We further conclude that the People disproved defendant's alibi defense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Greco, 230 A.D.2d 23, 30 (4th Dept. 1997) (citations omitted). The Court further rejected petitioner's arguments regarding probable cause.

Contrary to defendant's contention, the identification evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction. The two robbery victims, each of whom had known defendant for a number of years and were familiar with his voice, identified defendant as one of the robbers by his voice ( see, People v Sylvester, 247 AD2d 886, lv denied 91 NY2d 1013; People v Greco, 230 AD2d 23, 30, lv denied 90 NY2d 858, 940). In addition, an eyewitness, who also had known defendant for a number of years, made a visual identification of defendant as defendant ran away from the scene of the crime.

But to obtain a hearing, a defendant must do more than make conclusory allegations that his prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained. He must support his allegations with facts ( People v Gordon, 251 AD2d 93 [1st Dept 1998]; People v Greco, 230 AD2d 23, 31 [4th Dept 1997]). Here, defendant stated only that he wanted to call numerous witnesses who, he claimed, would demonstrate that his "guilty pleas were coerced" and that his attorney was "ineffective."

We also conclude that the voice identification procedure involving the other victim was not unduly suggestive. A voice identification is governed by the same due process guarantees as other identification procedures (seePeople v. Greco , 230 A.D.2d 23, 30, 654 N.Y.S.2d 890 [4th Dept. 1997], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 858, 661 N.Y.S.2d 185, 683 N.E.2d 1059 [1997], reconsideration denied 90 N.Y.2d 940, 664 N.Y.S.2d 758, 687 N.E.2d 655 [1997] ; People v. Shepard , 162 A.D.2d 226, 226, 556 N.Y.S.2d 594 [1st Dept. 1990], lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 944, 563 N.Y.S.2d 73, 564 N.E.2d 683 [1990] ). Here, the police did not "convey[ ] their beliefs or otherwise suggest[ ] ... defendant's guilt to the" victim ( People v. Collins , 60 N.Y.2d 214, 219, 469 N.Y.S.2d 65, 456 N.E.2d 1188 [1983] ).

We also conclude that the voice identification procedure involving the other victim was not unduly suggestive. A voice identification is governed by the same due process guarantees as other identification procedures (see People v Greco, 230 A.D.2d 23, 30 [4th Dept 1997], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 858 [1997], reconsideration denied 90 N.Y.2d 940 [1997]; People v Shepard, 162 A.D.2d 226, 226 [1st Dept 1990], lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 944 [1990]). Here, the police did not "convey[ ] their beliefs or otherwise suggest[ ]... defendant's guilt to the" victim (People v Collins, 60 N.Y.2d 214, 219 [1983]).

Defendant thus failed to effectively invoke his statutory right to testify before the grand jury (see People v Saldana, 161 AD2d 441, 444 [1st Dept 1990], lv denied 76 NY2d 944 [1990]). "In the absence of an effective request to testify, the People were entitled to resubmit the charges without notice to defendant" and without affording him an opportunity to testify (People v Nix, 265 AD2d 891, 891 [4th Dept 1999]; cf. People v Greco, 230 AD2d 23, 27-28 [4th Dept 1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 858 [1997], reconsideration denied 90 NY2d 940 [1997]). Contrary to defendant's assertion, the People were not obligated to preemptively notify him of the superceding grand jury proceeding because, at that time, there was no "currently undisposed of felony complaint charging an offense which is a subject of the prospective or pending [superceding] grand jury proceeding" (CPL 190.50 [5] [a]; see People v Lunney, 84 Misc 2d 1090, 1095-1096 [Sup Ct, New York County 1975]; see also People v Washington, 42 AD2d 677, 677 [4th Dept 1973]; see generally People v Franco, 86 NY2d 493, 499-500 [1995]).

Here, although defendant sent a letter to the trial judge asking to testify before the grand jury and later orally reiterated that desire in open court, it is undisputed that defendant never "serve[d] upon the district attorney ... a written notice" of his intent to testify as required by CPL 190.50(5)(a) (emphasis added). Defendant thus failed to effectively invoke his statutory right to testify before the grand jury (seePeople v. Saldana, 161 A.D.2d 441, 444, 556 N.Y.S.2d 534 [1st Dept. 1990], lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 944, 563 N.Y.S.2d 73, 564 N.E.2d 683 [1990] ). "In the absence of an effective request to testify, the People were entitled to resubmit the charges without notice to defendant" and without affording him an opportunity to testify ( People v. Nix, 265 A.D.2d 891, 891, 696 N.Y.S.2d 326 [4th Dept. 1999] ; cf.People v. Greco, 230 A.D.2d 23, 27–28, 654 N.Y.S.2d 890 [4th Dept. 1997], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 858, 661 N.Y.S.2d 185, 683 N.E.2d 1059 [1997], reconsideration denied 90 N.Y.2d 940, 664 N.Y.S.2d 758, 687 N.E.2d 655 [1997] ). Contrary to defendant's assertion, the People were not obligated to preemptively notify him of the superceding grand jury proceeding because, at that time, there was no "currently undisposed of felony complaint charging an offense which is a subject of the prospective or pending [superceding] grand jury proceeding" ( CPL 190.50[5][a] ; seePeople v. Lunney, 84 Misc.2d 1090, 1095–1096, 378 N.Y.S.2d 559 [Sup. Ct., New York County 1975] ; see alsoPeople v. Washington, 42 A.D.2d 677, 677, 344 N.Y.S.2d 116 [4th Dept. 1973] ; see generallyPeople v. Franco, 86 N.Y.2d 493, 499–500, 634 N.Y.S.2d 38, 657 N.E.2d 1321 [1995] ). There was thus no basis to dismiss the superceding indictment pursuant to CPL 190.50(5) (seePeople v. Ponce, 276 A.D.2d 921, 921–922, 714 N.Y.S.2d 592 [3d Dept. 2000], lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 786, 725 N.Y.S.2d 651,

Either event triggers the District Attorney's obligation to give notice of the pending grand jury proceeding and afford an opportunity to testify ( see CPL 190.50 [a], [b]). Here, because defendant timely requested the right to appear, the District Attorney was obligated to give notice of the grand jury proceedings to enable him to exercise that right ( see CPL 190.50 [b]; People v Evans, 79 NY2d 407, 413-414; People v Greco, 230 AD2d 23, 27, lvs denied 90 NY2d 858, 940; People v Luna, 129 AD2d 816, 816-817, lv denied 70 NY2d 650). The failure to give the prescribed notice renders the resulting indictment invalid and mandates its dismissal ( see CPL 190.50 [c]; People v Smith, 87 NY2d 715, 720; People v Degnan, 246 AD2d 819, 820). We also agree with defendant that his failure to file proof of service did not provide a sufficient basis for County Court to deny his second motion to dismiss.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of one count each of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 20.00, 160.15) and endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10), and two counts of robbery in the second degree (Penal Law § 20.00, 160.10, [2] [a]). Contrary to defendant's contention, the identification evidence is legally sufficient to support the conviction. The two robbery victims, each of whom had known defendant for a number of years and were familiar with his voice, identified defendant as one of the robbers by his voice ( see, People v. Sylvester, 247 A.D.2d 886, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 1013; People v. Greco, 230 A.D.2d 23, 30, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 858, 940). In addition, an eyewitness, who also had known defendant for a number of years, made a visual identification of defendant as defendant ran away from the scene of the crime.

This provided the People with a good faith basis to request that the hearing be reopened, and additionally, to seek a search warrant for the defendant's journal, which contained written threats against the complainant. Under these circumstances, it was within the sound discretion of the trial court to reopen the hearing to allow the People to present their new evidence (see generally, People v. Greco, 230 A.D.2d 23, 29; People v. Ayala, 149 A.D.2d 519). Furthermore, the trial court properly granted the People's application for a search warrant, since they demonstrated at the reopened hearing that an independent, untainted source had provided information indicating that the defendant's journal contained inculpatory evidence (see, People v. Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27; People v. Coste, 272 A.D.2d 205). The defendant received meaningful assistance from his trial counsel (see, People v. Flores, 84 N.Y.2d 184, 186; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147).