court noted that the challenged statutes had withstood similar constitutional challenges in the past and rejected Gill's claim on the merits. See, e.g., People v. Guidry, 220 Ill. App.3d 406, 163 Ill.Dec. 87, 581 N.E.2d 38 (1991). The court further held that the tendered instructions accurately set forth the law.
In fact, section 9-2(c) has withstood numerous constitutional challenges raised precisely because it shifts the burden to the defendant to prove the existence of a mitigating factor instead of requiring the State to disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 114-19 (1995); People v. Hooker, 249 Ill. App. 3d 394, 406 (1993) (collecting cases); People v. Guidry, 220 Ill. App. 3d 406, 412 (1991) (collecting cases); People v. Cook, 217 Ill. App. 3d 299, 301-05 (1991); People v. Brown, 218 Ill. App. 3d 890, 895-97 (1991); Buckner, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 529-34. We note that the decision in Buckner is particularly odd, because it rejects the defendant's argument that section 9-2 "improperly shifted the burden of proof to him" ( Buckner, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 529) yet still misstates the law by saying, without supporting authority, that, if the trier of fact finds mitigating factors to have been established by a preponderance of the evidence, "the State must disprove such factor(s) by proof beyond a reasonable doubt" ( Buckner, 203 Ill. App. 3d at 534).
In so ruling, we note that Officer Owens's failure to include an explanation of the furtive movements in his police report is inconsequential in this case. See People v. Allgood, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1088 (1993) (although two officers testified to observations not included in their police reports, the officers' statements merely showed that they omitted observations from their reports); People v. Guidry, 220 Ill. App. 3d 406, 410 (1991) (although the witness testified to a statement that was not included in the officer's police report, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the report contained a verbatim account of the witness' statement). Additionally, credibility determinations are left to the trier of fact and the trial court did not find Officer Owens's testimony about the furtive movements to be incredible.
The arguments advanced by defendant have been repeatedly rejected. (See People v. De Oca (1992), 238 Ill. App.3d 362, 370, 606 N.E.2d 332, appeal denied (1993), 149 Ill.2d 654, 612 N.E.2d 518; People v. Collier (1992), 228 Ill. App.3d 159, 161, 592 N.E.2d 444, appeal denied (1992), 146 Ill.2d 636, 602 N.E.2d 461; People v. Guidry (1991), 220 Ill. App.3d 406, 581 N.E.2d 38.) We will not reconsider these prior rulings.
• 3 As to the merits of defendant's contention, we observe that numerous appellate courts have considered and rejected arguments which maintained that the second degree murder statute violates due process. ( E.g., People v. Davis (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 1023, 583 N.E.2d 64; People v. Guidry (1991), 220 Ill. App.3d 406, 581 N.E.2d 38; People v. Willis (1991), 217 Ill. App.3d 909, 926, 577 N.E.2d 1215 (and cases cited therein); People v. Cook (1991), 217 Ill. App.3d 299, 576 N.E.2d 1242.) Given the abundance of authority holding that the second degree murder statute does not violate a defendant's constitutional rights to due process of law, we decline to expound at length on the present defendant's analogous argument. Due process requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all elements included in the definition of the offense with which the defendant is charged. ( People v. Mitchell (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 926, 931, 583 N.E.2d 78; People v. Brown (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 890, 896-97, 578 N.E.2d 1168.)
This court has on numerous and recent occasions considered and rejected these specific challenges to the constitutionality of our murder statute. (See, e.g., People v. Banks (1992), 227 Ill. App.3d 462, 592 N.E.2d 107; People v. Johnson (1992), 227 Ill. App.3d 800, 592 N.E.2d 345; People v. Smallwood (1991), 224 Ill. App.3d 393, 586 N.E.2d 636; People v. Davis (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 1023, 583 N.E.2d 64; People v. Guidry (1991), 220 Ill. App.3d 406, 581 N.E.2d 38; People v. Brown (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 890, 578 N.E.2d 1168; People v. Wright (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 764, 578 N.E.2d 1090; People v. Willis (1991), 217 Ill. App.3d 909, 577 N.E.2d 1215; Peoplev. Gore (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 984, 571 N.E.2d 1041; People v. Clark (1991), 207 Ill. App.3d 439, 565 N.E.2d 1373.) We decline to diverge from this substantial body of established precedent.
The arguments presented by defendant here have been previously considered by this court, and the statute has consistently been held constitutional. See, e.g., People v. Mitchell (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 926, 583 N.E.2d 78; People v. Davis (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 1023, 583 N.E.2d 64; People v. Guidry (1991), 220 Ill. App.3d 406, 581 N.E.2d 38; People v. Willis (1991), 217 Ill. App.3d 909, 577 N.E.2d 1215; People v. Doss (1991), 214 Ill. App.3d 1051, 574 N.E.2d 806. For all the above reasons, we affirm.
A plethora of recent decisions by this court have specifically addressed and rejected constitutional challenges to the Illinois murder statutes as raised by the defendant here. (See People v. Guidry (1991), 220 Ill. App.3d 406, 581 N.E.2d 38; People v. Brown (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 890, 578 N.E.2d 1168; and People v. Wright (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 764, 578 N.E.2d 1090.) As defendant has failed to present any new arguments which would require our reconsideration of prior rulings by this court, we render our decision here in accordance with the reasons set forth in the above mentioned decisions.
The arguments advanced by defendant have been repeatedly rejected, as acknowledged by defendant, in numerous appellate decisions. (See People v. Collier (1992), 228 Ill. App.3d 159, 161, 592 N.E.2d 444, citing People v. Guidry (1991), 220 Ill. App.3d 406, 581 N.E.2d 38; People v. Brown (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 890, 578 N.E.2d 1168; People v. Wright (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 764, 578 N.E.2d 1090; People v. Willis (1991), 217 Ill. App.3d 909, 577 N.E.2d 1215; People v. Cook (1991), 217 Ill. App.3d 299, 576 N.E.2d 1242; People v. Hrobowski (1991), 216 Ill. App.3d 711, 575 N.E.2d 1306; People v. Thomas (1991), 216 Ill. App.3d 469, 576 N.E.2d 1020; People v. Collins (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 818, 572 N.E.2d 1005; People v. Lyons (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 617, 572 N.E.2d 1163; People v. Gore (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 984, 571 N.E.2d 1041; People v. Clark (1991), 207 Ill. App.3d 439, 565 N.E.2d 1373; People v. Jerome (1990), 206 Ill. App.3d 428, 564 N.E.2d 221; People v. Buckner (1990), 203 Ill. App.3d 525, 561 N.E.2d 335; see also People v. Mitchell (1991), 221 Ill. App.3d 926, 583 N.E.2d 78.) We find no basis to reconsider these prior rulings.
A plethora of recent decisions by this court have specifically addressed and rejected defendant's constitutional challenge to the Illinois murder statutes. (See People v. Guidry (1991), 220 Ill. App.3d 406, 581 N.E.2d 38; People v. Brown (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 890, 578 N.E.2d 1168; People v. Wright (1991), 218 Ill. App.3d 764, 578 N.E.2d 1090; People v. Willis (1991), 217 Ill. App.3d 909, 577 N.E.2d 1215; People v. Cook (1991), 217 Ill. App.3d 299, 576 N.E.2d 1242; People v. Hrobowski (1991), 216 Ill. App.3d 711, 575 N.E.2d 1306; People v. Thomas (1991), 216 Ill. App.3d 469, 576 N.E.2d 1020; People v. Collins (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 818, 572 N.E.2d 1005; People v. Lyons (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 617, 572 N.E.2d 1163; People v. Gore (1991), 212 Ill. App.3d 984, 571 N.E.2d 1041; People v. Clark (1991), 207 Ill. App.3d 439, 565 N.E.2d 1373; People v. Jerome (1990), 206 Ill. App.3d 428, 564 N.E.2d 221; People v. Buckner (1990), 203 Ill. App.3d 525, 561 N.E.2d 335.) In the written briefs and at oral argument, defense counsel failed to present any new arguments which would necessitate our reconsideration of prior rulings by this court.