Opinion
SC 164683 COA 355477
03-22-2024
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BRIAN KELLEY GRANGER, Defendant-Appellee.
Midland CC: 83-004565-FC
Elizabeth T. Clement, Chief Justice Brian K. Zahra David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch Kyra H. Bolden, Justices
ORDER
By order of May 31, 2023, the application for leave to appeal the August 4, 2022 judgment of the Court of Appeals was held in abeyance pending the decision in People v Musselman (Docket No. 163290). On order of the Court, the order directing oral argument on the application in Musselman having been vacated on November 22, 2023, Mich. (2023), the application is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the question presented should be reviewed by this Court.
Viviano, J. (dissenting).
I agree with the Court of Appeals dissent that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by resentencing defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole (LWOP) after conducting a Miller hearing. And even if resentencing were warranted, the Court of Appeals should have remanded to the trial court for resentencing under the standard set forth in People v Taylor, 510 Mich. 112 (2022), so that the prosecution could have the opportunity to rebut the presumption that LWOP is a disproportionate sentence for defendant due to his age at the time he committed his crime. Instead, by holding that defendant is entitled to a term-of-years sentence, the Court of Appeals majority usurped the trial court's role and substituted its judgment for that of the trial court, as noted by the Court of Appeals dissent. For these reasons, I dissent from the denial of leave to appeal.
See generally Miller v Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012) (holding that "mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual punishments' "); MCL 769.25a (establishing procedures for resentencing juvenile homicide offenders originally sentenced to LWOP in order to comply with Miller).
For the reasons stated in my dissent in Taylor, I do not believe there is a presumption that life without parole is a disproportionate sentence or that the prosecution is required to rebut this presumption in order for a court to impose a sentence of life without parole on a defendant who was under the age of 18 at the time of the crime. But when, as in this case, resentencing occurred prior to Taylor being decided, the prosecution should at least have the opportunity to rebut the presumption created in Taylor before an appellate court determines that LWOP is off the table as a matter of law.