Opinion
Submitted May 25, 2001
June 18, 2001.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Rios, J.), rendered January 13, 1999, convicting him of murder in the second degree, manslaughter in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
Lynn W. L. Fahey, New York, N.Y. (Jay L. Weiner of counsel), for appellant.
Richard A. Brown, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, N.Y. (John M. Castellano, Johnnette Traill, and Sabine Browne of counsel), for respondent.
Before: CORNELIUS J. O'BRIEN, J.P., MYRIAM J. ALTMAN, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, THOMAS A. ADAMS, JJ.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's contention with respect to the propriety of the portion of the jury charge defining reasonable doubt is unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Mollica, 267 A.D.2d 333). In any event, the argument is without merit. The court never "impose[d] an affirmative obligation" on the jurors "to specifically articulate the basis" for any doubt of the defendant's guilt which they might have had (People v. Antommarchi, 80 N.Y.2d 247, 251). Moreover, the charge, when viewed as a whole, accurately defined a reasonable doubt (see, People v. Robinson, 218 A.D.2d 673, affd 88 N.Y.2d 1001), and clearly explained that the burden of proof was always on the People (see, People v. Jackson, 155 A.D.2d 329, affd 76 N.Y.2d 908).
The defendant's remaining contention does not require reversal.
O'BRIEN, J.P., ALTMAN, LUCIANO and ADAMS, JJ., concur.