Id.See alsoNorthrup, 785 F.3d at 1132.In People v. Granados, 332 Ill.App.3d 860, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 266 Ill.Dec. 202 (2002), the Court determined the defendant's legal possession of firearms was not a sufficient basis to extend a traffic safety checkpoint stop so that the officer could obtain the defendant's firearm owner's identification card and confirm his valid possession of the firearms, explaining as follows:The traffic stop here concluded when the officer returned to defendant his driver's license, registration, and insurance card and stated that defendant was free to go. Because the initial purpose of the stop (the roadside check) had been completed and because the officer lacked any reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, we find that the subsequent detention of defendant's vehicle without reasonable suspicion was improper.

¶ 17 In a statutory summary suspension hearing, the defendant bears the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case for rescission. People v. Granados, 332 Ill.App.3d 860, 862, 266 Ill.Dec. 202, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (2002). The defendant must satisfy his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

In a statutory summary suspension hearing, the defendant motorist bears the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case for rescission. People v. Granados, 332 Ill. App. 3d 860, 862, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (2002). The defendant must satisfy his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

In a statutory summary suspension hearing, the defendant motorist bears the burden of proof to establish a prima facie case for rescission. People v. Granados, 332 Ill. App. 3d 860, 862, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 1274 (2002). The defendant must satisfy his burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence.

And no case supports Plaintiff's position at summary judgment that Defendants needed probable cause to believe that he violated the FOID Card Act before they could ask to see his FOID card. Logically, such a requirement would make it nearly impossible to develop probable cause for a violation of the FOID Card Act, unless gun owners regularly announce that they lack FOID cards. And the cases that Plaintiff cited for his dubious argument addressed whether officers had the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop of a moving vehicle, not whether officers already lawfully conversing with someone may ask to see a FOID card. See, e.g., People v. Granados, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). Finally, this Court notes that Plaintiff' blurs the fundamental difference between probable cause to arrest and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

No case supports Plaintiff's position that officers needed probable cause to believe that he violated the FOID Card Act before they could ask for his FOID card. Logically, such a requirement would make it nearly impossible to develop probable cause for a violation of the FOID Card Act, unless gun owners regularly announce that they lack FOID cards. And the cases that Plaintiff cites for his dubious argument do not apply here because they address whether officers had the reasonable suspicion necessary for a Terry stop of a moving vehicle, not whether officers already conversing with someone may ask to see a FOID card. See, e.g., People v. Granados, 773 N.E.2d 1272, 1276 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). Here, the Defendant Officers unquestionably possessed probable cause to believe that Plaintiff violated the FOID Card Act when he admitted to possessing the firearms and ammunition in his bedroom, but could not produce a FOID card upon request.

It follows that if the facts and the credibility of witnesses are unquestioned, our standard of review is purely de novo. People v. Granados, 332 Ill.App.3d 860, 862-63 (2002).

However, where, as in this case, the relevant facts are undisputed, review of the ruling on the petition is de novo. People v. Granados, 332 Ill. App. 3d 860, 862-63 (2002). The Village first argues that defendant was not seized.