¶ 13 The defendant argues that Officers Prothro and Smith lacked reasonable suspicion to justify both the initial Terry stop and the resulting pat-down. In support, he cites caselaw holding that the sight of a bulge in a suspect's clothing is insufficient to justify a stop (see, e.g., People v. Goodum, 356 Ill.App.3d 1081, 1085 (2005)) and he further argues that, even if a firearm were visible, the stop still would not have been warranted because possessing a firearm is not necessarily a crime (see People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 170474, ¶ 40 ("[P]olice cannot simply assume a person who possesses a firearm outside the home is involved in criminal activity.")). He also contends that, once stopped, there was no evidence that he posed a danger to the officers so as to justify the pat-down.
An arrest or restraint occurs when a reasonable person would believe he was not free to leave. People v. Goodum, 828 N.E.2d 835, 840 (Ill.App.Ct. 2005). A person's freedom of movement may be restrained by physical force or a show of authority.
494 F3d 1146, 1152 [9th Cir 2007] ["when police officers see a license plate in plain view, and then use that plate to access additional non-private information about the car and its owner, they do not conduct a Fourth Amendment search"]; United States v Ellison, 462 F3d 557, 563 [6th Cir 2006] ["Thus, so long as the officer had a right to be in a position to observe the defendant's license plate, any such observation and corresponding use of the information on the plate does not violate the Fourth Amendment"]; Olabisiomotosho v City of Houston, 185 F3d 521, 529 [5th Cir 1999]; United States v Walraven, 892 F2d 972, 974 [10th Cir 1989]). Lower courts of this state reached the same conclusion (see People v Davila, 27 Misc 3d 921, 925 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2010], affd 137 AD3d 655 [1st Dept 2016]; People v Diggs, 38 AD3d 565, 565 [2d Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 922 [2007]; People v Brown, 306 AD2d 291, 291 [2d Dept 2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 618 [2003]), as have courts in other states (seePeople v Goodum, 356 Ill App 3d 1081, 1085-1086, 828 NE2d 835, 840 [Ill App Ct 2005]; Commonwealth v Muckle, 61 Mass App Ct 678, 681, 814 NE2d 7, 11 [Mass App Ct 2004]; State v Richter, 145 NH 640, 640-641, 765 A2d 687, 688 [2000]). Because the purpose of a license plate is to readily facilitate the identification of the registered owner of the vehicle for the administration of public safety, a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information acquired by the State for this purpose and contained in a law enforcement or DMV database. Indeed, the information is typically provided voluntarily by a driver to a government agency in exchange for the privilege of a valid license and registration. Considering that police officers are authorized by law to inspect and check for violations of licensing and registration requirements (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 390, 401), drivers cannot claim any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the DMV information being obtained by law enforcement.
,Bronx County 2010], aff'd. 137 A.D.3d 655, 28 N.Y.S.3d 366 [1st Dept.2016] ; People v. Diggs, 38 A.D.3d 565, 565, 833 N.Y.S.2d 518 [2d Dept.2007], lv. denied 9 N.Y.3d 922, 844 N.Y.S.2d 177, 875 N.E.2d 896 [2007] ; People v. Brown, 306 A.D.2d 291, 291, 760 N.Y.S.2d 348 [2d Dept.2003], lv. denied 100 N.Y.2d 618, 767 N.Y.S.2d 401, 799 N.E.2d 624 [2003] ), as have courts in other states (see People v. Goodum, 356 Ill.App.3d 1081, 1085–1086, 293 Ill.Dec. 525, 828 N.E.2d 835, 840 [2005] ; Commonwealth v. Muckle, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 678, 681, 814 N.E.2d 7, 11 [2004] ; State v. Richter, 145 N.H. 640, 640–641, 765 A.2d 687, 688 [2000] ). Because the purpose of a license plate is to readily facilitate the identification of the registered owner of the vehicle for the administration of public safety, a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information acquired by the State for this purpose and contained in a law enforcement or DMV database. Indeed, the information is typically provided voluntarily by a driver to a government agency in exchange for the privilege of a valid license and registration. Considering that police officers are authorized by law to inspect and check for violations of licensing and registration requirements (see Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 390, 401 ), drivers cannot claim any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the DMV information being obtained by
A police officer may temporarily detain a person when the officer's observations create a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has committed a crime. People v. Goodum, 356 Ill.App.3d 1081, 1085 (2005). "[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries
However, "[a] single bulge in a defendant's clothing, by itself, does not justify a Terry stop and pat-down search." People v. Goodum, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1085 (2005). Here, we also have the added circumstance of respondent's suspected curfew violation.
¶ 77 Besides Harris , Respondent relies on additional cases where this court has stated that a bulge in the defendant's clothing, by itself, does not create reasonable suspicion. See, e.g. , People v. Surles , 2011 IL App (1st) 100068, ¶ 40, 357 Ill.Dec. 559, 963 N.E.2d 957 ; People v. Goodum , 356 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1085, 293 Ill.Dec. 525, 828 N.E.2d 835 (2005) ; People v. Byrd , 47 Ill. App. 3d 804, 808, 8 Ill.Dec. 205, 365 N.E.2d 443 (1977). We take no issue with that proposition of law.
People v. Gonzalez, 184 Ill. 2d 402, 422 (1998). ¶ 17 The lateness of the hour, and defendant's presence in a "high crime" area, are factors to consider in determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the Terry "reasonable, articulable suspicion" standard has been met (see People v. Kipfer, 356 Ill. App. 3d 132, 138 (2005); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); People v. Jackson, 2012 IL App (1st) 103300, ¶ 51; People v. Smithers, 83 Ill. 2d 430, 438 (1980); and People v. Goodum, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1085 (2005)). ¶ 18 In the present case, the totality of the circumstances supports the reasonableness of the officer's decision to perform a safety pat-down.
Here, Officer Tanovic testified that defendant matched the description of the person reportedly carrying a gun in the designated area, he believed the bulge he observed in defendant's pants pocket was a gun and he feared for his safety. Under these circumstances, we find that the pat down search was warranted (People v. Morales, 221 Ill. App. 3d 13, 18 (1991); People v. Goodum, 356 Ill. App. 3d 1081, 1085 (2005)), and the removal of the gun proper (Morales, 221 Ill. App. 3d at 18). Accordingly, we find no error by the trial court in denying defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. ¶ 27 In reaching this conclusion, we have considered Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), upon which defendant primarily relies.
Further, this court has repeatedly rejected claims, as made by the State, that Officer Solana's observation of the bulge in defendant's waistband is an independent basis for the pat-down search, holding that the presence of a bulge in defendant's clothing alone is in sufficient to warrant a search. People v. Goodum, 356 Ill.App.3d 1081, 1085, 293 Ill.Dec. 525, 828 N.E.2d 835 (2005); Harris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103382, ¶ 17, 354 Ill.Dec. 336, 957 N.E.2d 930. ¶ 41 Having concluded that neither defendant's presence in the high-crime area nor the bulge alone was sufficient to justify a pat-down search, we must also conclude that these two together are also insufficient, because “[w]hen you add nothing to nothing, you get nothing.”