Opinion
C080306
01-16-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GORDON CHARLES GRISSOM, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14F4645)
A jury found defendant Gordon Charles Grissom guilty of 32 sexual offenses committed against one minor victim. The trial court sentenced defendant to 54 years in prison.
Defendant now contends the trial court erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress statements made to detectives because he made the statements during a custodial interrogation without first receiving Miranda warnings, and (2) requiring defendant to reimburse law enforcement for medical examinations occurring after sentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1h.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress, but we will modify the judgment to strike the order requiring defendant to reimburse law enforcement for future medical examinations and affirm the judgment as modified.
BACKGROUND
Defendant engaged in regular sexual intercourse with the minor over the course of two years, sometimes as often as two or three times a day. The sexual acts included oral copulation, digital penetration, vaginal intercourse, and anal sex.
The minor became pregnant repeatedly and defendant helped her obtain multiple abortions. When the minor was 14 she became pregnant again and gave birth to a child when she was 15. Defendant was the father of the child. Almost one year later, the minor told family members defendant was the father of the baby and admitted their sexual relationship. Defendant also admitted to the family members that he was the child's father and that he and the minor had been "seeing each other" for a few years, and had been having a sexual relationship since the minor was 12 years old. The family members contacted law enforcement.
Shasta County Sheriff's Detective Chris Edwards interviewed the minor. The next day, the minor and Detective Edwards met at a sheriff's substation in a shopping mall. The minor placed a pretext phone call to defendant and asked him to pick her up from the shopping mall. When defendant pulled into the shopping mall, Detective Edwards and Detective Gene Randall approached his vehicle and asked to speak with him. During a recorded interview, played for the jury, defendant acknowledged he had a sexual relationship with the minor over the course of multiple years that involved numerous and varied sexual acts.
The jury convicted defendant on 32 counts of sexual offenses against the minor, including 19 counts of lewd and lascivious acts on a child under 14, one count of oral copulation of a person under 14, three counts of sodomy of a person under 18, five counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under 16, two counts of sexual penetration with a foreign object, and two counts of oral copulation of a person under 16. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 54 years in prison, awarded 449 days of presentence credit, and ordered defendant to pay a $10,000 restitution fine (§ 1202.4), a $10,000 parole revocation fine (§ 1202.45), a $1,280 court security fee (§ 1465.8), a $960 criminal conviction assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), and to pay direct victim restitution in an amount to be determined. The trial court ordered defendant to register as a sex offender and to submit DNA and other samples as necessary.
The trial court also ordered defendant to pay the law enforcement cost for any subsequent medical examinations conducted on the minor. The trial court did not orally state the statutory basis for this order, but the abstract of judgment indicates it was ordered pursuant to section 1203.1h.
Additional facts are included in the discussion as relevant to the contentions on appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made to Detectives Edwards and Randall, arguing the statements were the product of a custodial interrogation and he was not given the warnings required by Miranda.
A
At an evidentiary hearing on defendant's suppression motion, Detective Edwards testified that he arranged for the minor to place a pretext phone call to defendant in which she asked defendant to pick her up at the mall. When defendant arrived, Edwards and Randall went out to meet him. Edwards was in plain clothes, with a badge and gun on his hip. He identified himself as a detective, said he was investigating a case involving the minor, and asked to speak with defendant about it. Defendant agreed to speak with him.
Detective Edwards told defendant they were trying "to make sense of all this mess." Defendant said he had also been trying to make "sense of it for almost two years." He claimed he had gotten drunk one night and the next morning, the minor said they had sexual intercourse. When the minor was about three months pregnant, she told him he was the father. Because he was drunk, he did not know whether he was or not. He stated he had never forced her into anything. Detective Randall told defendant they had his DNA on file and "we probably wouldn't be havin' this conversation if you weren't the father."
Defendant said the minor was 14 years old when she got pregnant. He said he was worried he might be the father "[b]ecause of the drunk night that she says that we did something." He acknowledged that if he had sex with the minor he was "screwed." Detective Randall responded, "We don't wanna compound one - one bad decision and one mistake. I mean, that's just a snapshot of your life." Noting it was hot outside Randall suggested they continue the conversation inside the substation. Defendant agreed. They also discussed him getting the key out of the ignition and locking his car.
The room inside the substation was about 25 feet by 15 feet. Defendant sat with his back to the door and no one was between defendant and the door. Detective Randall was across from defendant to his left. Defendant was emotional but in control. He did not express any fear.
In the substation, Detective Randall assured defendant: "Okay. Gordon, um, again, I appreciate your cooperating with us. I do. And I don't think that you're a bad person.
"[Defendant]: No, but you think I'm the father or you wouldn't have made the comment about DNA.
"[Randall]: Okay. And - hold on, just listen to me. I don't think that you're a bad person.
"[Defendant]: (Unintelligible).
"[Randall]: Gordon, are - lis- okay, listen to me real carefully. Are you in handcuffs right now?
"[Defendant]: No.
"[Randall]: Huh?
"[Defendant]: No.
"[Randall]: Okay. Are you under arrest?
"[Defendant]: No.
"[Randall]: Okay. Did - that door is unlocked, okay. Hold on, Gordon, listen. That door is unlocked. You're free to go. . .
"[Defendant]: I don't care about goin' to jail. That's not the point.
"[Randall]: Hold on - hold on, listen. Gordon, listen to me. The door is unlocked, you're free to go at any time. But you're here to work this out and to be honest. . . [¶] . . . [¶] Okay. And if you're here to be honest let's clear the air once and for all and - and talk about what it is that's been goin' on because I know how girls could be with a strong male in their lives and it's hard. There's a good chance that maybe she was comin' on to you. I don't know."
Defendant indicated the minor had once come on to him and he told her she was confused. She claimed he was the child's father and he dismissed it. He then claimed he had previously had a vasectomy and relayed some of the family history.
Detective Randall interrupted: "Gordon, listen. I understand that you're a good guy but here's the - here's the issue. [¶] . . . [¶] Is that now that CPS is involved, then - I mean the ball's kinda rollin' here. And what we don't want to have happen, [defendant], is for you to think - you have an opportunity right now for a clean slate. I know, you know, just in talkin' to you that you're a good guy. And I don't think that you wan- wish an ill-will to anybody."
Detective Randall told defendant they knew he had an ongoing sexual relationship with the minor. Defendant denied it was ongoing, claimed he had not acted on anything, and walked away when she tried to kiss him.
Detective Randall interjected: "Hold on, we're way - we're way beyond that right now, okay. You're the father of her child, okay. We're in a mess here and we gotta figure this out. I'm not sayin' that you're a bad guy. But I know, you know, I'm a guy too. Detective Edwards is a man.
"[Edwards]: We're all men here, sittin' here talkin', okay? The difference is that we're honestly tryin' to help you get this thing outta you, okay? We're - we're not tryin' to jam you up (unintelligible).
"[Defendant]: "I don't know what to - I don't know what to fix. I don't know how to fix it." Detective Randall told defendant to just tell the truth.
After further conversation, defendant admitted he had let his "feelings get screwed up for a child that should've been my daughter, not anything else." He stated he would marry her if he could, he loved her, although he knew it was not "right." After defendant admitted he had fallen " 'in love with a kid,' " Detective Randall asked defendant to open up. Defendant admitted he had sex with the minor more than once. Defendant then detailed the course of the relationship and made progressively incriminating statements about the nature of the relationship with the minor. Ultimately he admitted he had sexual intercourse with her 50 times after she was 14, oral sex 25 to 30 times, anal sex once, and digitally penetrated her four to five times. Toward the end of the interview, defendant said, "I'm sittin' here tellin' you guys the truth knowin' that I could be locked up for the rest of my life for this situation, and as long as she's not hurt in the process and she's not embarrassed or humiliated, drug into court . . . ."
"[Edwards]: Well, I - that stuff down the road, I can't - I - I can't, uh, well, I'm tellin' you[] right now she's very safe. But as far as down the road, you mentioned court, I can't guarantee that 'cause that's outta my hands.
"[Randall]: Gordon, here's the million-dollar question. Since you brought it up as far as court. . . Okay. So the last thing that we wanna have happen here, Gordon, if you've jumped off the cliff and have been this honest with us, is for you to have anything else to look over your shoulder and worry about. That is pointless at this time, okay. There is another allegation out there involving [the minor's sister]. We need to address that truthfully and honestly. If somethin' happened between the two of you, . . . it's essentially the same crime you've committed with [the minor] but at least we can deal with it and get it on the table and figure out what happened." Defendant denied any conduct with the minor's sister.
There were allegations that defendant engaged in sexual conduct with the minor's sister, but they were not charged in this case. --------
Defendant was arrested immediately thereafter and given his Miranda advisements.
The trial court reviewed the transcripts, listened to the audio tape and the arguments by counsel, and noted that defendant did not express any hesitation in speaking to the detectives or ask to speak with an attorney. Rather, "just the opposite. The impression that I get both from reading the transcript and from listening to the audio tape is that to his misfortune, [defendant] is just babbling away. The detective almost has to interrupt to get in a word or two edgewise for the purpose of saying, gosh, let me make sure I've got your first name correct." The trial court denied the motion to suppress defendant's statements.
B
"To safeguard the uncounseled individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Miranda Court held, [individuals] interrogated while in police custody must be told that they have a right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, at the interrogation." (Thompson v. Keohane (1995) 516 U.S. 99, 107 [133 L.Ed.2d 383, 391].) "The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, [and] to relieve the ' "inherently compelling pressures" ' generated by the custodial setting itself, ' "which work to undermine the individual's will to resist." ' " (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 420, 433 [82 L.Ed.2d 317, 330], fns. & italics omitted.) The People may not use statements obtained in violation of Miranda to establish guilt. (Berkemer, at p. 428.)
Miranda applies only to custodial interrogations. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 401 (Ochoa).) "An interrogation is custodial, for purposes of requiring advisements under Miranda, when 'a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' [Citation.] Custody consists of a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. [Citations.] When there has been no formal arrest, the question is how a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have understood his situation." (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 394-395.)
Several factors are useful in this inquiry: "(1) whether the suspect has been formally arrested; (2) absent formal arrest, the length of the detention; (3) the location; (4) the ratio of officers to suspects; and (5) the demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning." (People v. Forster (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753.) Other factors "are [(6)] whether the suspect agreed to the interview and was informed he or she could terminate the questioning, [(7)] whether police informed the person he or she was considered a witness or suspect, [(8)] whether there were restrictions on the suspect's freedom of movement during the interview, and [(9)] whether police officers dominated and controlled the interrogation or were 'aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory,' whether they pressured the suspect, and [(10)] whether the suspect was arrested at the conclusion of the interview." (People v. Pilster (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1403-1404.)
In reviewing the trial court's determination that defendant was not in custody, we apply a deferential substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court's conclusions regarding the historical facts. (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 402.) We independently review the mixed question of law and fact regarding whether a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interrogation. (Ibid.) In applying this independent review standard, we " ' " ' "examine the uncontradicted facts to determine independently whether the trial court's [legal] conclusion . . . was properly found" . . . . [Citation.]' " [Citation.] If there is "conflicting testimony, the court must 'accept that version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the extent that it is supported by the record.' " ' " (People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 831.) We also accept factual inferences in favor of the order below. (Ibid.)
Here, the historical facts are uncontested. The detectives arranged in a pretext call for defendant to come to the mall where there was a substation. The detectives initially approached defendant in the parking lot. That is, the interview began in a public place where defendant came at the request of the minor, not law enforcement. The two detectives who interviewed defendant were in plain clothes, with badges and weapons visible. After they identified themselves and their investigation, they asked to speak with defendant and he agreed. They then asked if defendant wanted to go inside to the substation and defendant agreed. Defendant was emotional, but did not express fear or hesitation in speaking with the detectives.
Defendant was not restrained or arrested during the interview, although he was arrested at the conclusion of the interview. Defendant explicitly stated he was not handcuffed, and acknowledged during the interview he was not under arrest. There were two detectives in the room with him, neither blocking access to the door. The detectives also explicitly advised defendant the door was unlocked and he was free to leave at any time.
It appears defendant realized he was a suspect, given the subject of the interview. The detectives told defendant they had his DNA on file and they "probably wouldn't be havin' this conversation if [defendant] weren't the father [of the minor victim's child]." But the detectives said they told him they were seeking his version of events and the opportunity to give him a "clean slate." The tone of the interview was conversational, not confrontational or accusatory. Many of defendant's incriminating statements were not in response to a question from the detectives. Although the interview lasted approximately 47 minutes, much of that time was a result of defendant's loquaciousness, not the detectives' questioning.
Based on these facts, a reasonable person would have felt free to end the questioning. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress his statements.
II
Defendant next claims the trial court erred in ordering defendant to reimburse law enforcement for future medical examination costs. The People agree.
Among other things, the trial court ordered defendant to "pay for any subsequent medical examinations for the law enforcement agency costs." Section 1203.1h, subdivision (b), provides that upon conviction in a case of sexual assault, including child molestation, the court may require the defendant to pay the cost of any medical examinations conducted on the victim "for the collection and preservation of evidence." If the court determines the defendant has the ability to pay all or part of the cost, the court may set the amount to be reimbursed and order the defendant to pay that sum. (§ 1203.1h, subd. (b).)
Section 1203.1h, subdivision (b), does not authorize reimbursement to law enforcement for medical examinations occurring after the defendant has been convicted and sentenced; there is no need "for the collection and preservation of evidence" at that point. Nor would the ordered payments fall within appropriate direct victim restitution, as the payments would be to law enforcement for investigative costs. (People v. Ozkan (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1077.) Accordingly, we will modify the judgment to strike the order for reimbursement of medical examination costs.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to strike the order requiring defendant to reimburse law enforcement for the cost of future medical examinations of the minor. The judgment is affirmed as modified. The trial court is directed to amend the abstract of judgment to reflect the modified judgment and to forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
MAURO, J. We concur: HULL, Acting P. J. BUTZ, J.