Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Monterey County, Super. Ct. No. SS070784
McAdams, J.
Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant Fredrick Guidotti pleaded guilty to a single count of possession for sale of methamphetamine and admitted a prior conviction that qualified as a strike. (Health & Saf. Code § 11378; Pen. Code § 1170.12.) In exchange, several other charges and enhancement allegations were dismissed, and defendant was promised a six-year prison sentence. The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in state prison and imposed a $440 lab fee and a $180 drug program fee (§§ 11372.5, subd. (a), 11372.7, subd. (a)), among other fines and fees. On appeal, defendant challenges the imposition of the laboratory and drug program fees.
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Health and Safety Code.
The facts are drawn from the probation report.
The historical facts are not pertinent to this appeal and may be briefly summarized. On January 29, 2007, Monterey County Sheriff’s deputies went to defendant’s residence to conduct a parole search. They encountered defendant in his vehicle. A search of the vehicle yielded a plastic bag containing crystal methamphetamine. More methamphetamine was found in defendant’s pocket, along with $1,160 in his wallet. In defendant’s room, police discovered a digital scale with white powdery residue on it. While police were at the residence, defendant’s cell phone rang continuously. At one point, a deputy answered the phone. The unidentified caller asked for “Freddy” and wanted to come over to get a “twenty.”
The probation report recommended that defendant pay a fine of $180 pursuant to section 11372.5 and another fine of $180 pursuant to section 11372.7. At the time of sentencing, the court remarked that “this is an error here where it talks about these fees on page 11. I think [Health & Saf. Code § 11]372.5 is 400 and something, isn’t it?” The probation officer responded: “$440, Judge.” The court then imposed $440 pursuant to section 11372.5 and $180 pursuant to section 11372.7.
CONTENTIONS
Defendant contends that the $440 laboratory fee and the $180 drug program fee are not authorized by statute and may be corrected on appeal, despite the lack of an objection below, because “[t]he imposition of a sentence not statutorily authorized is jurisdictional error that is subject to corrections whenever it comes to a court’s attention.” (People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1519 (Martinez).) He argues that the laboratory fee must be reduced to $50, but a remand to the trial court is required with respect to the drug program fee, because the court has the discretion to set that fee at less than $150. Finally, defendant argues that penalty assessments should not be added to the fees in issue, because they are not punishment.
The Attorney General agrees that the fees imposed in this case exceed the statutory maximum and are unauthorized. He argues, however, that a remand is unnecessary, and that the fees may be reduced by this court, although he also argues that this court should impose the penalty assessments mandated by Penal Code sections 1464 and 1465.7, and Government Code sections 70372, subdivision (a) and 76000. For the reasons discussed below, we accept the Attorney General’s concession that the fees are unauthorized and are subject to reduction, but we will remand to the trial court to specify and impose applicable penalty assessments.
DISCUSSION
The parties are correct that the laboratory analysis fee of $440 and the drug program fee imposed in his case are not authorized by sections 11372.5 and 11372.7. Section 11372.5 imposes a $50 laboratory analysis fee for every conviction under section 11378. Section 11372.7 imposes a drug program fee in an amount up to $150 for every conviction under section 11378. The trial court’s imposition of fees in excess of $50 and $150 were unauthorized by sections 11372.5 and 11372.7, respectively.
Health and Safety Code section 11372.5 provides, in relevant part: “Every person who is convicted of a violation of Section 11350, 11351, 11351.5, 11352, 11355, 11358, 11359, 11361, 11363, 11364, 11368, 11375, 11377, 11378, 11378.5, 11379, 11379.5, 11379.6, 11380, 11380.5, 11382, 11383, 11390, 11391, or 11550 or subdivision (a) or (c) of Section 11357, or subdivision (a) of Section 11360 of this code, or Section 4230 of the Business and Professions Code shall pay a criminal laboratory analysis fee in the amount of fifty dollars ($50) for each separate offense. The court shall increase the total fine necessary to include this increment.” (Italics added.)
Section 11372.7 provides, in relevant part: “(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b) or (e), each person who is convicted of a violation of this chapter shall pay a drug program fee in an amount not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for each separate offense. The court shall increase the total fine, if necessary, to include this increment, which shall be in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law. (b) The court shall determine whether or not the person who is convicted of a violation of this chapter has the ability to pay a drug program fee. If the court determines that the person has the ability to pay, the court may set the amount to be paid and order the person to pay that sum to the county in a manner that the court believes is reasonable and compatible with the person’s financial ability. In its determination of whether a person has the ability to pay, the court shall take into account the amount of any fine imposed upon that person and any amount that person has been ordered to pay in restitution. If the court determines that the person does not have the ability to pay a drug program fee, the person shall not be required to pay a drug program fee. (c) The county treasurer shall maintain a drug program fund. For every drug program fee assessed and collected pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b), an amount equal to this assessment shall be deposited into the fund for every conviction pursuant to this chapter, in addition to fines, forfeitures, and other moneys which are transmitted by the courts to the county treasurer pursuant to Sections 11372.5 and 11502. These deposits shall be made prior to any transfer pursuant to Section 11502. Amounts deposited in the drug program fund shall be allocated by the administrator of the county’s drug program to drug abuse programs in the schools and the community, subject to the approval of the board of supervisors.…”
The Laboratory Analysis Fee and Drug Program Fee Are Punitive
The parties diverge on the question whether additional penalty assessments should be added to the base amounts. The Attorney General argues that certain penalty assessments are mandatory and must be assessed, citing People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151. Defendant does not concede that any additional penalty assessments are authorized. Relying on People v. Vega (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 183 (Vega), defendant instead maintains that the fees imposed by sections 11372.5 and 11372.7 are not punishment imposed for purposes of “retribution and deterrence,” but rather are imposed to “defray administrative costs.” (Vega, at p. 195.) Defendant recognizes that other courts have reached the contrary conclusion. (People v. Jordan (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 349, 368 [lab fee] (Jordan); People v. Terrell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1256-1257 [lab fee] (Terrell); Martinez, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1522 [lab fee]; People v. Sierra (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1690, 1696 [drug program fee] (Sierra); cf. People v. Talibdeen, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1141 [failure to impose penalty assessments on lab fee is error correctable at any time].)
Jordan relied on Terrell; Terrell, in turn, relied on Martinez and Sierra. Martinez relied on Sierra and People v. Sanchez (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1329 (Sanchez). Our review, therefore will focus on Sierra and Sanchez. For the following reasons, we conclude that the “fees” imposed under sections 11372.5 and 11372.7 are in actuality penal fines and not civil fees.
In Sierra, the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s imposition of a $100 drug program fee pursuant to section 11372.7 plus a penalty assessment. The Sierra court rejected the defendant’s argument “that the drug program fee pursuant to … section 11372.7 is a specific fee created by the Legislature for a specific purpose and from the language of the statute is imposed in addition to a base fine”; it also rejected his contention that “the sanction of levying any additional penalty assessment on top of the drug program fee would permit an absurd result because the last sentence of this section provides that the drug program fee be imposed after all other fees because it ‘shall be in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law.’ ” (Sierra, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 1695.) As the Sierra court saw it, the problem with this “construction of Health and Safety Code section 11372.7, subdivision (a) is that the very sentence appellant attempts to interpret defines the drug program fee as an increase to the ‘total fine’ and later as a fine in addition ‘to any other penalty.’ (Italics added.) In other words, section 11372.7, subdivision (a) describes itself as both a fine and/or a penalty. [¶] … [¶] The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In order to determine such intent, courts begin by examining the language of the statute. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that the language of the statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend. [Citation.] [¶] Appellant’s interpretation of … section 11372.7 would lead to absurd consequences by reading out of that very section the fact that it is a fine and/or a penalty. So reading the statute, the trial court could not impose an otherwise mandatory penalty assessment. Appellant’s interpretation does violence to the express language of the statute and to the clear intent of the Legislature, and would lead to an absurd result. [¶] The only reasonable interpretation of … section 11372.7 is that it is a fine and/or a penalty to which the penalty assessment provisions of Penal Code section 1464 and Government Code section 76000 apply.” (Sierra, at pp. 1695-1696.) As noted above, other courts have cited the Sierra court’s opinion in support of their conclusions that section 11372.5’s laboratory analysis fee is also a penal fine.
In Sanchez, the trial court orally imposed a $50 laboratory analysis fee pursuant to section 11372.5 that was not reflected in the abstract of judgment. Division Five of the Second District Court of Appeal held that the criminal laboratory analysis fee is a fine that is a part of the judgment and, as such, must be reflected in the abstract of judgment. Analogizing the laboratory fee to a restitution fine, which has been held to be punitive, the Sanchez court reasoned: “Although identified as a laboratory fee, the sum imposed pursuant to … section 11372.5 is also described as an increment of a fine.” (Sanchez, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1332.) “Just as a ‘ “[r]ose is a rose is a rose is a rose[]” ’ [citations], a fine is a fine is a fine is a fine….” (Ibid.)
In Vega, Division Seven of the Second District Court of Appeal considered whether section 11372.5’s laboratory analysis fee, which on its face applies to violations of sections 11351 and 11352, also applies to conspiracy to commit violation of sections 11351 and 11352. The Vega court reasoned that since conspiracy is punishable to the same extent as the underlying crime (Pen. Code § 182, subd. (a)), if section 11372.5’s fee is actually a fine – that is, punishment – then it also applies to conspiracy to commit any of the crimes specified in section 11372.5. The Vega court held, without discussing Sanchez (or Sierra), that the criminal laboratory analysis fee is not punishment for purposes of Penal Code section 182, subdivision (a). (Vega, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 193-195.)
The court reasoned: “A cogent argument can be made from the language of … section 11372.5, subdivision (a) the Legislature intended the $50 laboratory ‘fee’ to be an additional punishment for conviction of one of the enumerated felonies. Subdivision (a) of the statute states in relevant part: ‘Every person who is convicted of a violation of section 11350 [or] 11352 ... shall pay a criminal laboratory analysis fee in the amount of fifty dollars ($50) for each separate offense. The court shall increase the total fine necessary to include this increment.’ (Italics added.) The same subdivision also provides: ‘With respect to those offenses specified in this subdivision for which a fine is not authorized by other provisions of law, the court shall, upon conviction, impose a fine in an amount not to exceed fifty dollars ($50), which shall constitute the increment prescribed by this section and which shall be in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law.” (Italics added.) [¶] Support for this interpretation of the statute can also be found in People v. Talibdeen in which our Supreme Court held the penalty assessments applicable to ‘ “every fine, penalty, or forfeiture” ’ applied to the laboratory analysis fee in … section 11372.5. Talibdeen is not controlling … because the court did not address the question whether the laboratory analysis fee was a punishment. Rather, the court and the parties in Talibdeen proceeded under the assumption the fee was a punishment and addressed the question whether the trial court had discretion to waive the penalty assessments. [¶] Furthermore, the label the Legislature places on a charge, whether ‘fee’ or ‘fine’ is not determinative, especially where as here the Legislature used both terms. Courts have developed multi-part tests for determining whether something is a ‘punishment’ but it would needlessly prolong this opinion to engage in a detailed analysis of every factor. In most cases the determination can be made on the basis of the purpose of the charge imposed. Fines are imposed for retribution and deterrence; fees are imposed to defray administrative costs. It is clear to us the main purpose of … section 11372.5 is not to exact retribution against drug dealers or to deter drug dealing … but rather to offset the administrative cost of testing the purported drugs the defendant transported or possessed for sale in order to secure his conviction. The legislative description of the charge as a ‘laboratory analysis fee’ strongly supports our conclusion, as does the fact the charge is a flat amount, it does not slide up or down depending on the seriousness of the crime, and the proceeds from the fee must be deposited into a special ‘criminalistics laboratories fund’ maintained in each county by the county treasurer.” (Vega, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 194-195, fns. omitted.)
We agree with the Vega court’s finding that one purpose of section 11372.5 is to offset the administrative costs of testing drugs confiscated from all persons convicted of certain drug offenses. However, the fact that the Legislature may have had more than one purpose in enacting a statute does not make an otherwise penal statute nonpunitive. (People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1198-1199 (High).) We cannot agree with defendant that Vega is dispositive of the question whether the laboratory analysis fee imposed under section 11372.5 and the drug program fee imposed under section 11372.7, have no punitive purpose or reflect a legislative intent to exempt these two fees from the mandatory penalties imposed under other statutes. (See e.g., Pen. Code §§ 1464, 1465.7; Gov. Code §§ 76000, 70372, 70375.)
We borrow the applicable legal principles from the ex post facto context. “[I]n assessing whether a statute imposes punishment, we inquire (1) whether the Legislature intended the sanction to be punitive and, if not, (2) whether the sanction is so punitive in effect as to prevent the court from legitimately viewing it as regulatory or civil in nature.” (People v. Madeyski (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 659, 662-663, citing People v. Rivera (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 705, 709 (Rivera) [criminal justice administration fees for booking and jail classification imposed per Gov. Code § 29559.2 are not punitive].) “ ‘We consider the statute’s text and its structure to determine the legislative objective.’ ” (People v. Wallace (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 867, 875 [court security fee is nonpunitive] (Wallace).) “ ‘If the intention of the legislature [or electorate] was to impose punishment, that ends the inquiry. If, however, the intention was to enact a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive, we must further examine whether the statutory scheme is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention” to deem it “civil.” ’ ” (People v. Batman (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 587, 590 [DNA penalty assessment in Gov. Code § 76104.6 is punitive] (Batman).) “ ‘The courts “must first ask whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.” ’ ” (Wallace,at p. 875.)
On this point we find Sierra and Sanchez more persuasive than Vega. The charges imposed under sections 11372.5 and 11372.7 are, as defendant argues, denominated as lab analysis and drug program “fees.” However, “[t]he Legislature’s choice of what in most cases would be considered a more nonpunitive term, a fee as distinguished from a fine, is directly relevant albeit not entirely dispositive in assessing the legislative intent question.” (Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 876.) In this case, despite the use of the term “fee,” the legislature has defined each “fee” as the “increment” of a “total fine” and, in section 11372.7, has also referred to the drug program fee as additional to “any other penalty.” (§§ 11372.5, subd. (a), 11372.7, subd. (a), italics added.) This language indicates a punitive purpose. (Ibid.)
In addition, other factors point to a punitive purpose. Unlike the court security fee, which applies to both criminal and specified civil cases, and which the Wallace court determined was not punitive, the lab analysis and drug program fees here are imposed only in criminal cases, upon persons convicted of specified drug offenses; the adoption of the statutes was not dependent upon budgetary concerns; and no nonpunitive legislative purpose is expressly stated in the statutes themselves. (See, e.g., Pen. Code § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1) [“To ensure and maintain adequate funding for court security”]; Wallace, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at pp. 875-876; see also People v. Crittle (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 368 [because Pen. Code § 1465.8 applies to every criminal conviction and is not punitive, court security fee must be imposed on counts stayed per Pen. Code § 654].)
And, unlike the “criminal justice administration fees” for the costs of booking and jail classification imposed by Government Code section 29950.2, which were found to be nonpunitive in Rivera, the drug program and lab analysis fees here are not expressly linked to the actual administrative costs incurred on account of those persons who are convicted of the specific offenses listed in the statutes. The language of sections 11372.5 and 11372.7 in no way indicates that the charges imposed are “in effect, … administrative ‘user’ fee[s].” (Rivera, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 711.)
Finally, like the DNA penalty assessment (Gov. Code § 76104.6), and the state court facilities construction penalty assessment (Gov. Code § 70372), the statutes under consideration here use language indicative of punishment (“increment” of a “total fine”; “any other penalty”), the fees are imposed only on persons convicted of criminal offenses, the fees are transmitted by the courts to the county treasurer pursuant to section 11502 in the same way as other criminal fines, forfeitures and other moneys, and the fees collected are earmarked for future law enforcement purposes. (See § 11372.5, subd. (b); 11372.7, subd. (c). (Batman, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 590 [DNA penalty]; High, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th 1192 [state court facilities construction penalty assessment].)
Section 11372.5, subdivision (b) provides: “The county treasurer shall maintain a criminalistics laboratories fund. The sum of fifty dollars ($50) shall be deposited into the fund for every conviction under Section 11350, 11351, 11351.5, 11352, 11355, 11358, 11359, 11361, 11363, 11364, 11368, 11375, 11377, 11378, 11378.5, 11379, 11379.5, 11379.6, 11380, 11380.5, 11382, 11383, 11390, 11391, or 11550, subdivision (a) or (c) of Section 11357, or subdivision (a) of Section 11360 of this code, or Section 4230 of the Business and Professions Code, in addition to fines, forfeitures, and other moneys which are transmitted by the courts to the county treasurer pursuant to Section 11502. The deposits shall be made prior to any transfer pursuant to Section 11502. The county may retain an amount of this money equal to its administrative cost incurred pursuant to this section. Moneys in the criminalistics laboratories fund shall, except as otherwise provided in this section, be used exclusively to fund (1) costs incurred by criminalistics laboratories providing microscopic and chemical analyses for controlled substances, in connection with criminal investigations conducted within both the incorporated or unincorporated portions of the county, (2) the purchase and maintenance of equipment for use by these laboratories in performing the analyses, and (3) for continuing education, training, and scientific development of forensic scientists regularly employed by these laboratories. Moneys in the criminalistics laboratory fund shall be in addition to any allocations pursuant to existing law. As used in this section, ‘criminalistics laboratory’ means a laboratory operated by, or under contract with, a city, county, or other public agency, including a criminalistics laboratory of the Department of Justice, (1) which has not less than one regularly employed forensic scientist engaged in the analysis of solid-dose controlled substances, and (2) which is registered as an analytical laboratory with the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of Justice for the possession of all scheduled controlled substances. In counties served by criminalistics laboratories of the Department of Justice, amounts deposited in the criminalistics laboratories fund, after deduction of appropriate and reasonable county overhead charges not to exceed 5 percent attributable to the collection thereof, shall be paid by the county treasurer once a month to the Controller for deposit into the state General Fund, and shall be excepted from the expenditure requirements otherwise prescribed by this subdivision.”
Section 11372.7, subdivision (c) provides in relevant part: “The county treasurer shall maintain a drug program fund. For every drug program fee assessed and collected pursuant to subdivisions (a) and (b), an amount equal to this assessment shall be deposited into the fund for every conviction pursuant to this chapter, in addition to fines, forfeitures, and other moneys which are transmitted by the courts to the county treasurer pursuant to Sections 11372.5 and 11502. These deposits shall be made prior to any transfer pursuant to Section 11502. Amounts deposited in the drug program fund shall be allocated by the administrator of the county’s drug program to drug abuse programs in the schools and the community, subject to the approval of the board of supervisors, as follows: [¶] … [¶] (2) A minimum of 33 percent of the fund shall be allocated to primary prevention programs in the schools and the community. … These primary prevention programs may include: [¶] (A) School- and classroom-oriented programs.… [¶] (B) School- or community-based nonclassroom alternative programs.… [¶] (C) Family-oriented programs.… [¶] (d) Moneys deposited into a county drug program fund pursuant to this section shall supplement, and shall not supplant, any local funds made available to support the county’s drug abuse prevention and treatment efforts.”
In sum, we reject defendant’s claim that the terms “criminal laboratory analysis fee” or “drug program fee” are more specific terms that trump all of the other indicators, discussed above, which lead us to conclude that the Legislature intended the charges imposed by sections 11372.5 and 11372.7 as additional punishment for certain drug offenses subject to penalty assessments. The Sierra court rejected a very similar argument, and we agree with that court’s reasoning as well.
Remand is Required Here
The Attorney General contends that we must modify the judgment to impose the mandatory penalty assessments under (1) Penal Code section 1464; (2) Penal Code section 1465.7; (3) Government Code section 70372; and Government Code section 76000. By the People’s calculation, the laboratory analysis fee plus mandatory assessments should be $120 rather than $440, while the drug program fee plus the same assessments should be $360 rather than $180.
Penal Code section 1464, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part: “Subject to Chapter 12 (commencing with Section 76000) of Title 8 of the Government Code, … there shall be levied a state penalty, in the amount of ten dollars ($10) for every ten dollars ($10), or part of ten dollars ($10), upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses, including all offenses, except parking offenses as defined in subdivision (i) of Section 1463, involving a violation of a section of the Vehicle Code or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to the Vehicle Code.”
Penal Code section 1465.7, subdivision (a) provides: “A state surcharge of 20 percent shall be levied on the base fine used to calculate the state penalty assessment as specified in subdivision (a) of Section 1464.”
Government Code section 70372, provides: “(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b) of Section 70375 and in this article, there shall be levied a state court construction penalty, in the amount of five dollars ($5) for every ten dollars ($10), or part of ten dollars ($10), upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses, including, but not limited to, all offenses involving a violation of a section of the Fish and Game Code, the Health and Safety Code, or the Vehicle Code or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to the Vehicle Code. This penalty is in addition to any other state or local penalty, including, but not limited to, the penalty provided by Section 1464 of the Penal Code and Section 76000. [¶] (2) The amount of the court construction penalty may be reduced by a county as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 70375.”
Government Code section 76000, subdivisions (a) and (e) provide, in relevant part: “(a)(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this section, in each county there shall be levied an additional penalty in the amount of seven dollars ($7) for every ten dollars ($10), or part of ten dollars ($10), upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for all criminal offenses, including all offenses involving a violation of the Vehicle Code or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to the Vehicle Code. [¶] … [¶] (e) The seven-dollar ($7) additional penalty authorized by subdivision (a) shall be reduced in each county by the additional penalty amount assessed by the county for the local courthouse construction fund established by Section 76100 as of January 1, 1998, when the money in that fund is transferred to the state under Section 70402. The amount each county shall charge as an additional penalty under this section shall be as follows: [¶] … [¶] Monterey $5.00.”
Given the wide disparity between the amounts imposed by the trial court and the amounts recommended by the Attorney General, the bewildering array of penalty assessment statutes, some of which vary in their application from county to county, and the trial court’s failure to specify the statutory bases for the penalty assessments, it is impossible for us to determine how the court arrived at $440 in fees and penalty assessments, or what the correct amounts might be. There may be other statutes not cited by the parties on appeal that the court applied in calculating the penalty assessments. (See, e.g., Gov. Code §§ 76104.6, 76104.7, 76000.5, subd. (a).)
“Although we recognize that a detailed recitation of all the fees, fines and penalties on the record may be tedious, California law does not authorize shortcuts. All fines and fees must be set forth in the abstract of judgment.” (High, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1200.) In order to facilitate review of the penalty assessments imposed in a case, as well as assist in collection efforts, it is important for the trial court to recite the statutory basis for the penalty assessments. (See People v. Taylor (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 454, 456-460; High, at p. 1200.) While the trial court may have properly assessed penalty assessments in this case, on this record we cannot tell. The trial court should, in the future, state the statutory bases for penalty assessments and, where necessary, make the requisite, underlying factual findings. For the present case, we will remand for further hearing regarding the statutory bases for the penalty assessments, and the amount of the base fine pursuant to section 11372.7, the drug program fee.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings regarding the statutory bases for fines and penalties assessed pursuant to Health and Safety Code sections 11372.5 and 11372.7. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the statutory bases for all fines and penalty assessments related to those sections. The trial court is further directed to forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections.
WE CONCUR:
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Mihara, J.