Opinion
Docket No. CR-004846-23QN
11-03-2023
The People of the State of New York v. Guardo, Defendant.
For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney (by Tara Hayes & Alyssa Glasshagel) For Mr. Guardo: The Legal Aid Society (by Angela Navarro)
Unpublished Opinion
For the People: Melinda Katz, District Attorney (by Tara Hayes & Alyssa Glasshagel)
For Mr. Guardo: The Legal Aid Society (by Angela Navarro)
Wanda L. Licitra, J.
On September 6, 2023, this court conducted a Mapp / Dunaway / Johnson hearing. The following now constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
At the hearing, the People called one witness, Michael Catanzaro. The court credits his testimony in full. Michael Catanzaro is an NYPD police officer who works at the 102nd Precinct. He has worked for the NYPD for four years. Before that, he was trained to be a police officer at the NYPD Police Academy. There, he was trained on "vehicle and traffic investigations" and "car stops." In his career, Officer Catanzaro has been involved in about one hundred "vehicle and traffic investigations" involving intoxicated persons and has made three to five arrests. To determine if someone is intoxicated, he looks to whether the person sways or has slurred speech or a smell of alcohol.
On February 19, 2023, Officer Catanzaro was working a patrol within the 102nd Precinct with his partner, Officer Roell. They were in a marked vehicle and Officer Catanzaro was the passenger. They were both in uniform.
At around 8:00 a.m., Officer Catanzaro observed a vehicle stopped, "parked," at a steady green light at the intersection of Lefferts Boulevard and Anderson Road in Queens. The car was in the middle of the road, blocking traffic, and it was there for a couple minutes. Other cars were driving around the vehicle. The officers activated their overhead lights and got out of their car. They went to the vehicle that was stopped in front of the steady green light and Officer Catanzaro knocked on the driver's side window. Through the window, he saw a man sleeping on the driver's side with an open Corona bottle in the cupholder, and he saw that the car was in "park." The person in the driver's seat was Mr. Guardo. No one else was in the vehicle. The car was on, and the engine was running.
Officer Catanzaro then opened the door, turned the car off, and took the key out of the ignition. He also rubbed Mr. Guardo on the chest to see if he would wake up. While doing this, he was about one foot away from Mr. Guardo and smelled alcohol. After the officer rubbed Mr. Guardo's chest, Mr. Guardo woke up. The officer told him to step out of the vehicle. When he asked Mr. Guardo to step out of the vehicle, the officer observed that Mr. Guardo had slurred speech, red eyes, and smelled like alcohol. That said, Mr. Guardo speaks Spanish, and the officer does not know how he normally speaks or how his eyes normally look. The officer then put him in handcuffs.
The officer then took Mr. Guardo to the 112th Precinct to take a chemical test. The test was administered within two hours of the arrest.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
At a Mapp / Dunaway / Johnson hearing, the People have the initial burden of going forward with facts that establish, prima facie, that each police action was lawful. (See, e.g., People v. Harris, 192 A.D.3d 151, 157-58 [2d Dep't 2020]). If the People meet their burden of production, the burden then shifts to the defense to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the police action was unlawful. (See, e.g., id.).
When police encounter a running car that is stationary at a traffic light, the court must conduct a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a seizure occurred. (See generally People v. Ocasio, 85 N.Y.2d 982 [1995]). The standard is "whether a reasonable person would have believed, under the circumstances, that the officer's conduct was a significant limitation on his or her freedom." (Id. at 984). That analysis requires considering whether there was a "chase"; whether "lights, sirens or a loudspeaker" was used; whether "verbal commands were given"; what the "content and tone of the commands" were; "how many officers were involved"; and "where" the "encounter" took place. (Id.).
As an initial matter, the court concludes that the police seized Mr. Guardo when they activated their overhead lights. A reasonable person would believe that a police officer "using their turret lights" was a significant limitation on their freedom. (See People v. Spencer, 84 N.Y.2d 749, 751 [1995] [turret lights and car horn sufficient to constitute seizure]; People v. May, 81 N.Y.2d 725, 727 [1992] [turret lights, spotlight, and loudspeaker sufficient to constitute seizure]; People v. E.C., 77 Misc.3d 944, 956 [Just. Ct., Westchester County 2022] [turret lights and approach sufficient to constitute seizure]; People v. Culcross, 184 Misc.2d 67, 68 [County Ct., Monroe County 2000] ["When the police, using red turret lights, required the Defendant-Appellate to pull his car over, he was effectively 'seized.'"]; see also People v. Velasquez, 64 Misc.3d 575, 581 [Crim. Ct., Bronx County 2019] [noting that "turret lights" are "characteristic of a police-dominated environment"]; cf. People v. Brown, 142 A.D.3d 1373, 1375 [4th Dep't 2016] [finding no seizure where the officer "never activated his vehicle's overhead lights or siren"]). Any reasonable person who sees a police car activate its overhead lights behind them understands that they are not free to leave.
This seizure cannot be justified under the traditional De Bour framework. (See generally People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 [1976]; People v. Hinshaw, 35 N.Y.3d 427 [2020] [explaining the De Bour principles as applied to automobile stops]). Police may stop an automobile traveling on a public highway upon "probable cause that a driver has committed a traffic violation"; "reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime"; or "nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory, uniform highway traffic procedures." (Hinshaw, 35 N.Y.3d at 430 [internal quotation marks omitted]). A car stalled in front of a green light for two minutes does not provide the police any suspicion of criminal activity. Nor have the People or the police pointed to any provision of the Vehicle and Traffic Law that such behavior violated here.
But that does not end the matter. Both the New York State and federal constitutions proscribe "unreasonable" searches and seizures. (NY Const. art. I, § 12; U.S. Const. amend. IV). As a result, the "touchstone" of a constitutional search-and-seizure analysis is "reasonableness." (People v. Garvin, 30 N.Y.3d 174, 186 [2017]). While De Bour 's levels concern an escalating police investigation for a crime, police may also act reasonably for other purposes. Such other purposes include rendering aid, providing emergency assistance, or taking care of the community. (See People v. Klossner, 145 A.D.3d 1648, 1649 [4th Dep't 2016]; People v. McPherson, 89 A.D.3d 752 [2d Dep't 2011]; see generally Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 [2006]; People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173 [1976]).
Here, police came upon a vehicle stopped at a steady green light in the middle of the road and blocking traffic. It was stationary there for a couple minutes. Other cars were driving around the vehicle. These circumstances suggested that the driver of that car may have needed assistance. They therefore warranted the police activating their turret lights and approaching the vehicle for the purpose of rendering aid.
Admittedly, the People elicited no testimony that the police took these actions because they were, in fact, concerned that someone may need help. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that under the federal Constitution, the "community caretaking" analysis is an "objective" one. (Brigham City, 547 U.S. at 404). "An action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action." (Id. [internal quotation marks omitted]). "It therefore does not matter," under federal law, whether the actual subjective intent of the police was to "arrest" Mr. Guardo "and gather evidence" or to "assist" him as a possibly injured person. (See id.). It has not been settled whether the New York State Constitution may separately require analyzing an officer's subjective intent. (See, e.g., People v. Alberts, 161 A.D.3d 1298 [3d Dep't 2018]; People v. Rossi, 99 A.D.3d 947 [2d Dep't 2012]; see also People v. S.S., 79 Misc.3d 1217 [A], at *3 [Sup. Ct., Kings County 2023] [analyzing the intent of the officers]). Nonetheless, the defense does not argue that it does, and the court declines to do so sua sponte without argument from the parties.
The rest of the police's actions are straightforward. Upon approaching the car, the police observed the driver unconscious at the wheel with an open Corona bottle in the cupholder. The car was on, and the engine was running. And, again, the car was in the middle of the road, stalled at a green light for several minutes. These circumstances sufficiently provide reasonable suspicion that the driver had been driving while intoxicated. That quantum of suspicion justifies the police in opening the car door and seizing the driver's keys. (See People v. Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470 [1982]; People v. Noble, 154 A.D.3d 883 [2d Dep't 2017]). Upon observing that the driver also smelled like alcohol, the police had probable cause to arrest. (People v. Fasano, 66 Misc.3d 149 [A] [App. Term, 2d Dep't 2020]). Finally, the IDTU chemical test was properly within the two-hour implied consent window. (V.T.L. § 1194[2][a]).
Accordingly, the motion to suppress is denied.
The foregoing constitutes the order and decision of the court.