Opinion
June 26, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Broomer, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant contends, inter alia, that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial by the trial court's improper participation in the questioning of witnesses and improper jury charge. We disagree.
In order to preserve a claim that a trial court improperly participated in the questioning of witnesses and helped develop the prosecutor's case, counsel must object to the court's interference (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Robinson, 137 A.D.2d 564). While we recognize that the failure to object might be excused where the court's participation is extreme (see, People v. Charleston, 56 N.Y.2d 886), such was not the case here. The trial court did not elicit incriminating evidence from several witnesses by its questioning, intrude into defense counsel's cross-examination of witnesses, lay foundations for the admission of evidence, or convey to the jury his disbelief of a witness (cf., People v. Tucker, 89 A.D.2d 153, 154-157). Nor does the record indicate that objection would have been unavailing (cf., People v. Tucker, supra, at 158).
With respect to the claim of error regarding the court's charge to the jury, we note that any claim of error of law with respect thereto is also unpreserved for appellate review as a matter of law (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Whalen, 59 N.Y.2d 273; People v. Rivera, 135 A.D.2d 755). In any event, the claim of error is without merit. The trial court's reference to a "search for the truth" did not hopelessly confuse the jury's understanding of the prosecutor's burden and the concept of reasonable doubt (People v. Sepulveda, 105 A.D.2d 854, 857). When the instructions are viewed in their entirety (see, People v Coleman, 70 N.Y.2d 817, 819; People v. Adams, 69 N.Y.2d 805, 806; People v. Goodfriend, 64 N.Y.2d 695, 697), it is apparent that they adequately conveyed to the jury the appropriate standards. In addition, while the instructions concerning the distinction between intentional and accidental acts were lengthy, the court did not thereby minimize the significance of the more fundamental issue of whether the defendant acted with the requisite specific intent (cf., People v. Brown, 129 A.D.2d 450).
We have considered the various contentions raised by the defendant's supplemental pro se brief, and find them to be either based upon alleged facts dehors the record, or without merit. Mangano, J.P., Brown, Kunzeman and Kooper, JJ., concur.