In ordering that the pattern instruction be modified, the court noted that defendant testified regarding both imminent threats of harm (i.e., the threat that the gang members who followed him to the Knoxville Food Mart would harm him if he did not commit the armed robbery) and future threats of harm (i.e., that Harper knew where his son's mother lived). Because defendant's testimony could reasonably be interpreted to contain both threats of imminent and future harm, the court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the pattern instruction to clarify that threats of future death or future great bodily harm did not excuse criminal conduct. ¶ 39 We find support for our holding in People v. Goodman, 347 Ill. App. 3d 278, 290 (2004) and People v. Carini, 151 Ill. App. 3d 264, 282 (1986). In both cases, the court instructed the jury that a threat of future harm was not sufficient to excuse criminal conduct.
Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d at 94-95. In People v. Goodman, 347 Ill. App. 3d 278 (2004), the defendant argued that testimony regarding a telephone conversation with her lacked an adequate foundation. This court held that "[a] mere assertion by a telephone caller as to his or her identity, being hearsay, cannot be taken as a sufficient showing of the other person's identity."
While the IPI instructions are preferred, it is within the discretion of the trial court to give a modified instruction provided that the instruction is a simple, brief, impartial, and nonargumentative statement of the law. Ill. S. Ct. R. 451(a) (eff. July 1, 2006); People v. Goodman, 347 Ill. App. 3d 278, 290, 806 N.E.2d 1124, 1134 (2004). ¶ 37 In this case, we find that it was error to give the State's modified version of the pattern instruction on compulsion.
While appellate review would be enhanced if trial courts briefly stated the bases for their fitness findings, there is no rule that requires them to do so. See People v. Goodman, 347 Ill. App. 3d 278, 287 (2004).
A trial court may rely on stipulated testimony regarding a defendant's fitness, although the court cannot blindly defer to an expert's opinion. People v. Goodman, 347 Ill.App.3d 278, 287, 282 Ill.Dec. 536, 806 N.E.2d 1124, 1132 (2004). "The parties may stipulate to what an expert would testify [as to a defendant's fitness], but they may not stipulate to an expert's conclusions regarding fitness."
App. Ct. Ill., 1st Dist. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 347 Ill. App. 3d 278, 806 N. E. 2d 1124.
Although defendant argues that the trial court should have gone further and asked defendant if he had continued to take his medication over the preceding two weeks, the court was under no obligation to do so. See People v. Goodman, 347 Ill.App.3d 278, 287 (2004) ("[W]e are aware of no statute or supreme court rule that requires trial courts to *** independently question a defendant ***."). ¶ 44 Defendant claims that the record is silent as to whether the trial court actually read the report, as required.
As the expert opinion in the report referenced medication compliance as a condition of fitness, the circuit court affirmatively exercised its discretion when it questioned defendant about whether he was currently taking his medication. See People v. Goodman, 347 Ill.App.3d 278, 287 (2004) ("In light of the trial court's independent duty to determine a defendant's fitness to stand trial, a trial court may certainly exercise its discretion to pose questions to the defendant."). During this inquiry, the court also had the opportunity to observe and assess defendant's responses and demeanor and make comparisons based on its periodic prior observations of defendant during court appearances where defendant was unfit.
While a court's observations of a defendant can support a fitness finding, and while there may be no explicit requirement that the court question a defendant about his or her fitness or specify all of its reasons for finding fitness, the record typically reflects that the court's observations and ultimate finding were accompanied by a review of the psychological report and/or certain stipulations by the parties. See, e.g., Cook, 2014 IL App (2d) 130545, ¶ 15 (court must state on the record the factual basis for its finding); cf. People v. Goodman, 347 Ill.App.3d 278, 297 (2004) (no statute or supreme court rule requires the court to make express findings of fact regarding fitness). The fact remains that, here, the record does not reflect that the court ever actually made an affirmative finding that defendant had been restored to fitness, there was nothing indicating that it had reviewed the report, there were no stipulations made by the parties or evidence offered, and the State cites no authority that the court's observations alone reflect it exercised discretion in finding defendant fit.
¶ 33 Although the defendant correctly notes that the circuit court here, as in both Contorno and Cook, did not state that it had read Dr. Hollabaugh's report, provide a factual basis for its fitness determination, or question the defendant on the issue, this court is "aware of no statute or supreme court rule that requires trial courts to either independently question a defendant or make express findings of fact regarding fitness." People v. Goodman, 347 Ill. App. 3d 278, 287 (2004). Instead, we conclude, as did our supreme court in Lewis, that the court could find the defendant fit to stand trial after considering a proper stipulation and personally observing the defendant.