Opinion
2015-00966, Ind. No. 1800/12.
07-26-2017
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Michael T. GRASING, appellant.
Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Edward E. Smith of counsel), for appellant. Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Glenn Green of counsel), for respondent.
Laurette D. Mulry, Riverhead, NY (Edward E. Smith of counsel), for appellant.
Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, NY (Glenn Green of counsel), for respondent.
RUTH C. BALKIN, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, SHERI S. ROMAN, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Cohen, J.), rendered January 5, 2015, convicting him of aggravated vehicular homicide, manslaughter in the second degree, leaving the scene of an incident without reporting, failure to stay in a designated lane, and exceeding the speed limit, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The County Court properly denied the defendant's challenge for cause to a prospective juror, since the statements made by the prospective juror did not demonstrate actual bias or otherwise indicate that he would be unable to render an impartial verdict (see CPL 270.20[1][b] ; People v. Ragland, 136 A.D.3d 845, 845, 24 N.Y.S.3d 529 ; People v. Wright, 134 A.D.3d 1059, 1060, 22 N.Y.S.3d 522 ; People v. Legette, 96 A.D.3d 1078, 1079, 946 N.Y.S.2d 894 ).
The defendant's challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for appellate review (see CPL 470.05[2] ; People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 ). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932 ), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of aggravated vehicular homicide ( Penal Law § 125.14[4] ) and leaving the scene of an incident without reporting ( Vehicle and Traffic Law § 600[2] ) beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Hale, 147 A.D.3d 975, 48 N.Y.S.3d 159 ; People v. Leddy, 47 A.D.3d 842, 849 N.Y.S.2d 163 ). Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 643–644, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
Further, while "[t]estimony about victims' personal backgrounds that is immaterial to any issue at trial should be excluded" ( People v. Harris, 98 N.Y.2d 452, 490–491, 749 N.Y.S.2d 766, 779 N.E.2d 705 ; see People v. Holiday, 142 A.D.3d 625, 36 N.Y.S.3d 520 ), to the extent that testimony was elicited from the victim's mother which was irrelevant to the sequence of events, any error was harmless as there was overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt and no significant probability that the error contributed to his convictions (see People v. LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88, 114, 783 N.Y.S.2d 485, 817 N.E.2d 341 ; People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 237, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 ; see also People v. Humphrey, 15 A.D.3d 683, 685, 789 N.Y.S.2d 325 ).
Similarly, although the County Court erred in allowing police officers to testify about remarks made to them by a witness to the incident, who was unavailable to testify at trial, such error was harmless (see People v. Johnson, 1 N.Y.3d 302, 306, 772 N.Y.S.2d 238, 804 N.E.2d 402 ; People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d at 237, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 ).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.