Opinion
2012-06-29
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Shawn G. GRANGER, Defendant–Appellant. (Appeal No. 3.)
Kathleen P. Reardon, Rochester, for Defendant–Appellant. Shawn G. Granger, defendant-appellant pro se.
Kathleen P. Reardon, Rochester, for Defendant–Appellant. Shawn G. Granger, defendant-appellant pro se.
Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General, Albany (Hannah Stith Long of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., SMITH, CENTRA, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.39[1] ) and two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (§ 220.16[1], [12] ), defendant contends that his plea was involuntary based on allegedly coercive statements made by County Court during a pretrial conference with respect to defendant's sentencing exposure. Because he did not move to withdraw his plea or to vacate the judgment of conviction on that ground, defendant failed to preserve that contention for our review ( see People v. Jackson, 64 A.D.3d 1248, 1249, 883 N.Y.S.2d 684,lv. denied13 N.Y.3d 745, 886 N.Y.S.2d 99, 914 N.E.2d 1017;People v. Lando, 61 A.D.3d 1389, 876 N.Y.S.2d 923,lv. denied13 N.Y.3d 746, 886 N.Y.S.2d 100, 914 N.E.2d 1018), and we decline to exercise our power to review that contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice ( seeCPL 470.15[6][a] ).
Defendant further contends that the court erred in conducting the Darden hearing in camera rather than in open court, and that the police did not timely file the search warrant return with the court, as required by CPL 690.50(5). By pleading guilty, however, defendant forfeited those contentions. It is well settled that “[a] guilty plea generally results in a forfeiture of the right to appellate review of any nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings” ( People v. Fernandez, 67 N.Y.2d 686, 688, 499 N.Y.S.2d 919, 490 N.E.2d 838), and defendant's contentions regarding the Darden hearing and the search warrant return do not fall within the exception to the general rule set forth in CPL 710.70(2) for an order “finally denying a motion to suppress evidence” ( see generally People v. Petgen, 55 N.Y.2d 529, 534, 450 N.Y.S.2d 299, 435 N.E.2d 669,rearg. denied57 N.Y.2d 674, 454 N.Y.S.2d 1032, 439 N.E.2d 1247).
Although defendant's constitutional speedy trial challenge survives his guilty plea ( see People v. Blakley, 34 N.Y.2d 311, 314, 357 N.Y.S.2d 459, 313 N.E.2d 763;People v. Faro, 83 A.D.3d 1569, 1569, 921 N.Y.S.2d 599,lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 858, 932 N.Y.S.2d 23, 956 N.E.2d 804), we conclude that it lacks merit. In view of the complex undercover investigation that led to defendant's arrest, the serious nature of the charges and the lack of prejudice to defendant, we conclude that the seven-month delay between defendant's commission of the first crime charged and his arrest and arraignment did not violate his constitutional right to a speedy trial ( see People v. Jenkins, 2 A.D.3d 1390, 1390–1391, 769 N.Y.S.2d 413;People v. Morobel, 273 A.D.2d 871, 709 N.Y.S.2d 743,lv. denied95 N.Y.2d 906, 716 N.Y.S.2d 647, 739 N.E.2d 1152;see generally People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 445, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303).
Defendant's contention that he received ineffective assistance of counsel does not survive his guilty plea because “[t]here is no showing that the plea bargaining process was infected by any allegedly ineffective assistance or that defendant entered the plea because of his attorney['s] allegedly poor performance” ( People v. Burke, 256 A.D.2d 1244, 682 N.Y.S.2d 650,lv. denied93 N.Y.2d 851, 688 N.Y.S.2d 498, 710 N.E.2d 1097). In any event, we reject defendant's contention that his attorney was ineffective based solely on his failure to file a demand for a bill of particulars ( see generally People v. Ford, 86 N.Y.2d 397, 404, 633 N.Y.S.2d 270, 657 N.E.2d 265). Indeed, although defendant was eligible for sentencing as a persistent felony offender and faced consecutive sentences on multiple criminal transactions, defense counsel negotiated a favorable plea agreement pursuant to which defendant received concurrent sentences aggregating eight years in prison with three years of postrelease supervision.
We have reviewed defendant's remaining contentions, including those advanced in his pro se supplemental brief, and conclude that none requires reversal or modification of the judgment.
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.