Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. No. FVI1000918, Miriam Ivy Morton, Judge.
Phillip I. Bronson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, and Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
RAMIREZ P. J.
Defendant and appellant Michael David Grant, Sr., contends, and the People concede, that the trial court failed to orally pronounce the dismissal of two counts and a prison prior allegation (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) that were to be dismissed pursuant to his plea agreement. We reverse the sentence with directions for the trial court to orally pronounce the dismissals.
BACKGROUND
Based upon his actions on April 22, 2010, defendant was charged with second degree commercial burglary (Pen. Code, § 459, count 1), petty theft with priors (Pen. Code, § 666, subd. (b), count 2), and possession of methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a), count 3). Defendant was also alleged to have a prior burglary conviction from 2006 that was both a strike prior (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and a prison prior (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). Pursuant to his plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to attempted second degree burglary (Pen. Code, §§ 664, 459) and admitted the strike prior. The trial court stated defendant would “get the mitigated 8 months, doubled, for 16 months and be sentenced forthwith.” The plea form also stated, “DISMISS REMAINING AND MVI-1001234, 2869732MG.” The form was signed by defendant, his counsel, a deputy district attorney, and the judge. The trial court imposed the agreed upon prison sentence, but as to the dismissals stated only: “Court will dismiss, pursuant to the plea, cases MVI 1001234 and Cite 2869732MG.” The minute order states, “on motion of People, pursuant to plea bargain, Count 2-3 ordered DISMISSED; Reason: 1385 PC.”
DISCUSSION
Once the court has accepted the terms of a negotiated plea, it is bound to impose a sentence within the limits of that bargain. (Pen. Code, § 1192.5; People v. Segura (2008) 44 Cal.4th 921, 931.) “In a criminal case, judgment is rendered when the trial court orally pronounces sentence. [Citations.]” (People v. Karaman (1992) 4 Cal.4th 335, 344, fn. 9.) “Where there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.” (People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.) “The clerk cannot supplement the judgment the court actually pronounced by adding a provision to the minute order and the abstract of judgment.” (Id. at pp. 387–388.)
The reporter’s transcript indicates that there was no oral pronouncement of the dismissal of the prison prior allegation or the dismissal of counts 2 and 3. Accordingly, the trial court must conduct a new sentencing hearing and fully pronounce the agreed upon sentence, as well as ensure that its reasons for dismissing the prison prior allegation are included in its minute order.
DISPOSITION
The imposed sentence is reversed. The trial court is directed to conduct a new sentencing hearing.
We concur: HOLLENHORST J., CODRINGTON J.