Opinion
H043534
03-29-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALFREDO GRIMALDO, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. C1519373)
Defendant Alfredo Grimaldo was charged by felony complaint with two counts of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury, in violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(4). He pleaded no contest to the first count, and the second count was dismissed. As called for in the plea agreement, the court suspended imposition of sentence and granted defendant probation, conditioned on service of six months in county jail and payment of various fines and fees. Defendant also was to be eligible to have his offense declared a misdemeanor under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b)(3), after 18 months of successful probation.
In the court proceedings below, defendant was often referred to by the name Alfredo Lara.
In this timely appeal, defendant challenges only an order made at sentencing, imposing a $129.75 criminal justice administration fee payable to the City of San Jose. He argues, as he did below, that there was insufficient evidence that this "booking fee" reflected "the actual administrative costs of booking or processing." Finding no error, we will affirm the judgment.
Defense counsel objected to this fee at sentencing. Forfeiture is therefore not at issue in this case. (See People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589, 590-591 (McCullough); People v. Trujillo (2015) 60 Cal.4th 850, 857; People v. Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862, 867 (Aguilar).)
Government Code sections 29550, 29550.1, and 29550.2 authorize the imposition of a "criminal justice administration fee" (i.e., booking fee) on an arrestee who is ultimately convicted, in order to cover the expenses involved in booking or otherwise processing the arrestee in a county jail. "Which section applies to a given defendant depends on which governmental entity has arrested a defendant before transporting him or her to a county jail. The factors a court considers in determining whether to order the fee payment also vary depending on whether or not the court sentences the defendant to probation or prison. (See Gov. Code, §§ 29550, subd. (d)(1) & (2), 29550.1, 29550.2, subd. (a).)" (McCullough, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 592.)
All further statutory references are to the Government Code except as otherwise specified.
At sentencing, the probation department recommended that a "$129.75 Criminal Justice Administration [f]ee to the City of San Jose be imposed pursuant to Government Code [sections] 29550, 29550.1 and 29550.2." The trial court adopted that recommendation in orally imposing the booking fee, but without citing a specific statute. Defendant assumes that the fee was imposed under section 29550.2, which limits the county's recovery to "actual administrative costs." The record indicates, however, that defendant was arrested and booked by the San Jose police; it thus appears that section 29550.1 applies to the circumstances presented here. That section does not expressly include the requirement that only actual costs be recoverable from the defendant, but the amount is nonetheless determined in accordance with section 29550, which does limit the county's ability to seek reimbursement from the city to actual administrative costs. (§ 29550, subd. (a)(1).) Accordingly, we presume for purposes of this appeal that the same limitation governs a section 29550.1 recovery by the city from a defendant.
Section 29550.2 states, in part: "(a) Any person booked into a county jail pursuant to any arrest by any governmental entity not specified in Section 29550 or 29550.1 is subject to a criminal justice administration fee for administration costs incurred in conjunction with the arresting and booking if the person is convicted of any criminal offense relating to the arrest and booking. The fee which the county is entitled to recover pursuant to this subdivision shall not exceed the actual administrative costs, as defined in subdivision (c), including applicable overhead costs as permitted by federal Circular A 87 standards, incurred in booking or otherwise processing arrested persons . . . The court shall, as a condition of probation, order the convicted person to reimburse the county for the criminal justice administration fee. . . . [¶] (c) As used in this section, "actual administrative costs" include only those costs for functions that are performed in order to receive an arrestee into a county detention facility. . . ." (Italics added.)
Section 29550.1 states: "Any city, special district, school district, community college district, college, university, or other local arresting agency whose officer or agent arrests a person is entitled to recover any criminal justice administration fee imposed by a county from the arrested person if the person is convicted of any criminal offense related to the arrest. A judgment of conviction shall contain an order for payment of the amount of the criminal justice administration fee by the convicted person, and execution shall be issued on the order in the same manner as a judgment in a civil action, but the order shall not be enforceable by contempt. The court shall, as a condition of probation, order the convicted person to reimburse the city, special district, school district, community college district, college, university, or other local arresting agency for the criminal justice administration fee."
In Aguilar, our Supreme Court explained, after reaffirming the application of the forfeiture rule, that as to the evidence of the administrative costs embedded in the booking fee, "the trial court correctly relied on the fee schedule set by the county board of supervisors based on actual cost data submitted by the county sheriff." (Aguilar, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 869.) The same result must be acknowledged here. This court has already taken judicial notice of the 2010-2011 recommended budget for Santa Clara County and the Board of Supervisors resolution adopting the $259.50 booking fee in 2006. The "half-rate" was designated as $129.75, the amount of the fee charged to defendant. We presume that the trial court found this evidence sufficient to meet the statutory requirement of "actual administrative costs." Defendant does not convince us otherwise.
Defendant does not complain on appeal that his individual booking fee should be less than the standard amount imposed on all arrestees. --------
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
ELIA, ACTING P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. /s/_________
MIHARA, J.