Opinion
05030049.
Decided September 22, 2005.
Joseph R. Carrieri, Esq., Village Prosecutor, Scott H. Greenfield, Esq., Mineola, NY, for the People New York, NY, pro se.
Defendant, in this traffic proceeding, has raised issues of first impression as to the jurisdiction of the police department and the sufficiency of the disclosures made to him in pre-trial proceedings.
The Case
Defendant was stopped in the Village of Muttontown by a police officer of the Old Brookville Police Department on March 24, 2005, and given a simplified information traffic ticket pursuant to CPL § 1.20(5), alleging that defendant had been speeding in violation of VTL § 1180(b) on "N/B Route 106" in the Village of Muttontown. By contract, the Village of Old Brookville, the Village of Muttontown and four other villages (Matinecock, Upper Brookville, Brookville and Mill Neck) share and jointly fund the services of the Old Brookville Police Department, and have authorized Old Brookville Police Officers to "supply police protection for, and . . . police service to, the Contracting Villages" [Agreement dated June 1, 2000, ¶ 3], including "twenty-four hour police protection and service within their boundaries" [ Id. ¶ 5]. The Old Brookville Police Officer believed he was authorized by that agreement to stop and ticket the defendant in the Village of Muttontown. Defendant disagrees.
Defendant entered a not guilty plea and, promptly thereafter, requested a supporting deposition. On April 5, 2005, the Old Brookville Police Department supplied him with a Supporting Deposition stating that the offense had been committed "at the location of N/B Route 106 in the Village of Muttontown, County of Nassau". Defendant then moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that: [1] the police officer lacked "geographical jurisdiction" to stop and ticket the defendant, since (notwithstanding the contract between the villages) statutory authority deprives the Old Brookville Police Department of jurisdiction in the Village of Muttontown; and [2] the supporting deposition supplied to defendant allegedly is "defective" and, in any event, is insufficient since it does not "supplement" the factual allegations of the accusatory instrument as facially required by Criminal Procedure Law § 100.20. Alternatively, defendant seeks a bill of particulars to better enable him to prepare for trial.
Geographical Jurisdiction
Defendant contends that CPL § 1.20(34-a) does not allow villages to contract to share the services of a police department of one of the villages in other villages where the police officers are not employed. Specifically, defendant notes, CPL § 1.20(34-a) restricts the area in which a police officer can act to the "geographical area of [his/her] employment"; and the "geographical area of employment" is statutorily defined as the "county, city, town or village" where that police officer is "employed". While CPL Article 140 provides "under varying circumstances and to varying degrees, for the arrest and/or stop of persons by police officers", defendant contends, that authority is "constrained by the geographical area of employment" as defined in CPL § 1.20(34-a) [Greenfield Aff ¶ 22]. Thus, he says, the Old Brookville Police Department is statutorily prohibited from making arrests and issue tickets in the Village of Muttontown.
There is no reported decision addressing the contentions made by defendant here. However, Opinions by the Attorney General of the State of New York have held that Article 5-G of the General Municipal Law permits municipalities to extend the jurisdiction in which police officers of one municipality can operate. In 1982 NY Opp (Inf.) Atty. Gen. 25, the Attorney General opined that a village police officer is permitted to patrol an area of the town located outside of the village when that is agreed in a municipal cooperation agreement entered into under GML §§ 119-o and 119-n by the town and the village. Without detailed explanation, the then Attorney General concluded that such a municipal corporation agreement can provide for "the extension of appropriate territorial jurisdiction" as to law enforcement. In 1982 NY Opp. (Inf.) Atty. Gen. 114, the Attorney General further opined that a municipal cooperation agreement can extend the jurisdiction of a police department of one village to a high school in another village, outside of its geographic border. NY State Comptroller Opinion 78-727 also allows a village to contract with another village for police service.
In 1992 NY Opp. (Inf.) Atty. Gen. 17, the Attorney General opined that two villages could enter into a municipal corporation agreement for their respective police departments to assist each other in the provision of the law enforcement. Here, however, the Village of Muttontown does not have its own police department. Rather, several villages have contracted to share the police department of one of them.
According to defendant, "while the creation of a joint police department amongst several villages is permitted by General Municipal Law § 121-a, provided they are all within the same town, it does not alter the express limitations on police authority set forth in CPL § 1.20 and Article 140" [Greenfield Aff ¶ 23]. In this regard, defendant relies upon case law regarding the general geographic area of authority of police officers. For example, in People v. Williams, 4 NY3d 535, the Court of Appeals held that "peace officers generally are authorized to apprehend an individual for criminal activity only when the offense is committed within the officer's geographical area of . . . employment (CPL 140.25) or when the officer acts 'pursuant to his special duties' (CPL 140.25." As a result, the court in Williams invalidated an arrest by Buffalo housing police of an automobile operator for failing to wear a seat belt (and a resulting drug charge) while driving out of the boundaries of the housing project. See also People v. Howard, 115 AD2d 321 (merely stating the general rule); People v. Graham, 192 Misc 2d 528 (Town of Amherst police officer lacked authority to stop defendant in the Town of Tonawanda for traffic violation committed in Town of Amherst).
Cf. People v. Humpleby, 7 Misc 3d 192 (town police officer authorized to make arrest in his town for an offense committed in adjacent town in response to radio request from police officers of that town).
None of these cases, however, involved a situation such as this, where adjacent villages have contracted and joined together to share the services of the police department of one of them. Here, the villages have purported to confer "geographical jurisdiction" on the Old Brookville Police Department. Defendant says, as noted above, they can not do so because the municipal corporation agreement of the six contracting villages does not provide for all of the villages to employ Old Brookville Police Officers. The agreement therefore, defendant contends, fails to satisfy the requirements of CPL § 140.50(1), because that statute allows a police officer to "stop a person in a public place located [only] within the geographical area of such officer's employment" and CPL § 1.20(34-a) (b) defines, and thus presumably limits, a police officer's "geographical area of employment" as the "county, city town or village" which employs the police officer. Defendant finds some support in People v. Edmonds, 157 Misc 2d 966, 970, where the Court held that a police officer of the Town of Poughkeepsie "lost jurisdiction to act once he crossed into the City of Poughkeepsie". But, there, the court was influenced by the fact that "each municipality is separately governed and each employee and pays for its own independent police department." 157 Misc 2d at 970. Here, a different set of facts is presented. Only the Village of Old Brookville has a police department; and the two municipalities involved have contracted to share the services of that police department and (as explained below) the cost of those services.
Defendant also ignores the definition of "geographical area of employment" of police officers contained in CPL § 140.25(5)(b), to wit that the geographical jurisdiction of a police officer "employed by . . [a] village" is both that" village" itself and "any other place where he is, at a particular time, acting in the course of his particular duties or employment" (emphasis added). Old Brookville Police Officers are acting within their" particular duties or employment" (CPL 140.25(b)(ii)) when they perform police enforcement services in any or all of the six contracting villages here, including the Village of Muttontown. Thus, CPL § 140.25(5)(b), at least on its face, allows them to do so, and conflicts with CPL § 1.20(34-a) (b), at least in the context of this action.
An even more serious conflict with CPL § 1.20(34-a) (b) appears to be presented by the General Municipal Law. GMC § 119-o(1) expressly allows villages to enter into agreements "for the performance among themselves or one or the other of their respective functions, powers and duties on a cooperative or contract basis or for the provision of joint service . . ." (emphasis added). The opinions of the Attorney General referred to above conclude that this statute allows villages to share police enforcement duties, and, in doing so, to provide an "extension of appropriate territorial jurisdiction for the joint undertaking" allowed under GML § 119-o(1). Atty Genl Op. 82-25. See also: 1983 NY Op. (Inf.) Atty Gen. 78 (under § 119-o(1), "municipal corporations and districts may agree by contract to perform services jointly or have one or more municipalities or districts perform services for the others").
Publ. Health Safety Law § 121-a further contemplates cooperation among municipalities for joint police services, albeit in a different context than the situation here. It provides that: "Notwithstanding the provisions of any law, general or special, the town board or boards of a town or towns in the same county and the board or boards of trustees of an incorporated village or villages located wholly within such town or towns, may, upon the adoption of propositions therefore duly submitted in such town or towns and village or villages, determine to create a joint town and village police department for such town or towns and village or villages".
Several rules of statutory construction enable the court to resolve these conflicts here. In the absence of an express legislative statement of intent to have one statute overrule another in a specific situation, it is the duty of the courts to reconcile statutory provisions, even apparently contradictory provisions, rather than apply one statute to the exclusion of the other. Morton v. Manconi, 417 U.S. 535, 551 ("when two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed [legislative] intent to the contrary, to regard each as effective"). See also Mtr of Goodman (Barnard College), 95 NY2d 15, 21 That is true both where two statutes appear to be in conflict, Am. Motor Sales v. Brown, 152 AD2d 343, 349, app den, 75 NY2d 709 ("the courts are required to harmonize statutes with each other . . . to provide a logical and unrestrained interpretation to each"), and where different provisions of the same statute appear to conflict, Levine v. Borenstein, 4 NY2d 241 ("all parts of an act are to be read together . . . and . . . should be harmonized with one another"). Accord: 97 NY Jur 2d: Statutes §§ 180 and 183. Courts are also required to give meaning and effect to all statutes, and may not regard a statutory pronouncement as mere surplasage or without effect. Morton, 417 US at 551; Lumpkin v. Soc. Servs., 59 AD2d 485, 490, aff'd, 45 NY2d 351, app dism, 439 US 1040 ("when two statutory or regulatory provisions are potentially in conflict, they should be construed in such a manner that the overriding purposes of both can be preserved"). Accord: 1A Singer, Statutes Statutory Construction § 23.10 at 480-86. A court also may decline to give an interpretation to a statute that would be contrary to public welfare. Meyers Bros. Parking Systems v. Sherman, 87 AD2d 562, 563, aff'd, 57 NY2d 653 (considering public welfare in construing statute). Accord: 97 NY Jur 2d: Statutes § 190. Finally, "when both general and particular statutory provisions are contained in the same statute, the more specific provision will prevail"; and the same result is called for when a general statute conflicts with a more specific statute. 97 NY Jur 2d: Statutes § 184. See, e.g., Erie County Water Auth. v. Kramer, 4 AD2d 545, 550, aff'd, 5 NY2d 954; Suzuki, Inc. v. Caruso Auto, 110 Misc 2d 823, 825.
Applying these rules at bar, the Court holds that the municipal corporation agreement between the six villages at issue here duly authorized the Old Brookville Police Department to operate in all six villages, and that it is valid and proper under CPL § 140.25(5)(b) and GMC § 119-o(1). To give effect to CPL § 1.20 (34-a) (b) without regard to CPL § 140.25(5)(b) and GMC § 119-o(1) would improperly undermine those latter statutes and the legislative intent they embody. The Court does not believe that this result conflicts with CPL § 1.20(34-a) (b), but rather concludes that the more particularized provisions of CPL § 140.25(5)(b), addressing the specific topic of an "arrest without a warrant", express a clearer legislative intent in the circumstances of this case than the general provisions of CPL § 1.20(34-a) (b); but, if there is a conflict, the more specific statute, i.e. CPL § 140.25(5)(b), controls. The Court further concludes that the purposes of GMC § 119-o(1) would improperly be frustrated and rendered nugatory if CPL § 1.20(34-a) (b) were interpreted, as defendant suggests, to limit the authority granted to the municipalities under the General Municipal Law. To rule otherwise here would be especially inappropriate since the villages' municipal corporation agreement is intended to protect the public in the six contracting villages. The interpretation sought by defendant would be contrary to public welfare, leaving five villages which have relied on GML § 119-0 to enable them to provide for joint police service without police service.
A fair reading of the municipal corporation agreement further supports this result. The agreement undeniably seeks to utilize the power given to the municipalities under GML § 119-0 to allow those municipalities to share the services of the Old Brookville Police Department, and expressly provides that police officers will provide enforcement services in and for all six villages. Under the contract, the villages share the cost of the police officers [¶ 17] and agree on the annual budget of the Old Brookville Police Department [¶ 12]; and they jointly pass on the conduct of the department and its officers. A joint Board of Commissions comprised of a representative from each village [¶ 7(a)(i)] determines and oversees the Old Brookville Police Department, and even the compensation of its police officers [¶¶ 7 and 10]. Each village also indemnifies the police department and each other, and shares in the cost of the defense of legal actions against the Old Brookville Police Department and its police officers [¶ 9]. Thus, whether the police officers are technically employed by the six villages, the villages are tantamount to employers of the police officers and the Department itself.
A "joint employer" relationship can exist when two entities have control over the "employment opportunities" and the employment characteristics of an employee's position (e.g. "hiring and firing", "pay, insurance and records", promotion, labor relations, etc.). NLRB v. Solid Waste Services, 38 F. 3d 93, 94; Longstreet Assoc. v. Bevona, 16 F. Supp. 2d 290, 296. See also: Schneidecker v. Arvig Enterprises, 122 F. Supp. 1031, 1038 (other factors of significance are whether the two entities have "interrelation of operations", a "common management", "centralized control of labor relations", and "common ownership of financial control").
For each and all of these reasons, the Court holds that the Old Brookville Police Department has lawful geographical jurisdiction over the Village of Muttontown, and that, accordingly, its police officers operate within their territorial authority when they perform their services in the Village of Muttontown and the other villages which are party to the municipal corporation agreement at issue here. Hence, the traffic ticket given to defendant was appropriately issued by a police officer operating within the geographical jurisdiction of his police department.
Supporting Deposition
Defendant contends that the Supporting Deposition supplied to him is "defective" because it allegedly "fails to state with sufficient specificity the location where the traffic infraction is alleged to have occurred" [Greenfield Aff. ¶ 7]. Further, defendant contends, the Supporting Deposition is "conclusory, rather than evidentiary" [ Id. ¶ 10] and provides "not an iota of supplementary information" in addition to the facts in the Simplified Information itself [Greenfield Reply Aff. ¶ 5] (emphasis added).
Unlike serious criminal cases, traffic proceedings can be, and generally are, commenced by service of a simplified information. But, since a simplified information is a "statutory creation designed for handling the large volume of traffic infractions and petty offenses", it "need not provide on its face reasonable cause" to believe the charged offense was committed. People v. Nuccio, 78 NY2d 102, 104. Moreover, the simplified information in a traffic case "has different and lesser requirements for facial sufficiency" than a misdemeanor information. People v. Rose, 2005 NY SLIP Op. 25126 at *2, 2005 NY Misc LEXIS 629 at **4-5. For these reasons, the defendant in a traffic case is entitled (upon timely and proper request) to a supporting deposition as a "matter of right."; and the supporting deposition can supplement a simplified information to provide required details that the simplified information may omit. People v. Thumsen, 148 Misc 2d 472, 474 (App. Term, 2d Dept.); People v. Rossi, 154 Misc 2d 616, 619. The combination of the simplified information and the supporting deposition is sufficient to show "reasonable cause" to sustain a proceeding by together alleging all requisite elements of the charged offense, and thus state a prima facie case for the People. People v. Inserra, 4 NY3d 30, 32. People v. Key, 45 NY2d 111, 115-16. In light of these purposes, the failure to provide a requested supporting deposition in a traffic case is fatal and requires dismissal of the case, Thumson, 148 Misc 2d at 474; People v. Zagorsky, 73 Misc 2d 420, 425, albeit without prejudice. Rossi, 154 Misc 2d at 619.
A Supporting Deposition must be a separate document; and the requirements for its contents are different from those for an information, e.g., the deposition is supposed to state evidentiary facts. Key, 45 NY2d at 116; People v. Mercurio, 93 Misc 2d 1126, 1127; However, a deposition in a traffic case may be based on information and belief instead of personal knowledge, CPL § 100.25(2); People v. Rothman, 193 Misc 2d 247, 248; and it need not have any particular format or form. People v. Hohmever, 70 NY2d at 43-44, (a printed, standardized form with boxes for check-marks suffices).
CPL § 100.15 provides that the combination of the Simplified Information and a Supporting deposition must merely allege enough evidentiary facts to support or tend to support the charge. CPL § 100.25 requires the deposition to contain " allegations of fact based either on personal knowledge or upon information and belief, providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense or offenses charged." CPL 100.20 requires that a supporting deposition contain "factual allegations of an evidentiary character . . . which supplement those of the accusatory instrument and support or tend to support the charge or charges contained therein."
Compare People v. Habernicht. 153 Misc 2d 76, 78-79; Matter of Mann, 137 Misc 2d 940, 941, and People v. Conserva, 42 Misc 2d 782, 783, explaining the different requirements for non-traffic cases. For example, in order to avoid baseless or useless prosecutions, a non-hearsay statement is required in criminal proceedings. Mtr. of Jackowitz v. District Ct. 127 Misc 2d 795, 798. See also People v. Jeffries;. 19 NY2d 564, 567.
Because of the sparseness of a Simplified Traffic Information, a Supporting Deposition generally is necessary to render the accusatory instrument legally sufficient, and thus give the Court adjudicatory jurisdiction over the defendant. People v. Beattie, 80 NY2d 840, 841; People v. Shapiro, 61 NY2d 880; Rossi, 154 Misc 2d at 618. Hence, a Supporting Deposition must set forth enough evidentiary facts "in a plain and concise manner" to provide reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed all of the necessary elements of the offense charged, failing which it must be rejected and the case dismissed. People v. Schuttinger, 143 Misc 2d 1032, 1035; People v. Cohen 131 Misc 2d 898, 900; People v. Hust, 74 Misc 2d 887, 890. See also People v. Key, 87 Misc 2d 262, 267 [App. Term, 2d Dept.], aff'd, 45 NY2d 111 For example, in Cohen, the Court dismissed the case, since the police officer had failed to state whether his accusation that the defendant was speeding was based upon personal observation or upon other mechanical or other technical means. Similarly, the case was dismissed in Hust, 74 Misc 2d at 890, since the supporting deposition did not apprise the defendant of the basis for the Police Officer's "feeling" that the defendant was intoxicated.
One rationale of these cases is that the defendant is generally entitled to something more than a mere parroting of the traffic ticket itself, People v. Redding, 109 Misc 2d 487, 391; Conserva, 42 Misc 2d at 783 (a deposition is not "mere surplusage"); and, as explained further below, at least one part of the statute supports that rationale.
But, while the CPL's provisions state the general rules, they do not provide the Court with easily applicable guidance as to what amount and kind of evidentiary facts are sufficient to provide such reasonable cause, i.e. how detailed the supporting deposition must be. Rather, what constitutes a sufficient deposition will vary from case to case. All that can be said as a general rule is that, to be sufficient, a Supporting Deposition must contain enough facts to allege all of the prerequisites of the offense specified in the statute, but only that. In other words, a supporting deposition need say what the People must prove, not how they will prove it. Likewise, a Supporting Deposition need not state all the evidentiary facts available to the deponent, but rather only enough facts to provide reasonable cause to believe that the statute was violated by the defendant, leaving for trial the question whether the People will be able to prove that. People v. Ortiz. 146 Misc 2d 594, 596. See also People v. Miles, 64 NY2d 731, 732-33.
Case law does add (with reference to CPL § 70.10(2)) that reasonable cause exists "when evidence or information which appears reliable discloses facts or circumstances which are collectively of such weight and persuasiveness as to convince a person of ordinary intelligence, judgment and experience that it is reasonably likely" that the defendant committed the charged offense. Schuttinger, 143 Misc 2d at 1035-36. See also: People v. Hetrick. 80 NY2d 344, 349. But, this does not provide specifics as to how much or what a supporting deposition must say.
Defendant's specific complaint as to the content of the Supporting Deposition here is that it does not say precisely where on Route 106 the offense occurred. The Court rejects this criticism. The statement in the Supporting Deposition suffices to tell the defendant enough to show what he supposedly did and where. No case or other authority requires the degree of specificity sought by defendant. The Supporting Deposition need not detail the People's case, but rather (as noted above) must merely state enough to make out a prima facie case, i.e. to specify the necessary elements of the offense, giving the defendant "fair notice of the nature of the charges against him"; People v. Keindl, 68 NY2d 410, 416; Matter of Rey R., 188 AD2d 473, 474; Rose, 2005 NY Slip Op. 25126 at *4, 2005 NY Misc LEXIS 629 at **4-5. The Supporting Deposition here does so.
More troublesome is defendant's overall criticism that the Supporting Deposition does not add anything to the Simplified Information. CPL § 100.20 appears, on its face to require that. Specifically, it defines a "supporting deposition" in CPL § 100.20 as a "written instrument" stating facts "which supplement those of the accusatory instrument". That, defendant, contends, means that the Criminal Procedure Law requires that the Supporting Deposition say something in addition to the Simplified Information, and not merely the same thing already in it [Greenfield Reply Aff. ¶ 1]. Here, both the Simplified Information and the Supporting Deposition say the same thing: i.e. that defendant was clocked on radar doing 76 miles per hour on a 55 mile per hour zone while traveling northbound on Route 106 in Muttontown, Nassau County at 9:30 am on March 24, 2005. Thus, the Supporting Deposition does not "supplement" the Simplified Information.
Once again, another provision of the Criminal Procedure Law appears to answer defendant's contention. CPL § 100.25(2), which prescribes the "form and content" of a supporting deposition, requires only that it contain allegations "providing reasonable cause to believe that the defendant committed the offense or offenses charged". The Court finds CPL § 100.25(2) to be the more specific of the two portions of the Criminal Procedure Law implicated here, and thus (in accordance with the rules of statutory construction detailed above) concludes that (as the title of § 100.25(2) says) § 100.25(2), not § 100.20, determines the appropriate content of a supporting deposition.
Logic also supports the conclusion that defendant is seeking to require too much from the Supporting Deposition. Where, as here, the Simplified Information itself satisfies the requirements of both the accusatory instrument and those of a Supporting Deposition, it would not make sense to require the Supporting Deposition to say more, merely because one provision of the statute uses the phrase "supplement". Such a rule would lead to an unreasonable rule whereby Supporting Depositions would have different requirements in different cases, and, in some cases, would have to do more than the legislature intended. That would require needless additional details by the police in cases where, in reality, a supporting deposition is not even needed to state a prima facie case. The Court declines to give such a reading to the statute. Goodman v. Del-Sa Foods, 15 NY2d 191, 196; 97 (" a reasonable construction should . . . be adopted where there is a doubt or uncertainty in regard to the legislative intent"); Breen v. Board of Trustees, 299 NY 8, 19 (a statute must be construed in a manner which does not produce "an unreasonable result") . See also NY Jur 2d: Statutes § 188.
A more reasonable interpretation of the legislature's intention here is that the combination of the accusatory instrument and the Supporting Deposition must state a prima facie case, and that supplementation of a Simplified Traffic Information in the Supporting Deposition is to be required only where the accusatory instrument is not in itself sufficient to do so. Other means (as explained below) are potentially available to enable the defendant to learn more evidentiary information if and where the court deems that appropriate. But, it would distort the purpose of a Supporting Deposition to require more to be said in it when more is not needed to give the court adjudicatory jurisdiction over the defendant. Thus, the Supporting Deposition here was and is legally sufficient.
Bill of Particulars
There may be circumstances where, notwithstanding the service of a supporting deposition, the defendant may lack information he/she needs to prepare adequately for trial. Thus, in an appropriate case, a defendant may obtain further information in a traffic case through pre-trial discovery. People v. Correia, 140 Misc 2d 813, 818; People v. Gutterson, 93 Misc 2d 1105, 1108-09. As one court has aptly explained, while "there is no general right to discovery" in a such a case, the court may direct further disclosure since "it is fundamental to our system of justice that defendant must be apprised of the facts and law which he is being accused of having violated". Chess, 149 Misc 2d at 433.
Prior to the replacement of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1970 with the Criminal Procedure Line, CCP § 147-g allowed defendants to demand and get a bill of particulars. CPL § 100.45(4), however, eliminated that right by instead enumerating the offenses for which a bill of particulars is required; they do not include traffic offenses. Cohen, 131 Misc 2d at 899. Thus, the only statutory right for disclosure in a traffic case is now the right to get a supporting deposition under CPL § 100.25(2). Chess, 149 Misc 2d at 433; See also People v. Siebemock, 65 Misc 2d 181. Whether a defendant is to obtain further information is now strictly a matter of discretion for the Court. Rose, 2005 NY SLIP Op 25126, NY Misc LEXIS 629 at **6-7; Correia, 140 Misc 2d at 818.
In this case, the Court agrees that defendant needs and, in fairness, should be given some further information. In particular, as requested, defendant should be advised specifically where on Route 106 he was tracked for speeding, where the police officer was situated, what type of radar the police officer used, when the radar device was last tested, and in what direction the police officer was facing at the time. Chess, 149 Misc 2d at 433; Gutterson, 93 Misc 2d at 1107-09; People v. Sumpter, 75 Misc 2d 55. More than that, however, is not required.
Conclusion
The Court denies the portion of defendant's motion seeking to dismiss the case. The Court, however, directs grants the portion of his motion seeking further information, but only to the extent provided above.
So ordered. Enter.