Opinion
10237 Ind. 3361/15
10-29-2019
Janet E. Sabel, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Jonathan McCoy of counsel), for appellant. Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Victoria Muth of counsel), for respondent.
Janet E. Sabel, The Legal Aid Society, New York (Jonathan McCoy of counsel), for appellant.
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., District Attorney, New York (Victoria Muth of counsel), for respondent.
Renwick, J.P., Manzanet–Daniels, Mazzarelli, Webber, Oing, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Thomas Farber, J. at suppression hearing; Daniel P. Conviser, J. at jury trial and sentencing), rendered May 17, 2016, convicting defendant of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree (six counts), forcible touching and sexual abuse in the third degree, and sentencing him to an aggregate term of two to six years, unanimously affirmed.
The hearing court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the credit cards retrieved from his wallet. The record establishes that the cards were recovered as part of a lawful stationhouse inspection of objects on defendant's person. To the extent this police action can be considered an inventory search, an officer's detailed testimony about the relevant police procedures was sufficient to establish its validity (see People v. Padilla, 21 N.Y.3d 268, 970 N.Y.S.2d 486, 992 N.E.2d 414 [2013], cert denied 571 U.S. 889, 134 S.Ct. 325, 187 L.Ed.2d 158 [2013] ), especially when viewed in the particular context of the long-recognized reasonableness of stationhouse inspections of arrestees' personal effects (see People v. Perel, 34 N.Y.2d 462, 465–468, 358 N.Y.S.2d 383, 315 N.E.2d 452 [1974] ; see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648, 103 S.Ct. 2605, 77 L.Ed.2d 65 [1983] ).
The trial court providently exercised its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant's prior incident of sexual misconduct on the subway. The evidence was relevant to establish defendant's intent and lack of mistake, where the charged sexual conduct occurred on a crowded subway during rush hour. Furthermore, even if defendant's principal defense was that he did not touch the victim at all, the record demonstrates, as in People v. McKenzie , 169 A.D.3d 557, 558, 92 N.Y.S.3d 642 (1st Dept. 2019), lv denied 33 N.Y.3d 1033, 102 N.Y.S.3d 517, 126 N.E.3d 167 [2019] ), that "portions of the defense cross-examination and summation could be viewed as challenging the proof of the element of intent."