Opinion
2022-00784
02-04-2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, v. JAMES GRAHAM, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
DAVISON LAW OFFICE PLLC, CANANDAIGUA (MARY P. DAVISON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
DAVISON LAW OFFICE PLLC, CANANDAIGUA (MARY P. DAVISON OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, NEMOYER, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the Monroe County Court (Victoria M. Argento, J.), rendered July 20, 2017. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree.
It is hereby ORDERED that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter is remitted to Monroe County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon his plea of guilty, of manslaughter in the first degree (Penal Law § 125.20 [1]). Preliminarily, we note that defendant's "waiver of his right to appeal was invalid... and, in any event, [would] not bar his contention that [County] Court failed to properly consider youthful offender treatment" (People v Dhillon, 143 A.D.3d 734, 735 [2d Dept 2016]). On the merits, as the People correctly concede, we agree with defendant that the court erred in determining that he was ineligible for youthful offender status. Contrary to the court's determination, manslaughter in the first degree is not an "armed felony" for purposes of CPL 720.10 (2) (a) (ii) (see Dhillon, 143 A.D.3d at 735; People v Wilson, 240 A.D.2d 603, 603 [2d Dept 1997]; see generally CPL 1.20 [41]). Thus, defendant's eligibility for youthful offender status did not turn, as the court held, on the existence of a statutory mitigating factor enumerated in CPL 720.10 (3) (see People v Jarvis, 186 A.D.3d 1086, 1086-1087 [4th Dept 2020]; Dhillon, 143 A.D.3d at 735). Inasmuch as defendant is otherwise eligible for youthful offender status on this conviction (see CPL 720.10 [1], [2]), the court was obligated to make a discretionary youthful offender determination before imposing sentence (see CPL 720.20 [1]; People v Rudolph, 21 N.Y.3d 497, 501 [2013]). We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court to make and state for the record a determination whether defendant should be afforded youthful offender status (see Jarvis, 186 A.D.3d at 1087; People v Willis, 161 A.D.3d 1584, 1584 [4th Dept 2018]).