Opinion
3-12-0190
04-11-2013
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
Grundy County, Illinois,
Appeal No. 3-12-0190
Circuit No. 11-CF-61
Honorable
Lance R. Peterson,
Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Schmidt and Carter concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held:The trial court's order granting defendant's motion to suppress is reversed. ¶ 2 Following a traffic stop, defendant, Jerilyn Marta Green, was charged with unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West 2010)). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. The trial court granted defendant's motion, finding that the underlying traffic stop was improper. The State appeals, arguing that the officer had sufficient grounds to stop defendant's vehicle and, therefore, the court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress. We reverse and remand.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 On April 13, 2011, Illinois State Police Officer Robert A. Matos initiated a traffic stop on defendant. As a result of the stop, defendant was charged with unlawful possession of more than 5,000 grams of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/5(g) (West 2010)). Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence. The cause proceeded to a hearing on defendant's motion. ¶ 5 At the hearing, defendant testified that she was pulled over at approximately 10:50 p.m. while driving east on Interstate 80. Prior to the stop, defendant had passed a rest area and was watching for trucks merging onto the highway. Immediately before being pulled over, defendant had passed a truck by using the left lane of the road and then returned to the right lane. After she returned to the right lane, she noticed a police car with its lights on behind her. She put her turn indicator on and pulled over to the side of the road. Defendant testified that prior to the stop, her right wheels never crossed the line that separated the shoulder from the lanes of traffic. ¶ 6 Matos testified that he was on patrol the night of April 13, 2011, when he spotted defendant's vehicle. He noticed that the vehicle's two right wheels made contact with the fog line for approximately five seconds. The fog line marked the outside edge of the right lane of the roadway. When asked how far the tires were over the fog line, Matos stated that they never crossed the fog line entirely; however, "the majority of the tires were actually on the opposite side, more on the shoulder." After witnessing the vehicle make contact with the fog line, Matos initiated a traffic stop. The stop was predicated on defendant's improper lane usage. ¶ 7 At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that defendant's vehicle made contact with the fog line for approximately five seconds. It also found that a majority of defendant's tire crossed the line and entered the shoulder while only a minority of the tire remained on the fog line. Further, the court expressly questioned defendant's credibility and noted that she did not have a valid reason for drifting onto and partially over the fog line. However, the court concluded that those facts did not give the officer a valid basis for a traffic stop based on our previous decision in People v. Hackett, 406 Ill. App. 3d 209 (2010). Therefore, defendant's motion to suppress was granted. The State appeals.
¶ 8 ANALYSIS
¶ 9 The State argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to suppress because the officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to a two-part test. People v. Absher, 242 Ill. 2d 77 (2011). First, we will uphold the court's factual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. Second, we assess the established facts in relation to the issues presented and review the ultimate legal question of whether suppression is warranted de novo. Id. In People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, the supreme court resolved any confusion over whether a traffic stop needed to be supported by probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by stating that a reasonable suspicion was sufficient. ¶ 10 In this case, the trial court found that defendant's vehicle made contact with the fog line and the shoulder for approximately five seconds. It further found that a majority of defendant's tire was on the shoulder while only a minority remained on the fog line. Based on our review of the record, we do not believe that those factual findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. Therefore, we now turn to a de novo review of whether these established facts amounted to a violation of section 11-709(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code). ¶ 11 Section 11-709(a) of the Code mandates that a "vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." 625 ILCS 5/11-709(a) (West 2010). After the trial court entered its order in this case, the Illinois Supreme Court overruled our decision in Hackett, 406 Ill. App. 3d 209, and held that section 11-709(a) is violated when a motorist crosses over a lane line and is not driving as nearly as practicable within one lane. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781. In light of the trial court's finding that the tires of defendant's vehicle were on the fog line and shoulder and not within her lane, we conclude that defendant did violate section 11-709(a). Therefore, the officer had sufficient grounds to stop defendant's vehicle, and defendant's motion to suppress should not have been granted.
¶ 12 CONCLUSION
¶ 13 The judgment of the circuit court of Grundy County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings. ¶ 14 Reversed and remanded.