While we agree with defendant that courts must more carefully scrutinize the evidence in a rape case than in any other type of case, pursuant to People v. Secret (1978), 72 Ill.2d 371, 381 N.E.2d 281, we believe the defendant's failure to raise the issue of alleged error in denying his motion for a directed verdict in his written post-trial motion for a new trial amounts to a waiver of that issue on appeal. ( People v. Cook (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 695, 397 N.E.2d 439; People v. Gray (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 52, 351 N.E.2d 339.) As we indicated previously the testimony of the victim in this case was clear and convincing and was corroborated by other evidence, and since the truth of the evidence introduced by the State is admitted by the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the case is clearly one wherein reasonable minds might differ.

The robbery, however, was interrupted by the appearance of two police officers. In People v. Gray (1977), 40 Ill. App.3d 52, 351 N.E.2d 339, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Dieringer, held: "The Illinois Supreme Court has consistently held, where it is contended the punishment imposed in a particular case is excessive, though within the limits prescribed by the legislature, Illinois reviewing courts should not disturb the sentence unless it clearly appears the penalty constitutes a great departure from the Illinois constitutional requirement that all penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense.

Similarly, in Colorado the need for corroboration is decided on an ad hoc basis, depending on the character of the prosecutrix, the probability or improbability of her testimony and whether her testimony is conflicting and contradictory. LaBanc v. People, 161 Colo. 274, 421 P.2d 474 (1966). See also People v. Gray, 40 Ill.App.3d 52, 351 N.E.2d 339 (1976) (no corroboration needed if testimony clear and convincing); Robinson v. Commonwealth, 459 S.W.2d 147 (Ky. 1970) (if not contradictory or incredible, or inherently improbable, unsupported testimony may be sufficient); State v. Thomas, 351 Mo. 804, 174 S.W.2d 337 (1943) (corroboration required where the prosecutrix is a mature woman and the case is weak); Gamble v. State, 576 P.2d 1184 (Okla.Cr.App. 1978) (corroboration unnecessary unless testimony of prosecutrix is of such contradictory and unsatisfactory nature, or she is so impeached, that such testimony is clearly unworthy of belief and insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conviction); Thomas v. State, 92 Wis.2d 372, 284 N.W.2d 917 (Wis. 1979) (corroboration necessary where the testimony on its face shows unreliability). Some statutes also require corroboration in certain types of sex crimes.

Generally, on an appeal from a bench trial, the reviewing court will defer to the trial court's assessment of the witnesses' credibility and decline to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court unless there "clearly appears" to be a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. ( People v. Gray (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 52, 54, 351 N.E.2d 339, 341.) It is undisputed that defendant left the scene of an accident without identifying himself.

Where a sentence is within the limits prescribed by the legislature, a reviewing court should not disturb it unless it constitutes a great departure from the Illinois constitutional requirement that penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense. ( People v. Richardson (1969), 43 Ill.2d 318, 253 N.E.2d 420; People v. Smith (1958), 14 Ill.2d 95, 150 N.E.2d 815; People v. Gray (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 52, 351 N.E.2d 339.) The trial judge is in the best position to determine an appropriate sentence because of his presence at the trial and at the hearing in aggravation and mitigation. ( People v. McCullough (1970), 45 Ill.2d 305, 259 N.E.2d 19; People v. Taylor (1965), 33 Ill.2d 417, 211 N.E.2d 673.) Absent an abuse of discretion in sentencing, this court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.