People v. Gray

20 Citing cases

  1. People v. Udzinski

    146 A.D.2d 245 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)   Cited 1,192 times
    Holding that an issue was unpreserved for appellate review because "defense counsel did not object or except to the Trial Judge's definition of the term 'forcible compulsion' in its jury charge"

    It is conceded that defense counsel did not object or except to the Trial Judge's definition of the term "forcible compulsion" in its jury charge. Citing People v McLucas ( 15 N.Y.2d 167), People v Grega ( 132 A.D.2d 749, mod 72 N.Y.2d 489, supra), People v Rubin ( 101 A.D.2d 71, 77), and People v Gray ( 71 A.D.2d 295), the defendant argues that a question of law is nonetheless presented, since "no objection is necessary to preserve a deprivation of a fundamental constitutional right".

  2. People v. Egan

    72 A.D.2d 239 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)   Cited 16 times
    In People v. Egan (72 A.D.2d 239, 240) we reversed a conviction containing a "presumed" intent charge which also contained the instruction that "if the consequences are natural and probable, you [the jury] will not be heard to say that he [defendant] did not intend them."

    We recognize that the charge of presumed intent is common in criminal trials. It is not unconstitutional per se, and we have approved many such charges, even after the Sandstrom decision, where the court has made it clear that the instruction describes only a permissible inference of fact on the issue of criminal intent which the jury may, but is not required to, draw from the evidence (see People v Gray, 71 A.D.2d 295). The danger risked and one judicially recognized in this State long before the Supreme Court's decision in Sandstrom (see Stokes v People, 53 N.Y. 164, 177-179; People v Cooke, 292 N.Y. 185, 189-190), is that if not so instructed the jury may conclude that the presumption is implied by law and that once the proof establishes a voluntary act, the necessary criminal intent is established by proof of the act. The charge in this case was erroneous because it not only failed to advise the jury that it had a choice in the matter, but it went further, specifically stating that a finding of intent was mandatory because "if the consequences are natural and probable, you will not be heard to say that [defendant] did not intend them."

  3. People v. Cunningham

    104 Misc. 2d 298 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980)   Cited 1 times

    very fact necessary to establish the crime and invaded the fact-finding function of the jury (Sandstrom v Montana, supra, at pp 514-517, 521-524). Appellate courts in New York have applied Sandstrom in direct appeals and have reversed judgments (see People v Jones, 74 A.D.2d 854; People v Egan, 72 A.D.2d 239; People v Thomas, 71 A.D.2d 280 [trial courts used word "presumed"]), have affirmed judgments (see People v Collazo, 74 A.D.2d 853; People v Thomas, 74 A.D.2d 614; People v Blum, 72 A.D.2d 691; People v Reyes, 71 A.D.2d 1034; People v Parker, 71 A.D.2d 986 [BLOOM, J., concurring]; People v Fournier, 70 A.D.2d 491 [trial courts used words "presumed", "rebuttable presumption", or "must infer", but errors deemed harmless in light of remainder of court's instructions to jury and overwhelming evidence of guilt]), and have found no error (see People v Davis, 72 A.D.2d 749; People v Gonzalez, 72 A.D.2d 508 [trial courts used words "may infer"]; see, also, People v Albino, 74 A.D.2d 831; People v Gray, 71 A.D.2d 295 [trial courts used word "presumed", but no error in light of remainder of court's instructions to jury]). CPL 440.10 codifies the common-law writ of error coram nobis, a remedy designed to inform the court of facts not reflected in the record and unknown at the time of the judgment which as a matter of law would undermine the basis of the judgment (People v Crimmins, 38 N.Y.2d 407, 418; People v Caminito, 3 N.Y.2d 596, 601).

  4. Arce v. Smith

    710 F. Supp. 920 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)   Cited 18 times

    One issue relevant herein is whether petitioner's counsel was incompetent in not objecting five years before the Supreme Court's pronouncement with respect to a charge that was routinely used in criminal cases in New York State. See People v. Gray, 71 A.D.2d 295, 423 N.Y.S.2d 66, 67 (4th Dep't 1979) ("The court's further charge on intent to the effect that 'a person is presumed to intend the logical and natural consequences of his acts' was an instruction the propriety of which has long been established in this State (see People v. Lieberman, 3 N.Y.2d 649, 652, 171 N.Y.S.2d 73, [76, 148 N.E.2d 293 (1958), and cases cited therein.])"). Under the Supreme Court's standard for effective assistance in Strickland v. Washington, counsel's performance must be deficient to the extent that his errors were not within the realm of reasonableness under the professional norms prevailing atthe time of trial. 466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65.

  5. State v. Trieb

    315 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1982)   Cited 37 times
    In State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 654 n. 6 (N.D. 1982), we observed that: "The key to satisfying Sandstrom is to explain to the jury the legal effect of the presumption.

    These instructions relied on by the State neither qualified nor explained how the jurors should interpret the presumption. State v. Amado, 433 A.2d 233 (R.I. 1981); contra, Jacks v. State, 394 N.E.2d 166, 174-176 (Ind. 1979), and People v. Gray, 71 A.D.2d 295, 299-300, 423 N.Y.S.2d 66, 69 (1979), appeal denied 49 N.Y.2d 804, 426 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 403 N.E.2d 462 (1980). We cannot, under Sandstrom, discount the possibility that Trieb's jury applied the intent presumption in an unconstitutional manner.

  6. State v. Amado

    433 A.2d 233 (R.I. 1981)   Cited 10 times
    Stating that “[t]he challenged instruction bears directly on * * * whether defendant possessed the intent to kill and, for second-degree murder, the added elements of malice aforethought or premeditation ”

    Additionally, we note that a number of post- Sandstrom decisions have sustained charges containing conclusive or burden-shifting instructions after the courts analyzed the context within which the presumption was used and found the harmful impact diminished by explanatory language. See, e.g., Jacks v. State, Ind., 394 N.E.2d 166, 175 (1979); State v. Williams, 228 Kan. 723, 731, 621 P.2d 423, 431 (1980); People v. Gray, 71 A.D.2d 295, 299-300, 423 N.Y.S.2d 66, 69 (1979), appeal denied, 49 N.Y.2d 804, 426 N.Y.S.2d 1033, 403 N.E.2d 462 (1980). Therefore, it becomes necessary to look carefully at the content of the trial justice's charge.

  7. People v. Thomas

    50 N.Y.2d 467 (N.Y. 1980)   Cited 472 times
    Reversing Appellate Division

    Its natural result would be to destroy life, and he must be presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his act just as if he had aimed at the heart of the deceased and fired a gun". Moreover, such manner of charge was so well accepted that it has never previously been challenged on constitutional grounds in this State (see People v Gray, 71 A.D.2d 295, 297). In law, the term "presumption", though sometimes carelessly employed as a synonym for "inference", is a most consequential evidentiary concept.

  8. State v. Arroyo

    180 Conn. 171 (Conn. 1980)   Cited 40 times
    In State v. Arroyo, 180 Conn. 171, 429 A.2d 457, this court recognized that "Sandstrom does not invalidate the use of all inferences and presumptions with regard to criminal intent."

    If, on the other hand, the instructions made it clear that the jurors were permitted but not required to infer criminal intent from the defendant's conduct, then the instructions do not violate the defendant's fourteenth amendment guarantees. United States v. Spiegel, 604 F.2d 961, 968-69 (5th Cir. 1979); Gagne v. Meachum, 602 F.2d 471, 473-74 (1st Cir. 1979); McInerny v. Berman, 473 F. Sup. 187, 189-90 (D.Mass. 1979); Jacks v. State, Ind. 394 N.E.2d 166, 174-76 (1979); State v. Rinehart, 283 N.W.2d 319, 320-23 (Iowa 1979) State v. Acheson, 3 Kan. App. 2d 705, 713-16, 601 P.2d 375 (1979); People v. Gray, 71 App.Div.2d 295, 298-300, 423 N.Y.S.2d 66 (1979). The three remaining reported cases which have been decided by lower courts under Sandstrom hold that although there is or may be error in the charge, the error is not reversible. United States v. Fowler, 605 F.2d 181, 183-85 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 463-66 (3d Cir. 1979); United States ex rel. Collins v. Crist, 473 F. Sup. 1354, 1357-58 (D.Mont. 1979).

  9. People v. Thompson

    145 A.D.2d 952 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988)   Cited 3 times

    randum: On appeal from a conviction of second degree robbery, defendant claims that the verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence and was against the weight of the evidence, that the court's charge on intent and reasonable doubt impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and that the verdict was repugnant. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People (People v Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620), we find that the People established that defendant and the codefendant forcibly deprived the complainant of the use of his truck, caused substantial damage to it and caused the complainant to suffer physical injury. This was sufficient to sustain defendant's guilt under count 4 of the indictment (see, People v Greene, 70 N.Y.2d 860; People v Dekle, 83 A.D.2d 522, affd 56 N.Y.2d 835). The court's charge on intent neither created a conclusive presumption nor impermissibly shifted the burden of proof (see, People v Getch, 50 N.Y.2d 456, 465; People v Barr, 75 A.D.2d 14, 16-17; People v Gray, 71 A.D.2d 295, 299; cf., Sandstrom v Montana, 442 U.S. 510). Defendant's claim that the verdict was repugnant was not raised before the jury was discharged and thus has been waived (see, People v Alfaro, 66 N.Y.2d 985; People v La Pella, 135 A.D.2d 735, lv denied 71 N.Y.2d 898). Although the court's instructions on reasonable doubt contained some inappropriate phrases, since defense counsel failed to object, the error has not been preserved for our review (see, People v Price, 144 A.D.2d 1013). In any event, when viewed as a whole, the court's charge properly conveyed to the jury the concept of reasonable doubt.

  10. People v. Lilley

    96 A.D.2d 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983)

    We disagree. In the first place, we do not read Connecticut v Johnson (460 US ___, 103 S Ct 969) as requiring us to reach the unpreserved issue as a matter of discretion pursuant to CPL 470.15 (subd 6). Even if we were to reach the issue, we would affirm because the charge is identical to that given in People v Gray ( 71 A.D.2d 295, 298-299) which we held was not contrary to Sandstrom. We have examined defendant's other contentions and find no basis for reversal.