Opinion
4-21-0153
12-15-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAROB K. GRINNAGE, Defendant-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County No. 20CM983 Honorable Sarah R. Duffy, Judge Presiding.
STEIGMANN, JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
STEIGMANN, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed defendant's conviction because he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.
¶ 2 In September 2020, the State charged defendant, Jarob K. Grinnage, with one count of resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2020)). In January 2021, defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and the trial court conducted a bench trial. The court convicted defendant and sentenced him to 310 days in jail with credit for time served.
¶ 3 Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by accepting his waiver of a jury trial without admonishing him about a bench trial, which would result if defendant waived his right to a jury trial. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 5 In September 2020, the State charged defendant with resisting a peace officer while he was incarcerated at the McLean County detention facility. The State alleged that defendant "knowingly resisted the performance of [a] McLean County detention facility correctional officer" by "physically struggling with [the officer] and attempting to exit his assigned cell" after being directed to remain inside the cell.
¶ 6 In January 2021, on the day when defendant's case was set for trial, defendant signed a written waiver of his right to a jury trial. The trial court then conducted a hearing at which the following exchange took place:
"THE COURT: The defendant appears with counsel ***. And we're set today for bench trial on the charge that was filed in this matter *** is that correct, [prosecutor] ?
MR. CHIKAHISA [(ASSISTANT STATE'S ATTORNEY)]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: [Defense counsel], do you agree with that?
MS. SIPIORA [(ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER)]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very good. Before we begin with the bench trial, we had held off this morning on taking the jury waiver from [defendant]. I wanted to do that on the record this afternoon. So sir, I am going to go through that jury waiver here with you today, make sure you understand what you are doing. So I have a document in front of me. It's entitled waiver or demand of jury and plea to complaint. Is that your signature on the document, sir?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: And you did sign that this morning with your attorney present?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Very good. I want to make sure that you understand what you're doing today and understand the rights that you have. Do you understand that a jury would consist of 12 persons chosen by the prosecutor, your lawyer, and you?
DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: The jury would listen to the evidence at trial and then decide whether or not the evidence was sufficient to prove that you are guilty of the charges that have been placed against you beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury's decision must be unanimous. That means all 12 jurors would have to find you guilty before a verdict could be entered against you.
Do you understand what a jury trial is, and do you wish to give up your right to a jury trial today?
DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: Has anyone forced you to give up the right to a jury trial today?
DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.
THE COURT: Has anyone promised you anything to get you to give up your right to a jury trial?
DEFENDANT: No, ma'am.
THE COURT: You wish for the Court to accept that waiver today?
DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am.
THE COURT: All right. I will show the waiver accepted. I will show the defendant freely, knowingly, and voluntarily waives his right to a jury trial today."
¶ 7 The trial court then discussed the State's plea offer with defendant. After doing so, the court asked if defendant wished "to go forward with the bench trial." Defendant replied, "Yes, ma'am."
¶ 8 At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court found defendant guilty. In February 2021, the court sentenced him to 310 days in jail with credit for time served.
¶ 9 This appeal followed.
¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 11 Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by accepting his waiver of a jury trial without admonishing him about a bench trial, which would result if defendant waived his right to a jury trial. We disagree and affirm.
¶ 12 A. Plain Error and The Standard of Review
¶ 13 Defendant concedes that he "failed to raise the invalidity of his jury waiver" in the trial court but argues that his forfeited claim is reviewable under the plain-error doctrine because it affects his substantial right to a jury trial. The usual first step under the plain-error analysis is to determine whether defendant has shown the occurrence of a clear or obvious error at all. People v. Walker, 232 Ill.2d 113, 124, 902 N.E.2d 691, 696-97 (2009). Accordingly, the issue before us in this case is whether the court committed error by accepting defendant's waiver of jury trial. People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (2d) 160767, ¶ 14, 127 N.E.3d 1080.
¶ 14 Defendant bears the burden of establishing that his jury waiver was invalid-an issue we review de novo. People v. West, 2017 IL App (1st) 143632, ¶ 10, 70 N.E.3d 771.
¶ 15 B. Waiver of Jury Trial Generally
¶ 16 Both the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8) and United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends.VI, XIV) guarantee a criminal defendant's right to trial by jury. People v. May, 2021 IL App (4th) 190893, ¶ 43. The trial court has a duty to "insure that a defendant's waiver of the right to a jury is made understandingly in that it is both knowing and voluntary." People v. Tooles, 177 Ill.2d 462, 468, 687 N.E.2d 48, 51 (1997).
¶ 17" 'When a defendant waives the right to a jury trial, the pivotal knowledge that the defendant must understand-with its attendant consequences-is the facts of the case will be determined by a judge and not a jury.'" May, 2021 IL App (4th) 190893, ¶ 46 (quoting People v. Bannister, 232 Ill.2d 52, 69, 902 N.E.2d 571, 583 (2008)). Ultimately, whether a jury waiver was understandingly made depends on the particular facts and circumstances of each case. People v. Liekis, 2012 IL App (2d) 100774, ¶ 30, 973 N.E.2d 1065.
¶ 18 C. This Case
¶ 19 The record before us demonstrates that defendant understandingly waived his right to a jury trial. However, the crux of defendant's argument is that the record contains no indication that defendant "understood what a bench trial was" or that "the court would serve as a finder of fact." The short answer to defendant's contention is that the record need not do so.
¶ 20 Essentially, defendant is asking this court to recognize a defendant's right to be admonished as to whether he knows what a bench trial is before a trial court can accept his jury waiver. We decline defendant's request and note that no Illinois court has ever so held. We will not be the first.
¶ 21 We note that this case is factually similar to West, in which the First District wrote the following:" [A]t no point [during the proceedings] did [the defendant] object to his case proceeding to a bench trial despite his presence in court; instead, he affirmatively indicated that he understood he was waiving his right to have a jury hear the evidence in his case." West, 2017 IL App (1st) 143632, ¶ 12.
¶ 22 We conclude that (1) defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury and (2) defendant has not met his burden of showing that his waiver was invalid. Accordingly, because there was no error, the plain-error doctrine does not apply.
¶ 23 D. A Better Practice
¶ 24 Although the trial court did not err by accepting defendant's jury waiver, the court could have done a better job of explaining its consequences-namely, that because of his jury waiver, a bench trial would then occur. The court would have needed only a few seconds to explain that a bench trial would mean (1) the court, not a jury, would determine the truthfulness of the witnesses who would testify at trial and (2) it would be the court, not a jury, that would then decide whether the State had met its burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 25 In support of our suggestion that the trial court should have expanded its discussion regarding the consequences of defendant's waiving his right to a jury trial, we note that over 40 years ago, the Illinois Supreme Court wrote the following:
'It takes but a few moments of a trial judge's time to directly elicit from a defendant a response indicating that [(1)] he understands that he is entitled to a jury trial, [(2)] that he understands what a jury trial is, and [(3)] whether or not he wishes to be tried by a jury or by the court without a jury.'" (Emphasis added.) People v. Chitwood, 67 Ill.2d 443, 448-49, 367 N.E.2d 1331, 1334 (1977) (quoting People v. Bell, 104 Ill.App.2d 479, 482, 244 N.E.2d 321, 323 (1969)).
¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 28 Affirmed.