People v. Gresl

10 Citing cases

  1. Robinson v. Golder

    443 F.3d 718 (10th Cir. 2006)   Cited 65 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a state post-conviction application is “properly filed” for tolling purposes “if it satisfies the State's requirements for filing such a pleading”

    Mr. Robinson contends that his motion to reconsider, filed on November 22, 1999, further tolled the statute of limitations. The district court determined, based on People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 501 (Colo.Ct.App. 2003), that because no provision of the Colorado criminal procedure rules specifically authorizes a motion to reconsider an order denying a Rule 35(b) motion, Mr. Robinson's motion to reconsider was not a properly filed state post-conviction motion within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2). The district court therefore concluded that the motion to reconsider did not toll the statute of limitations.

  2. Horrell v. Zavaras

    Civil Action No. 10-cv-02834-MSK (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2011)   Cited 1 times
    Observing that petitioner failed to point to any United States Supreme Court decision that contravened Lopez

    Further, to satisfy the requirements of due process, the record as a whole must show that the defendant entered a guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 502 (Colo. App. 2003). Before accepting a plea, the trial court must ensure that the defendant was advised of the direct consequences, including the possible sentencing range.

  3. People v. Montoya

    251 P.3d 35 (Colo. App. 2010)   Cited 5 times

    Here, we have concluded the trial court advisement was insufficient, but the record does not disclose whether defendant may have received a full advisement under Crim. P. 5 at his first appearance, or whether he had received other relevant information that would bear on the issue of the waiver. Cf. People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 502 (Colo.App. 2003) (although the defendant was not advised by the court regarding the range of sentences that could be imposed upon entry of his guilty plea, division concluded the prosecutor's statement at the hearing that the defendant could be sentenced to up to sixteen years in prison for the charge to which he pled guilty compensated for any deficiency in the court's advisement). Although defendant's attorney filed a written waiver with the court which stated that defendant was "fully advised," it is not clear what his attorney actually told defendant, but that can be clarified at the evidentiary hearing.

  4. People v. Hodge

    205 P.3d 481 (Colo. App. 2009)   Cited 4 times

    Nevertheless, to satisfy the requirements of due process, the record as a whole must show that the defendant entered a guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 502 (Colo.App. 2003). Before accepting the plea, the trial court must ensure that the defendant was advised of the direct consequences of the plea, including the possible sentencing range.

  5. People v. Corral

    174 P.3d 837 (Colo. App. 2007)   Cited 6 times
    In People v. Corral, 174 P.3d at 839, however, the defendant was not advised of the possibility of an aggravated sentence that the trial court later imposed.

    To satisfy the requirements of due process, the record as a whole must show that the defendant entered his or her guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 502 (Colo.App. 2003). Prior to accepting a guilty plea, a trial court must ensure that the defendant was advised of the direct consequences of the plea, including the possible sentencing range. Crim. P. 11(b)(4); People v. Gresl, supra, 89 P.3d at 502.

  6. Duran v. Timme

    Civil Action No. 11-cv-02260-WYD-MJW (D. Colo. Sep. 16, 2013)

    Thus a court may resolve a claim on the basis that a defendant failed to demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice. See People v. Sparks, 914 P.2d 544, 547 (Colo. App. 1996) (performance not deficient); People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 503 (Colo. App. 2003) (no prejudice). ECF No. 7, ex. G at 10-12.

  7. People v. Morones-Quinonez

    363 P.3d 807 (Colo. App. 2015)   Cited 5 times
    Explaining "strength of the evidence against the defendant may not be as probative of rationality as it would be in a nonimmigration case"

    In the latter situation, where a defendant contends that her counsel gave her no information on the issue that forms the basis of her postconviction motion, a court's correct and complete advisement will generally neutralize counsel's allegedly deficient performance. See, e.g.,People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 502 (Colo.App.2003) (the defendant could not establish prejudice from counsel's failure to advise defendant about applicable sentencing ranges because court advised the defendant of possible range and imposed sentence within that sentencing range); see alsoUnited States v. Gomez–Alvarez, 482 Fed.Appx. 330, 335–36 (10th Cir.2012) (the defendant could not establish prejudice from counsel's failure to advise him of immigration consequences of guilty plea where court advised that guilty plea could result in deportation).¶ 19 But Ms. Morones says that her lawyer, who specializes in immigration law, essentially promised her that, because of the precise nature of the offense, her guilty plea would not affect her immigration case and that she would be “just fine” for purposes of the removal proceedings.

  8. People v. Finney

    328 P.3d 205 (Colo. App. 2012)   Cited 9 times
    Concluding that a postconviction court correctly limited the time in which a defendant could present his case during a Crim. P. 35(c) hearing

    On the contrary, the transcript of the plea hearing does not indicate that the prosecutor or defendant's counsel informed defendant that he could be imprisoned for life if he pled guilty to violating the conditions of his deferred judgment. Cf. People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 502 (Colo.App.2003) (plea was valid where prosecutor mentioned possible penalty at the beginning of providency hearing). And defendant's counsel later admitted he “did not advise [defendant] on September 8, 2008 prior to his admission of the complaint to revoke his deferred judgment that [defendant] could be sentenced to life in prison if he were not accepted in Community Corrections.”

  9. People v. Thomas

    195 P.3d 1162 (Colo. App. 2008)   Cited 30 times
    Declining to apply C.R.C.P. 59 or C.R.C.P. 60 to a criminal defendant's motion to reconsider under Crim. P. 35

    The rules of criminal procedure do not authorize a motion to reconsider postconviction orders. See People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 501 (Colo.App. 2003)("No provision of the criminal procedure rules specifically authorizes a motion to reconsider an order denying a Crim. P. 35(b) motion or otherwise provides for reconsideration of such an order."); Janke, 852 P.2d at 1274 (a trial court may not reconsider its order granting Crim. P. 35(c) relief under law of the case doctrine).

  10. People v. Miera

    183 P.3d 672 (Colo. App. 2008)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding that Cuyler provides the appropriate standard to analyze an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a conflict of interest

    Indeed, the Cuyler exception has been applied in several Colorado cases since Justice Scalia noted in dicta in Mickens that, as far as the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court was concerned, the scope of conflicts to which Cuyler applied was "an open question." See, e.g., People v. Chang, 179 P.3d 240, 245 (Colo.App. 2007) (unspecified "ethical" conflict); People v. Kelling, 151 P.3d 650, 657 (Colo.App. 2006) (citing Mickens, 535 U.S. at 170-76, 122 S.Ct. 1237) (alleged conflict arose from defendant's allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel); Hodges, 134 P.3d at 426 (relying on Kenny, 30 P.3d 734, which was decided before Mickens) (alleged conflict based on animosity and lack of communication between defendant and his counsel); People v. Gresl, 89 P.3d 499, 503-04 (Colo.App. 2003); see also People v. Campbell, 58 P.3d 1148, 1156-58 (Colo.App. 2002). More important, the conflict of interest alleged here is not simply one of successive representation in unrelated matters.