Opinion
H049335 H049364
03-11-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RUDY ANTHONY GONZALEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. Nos. C1504229, C1359980)
We resolve this case by memorandum opinion under California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1. (See also People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 847, 853-855.)
BROMBERG, J.
Last year we affirmed a trial court order denying defendant Rudy Anthony Gonzalez's motion under Penal Code section 1370, subdivision (c)(1) for release or, in the alternative, referral for a conservatorship evaluation. (People v. Gonzalez (Aug. 29, 2023, H049335, H049364) [nonpub. opn.] (Gonzalez).) (Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) In so doing, we relied upon an earlier decision of this court, which the Supreme Court has reversed. (Rodriguez v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 472 (Rodriguez).) The Supreme Court has now transferred back this case with directions to vacate our opinion, which we have done, and to reconsider this appeal in light of the Rodriguez decision. (People v. Gonzalez (Feb. 2, 2024, S282166).) Gonzalez argues that in light of that decision the judgment below should be vacated, the order denying his motion under section 1370 reversed, and this case remanded for further proceedings on the relief sought. The Attorney General in turn concedes that Gonzalez's commitment violated section 1370 and this case should be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. For the reasons stated below, we accept this concession.
Gonzalez was charged with, among other things, burglary and rape in one case and with resisting an officer in another. On December 18, 2013, the trial court found Gonzalez incompetent to stand trial and committed him to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) for treatment to restore competence. On August 18, 2014, DSH filed a certification that Gonzalez had become competent to stand trial, but the trial court did not find Gonzalez competent to stand trial and reinstate criminal proceedings against him until June 9, 2016. In July 2018, the trial court again committed Gonzalez to the DSH for treatment to restore competence. On August 26, 2019, DSH certified that Gonzalez was once again competent to stand trial, but the trial court did not find Gonzalez restored to competence until April 4, 2021.
The Legislature has limited the length of time during which a defendant may be committed for treatment to restore competence (§ 1370, subd. (c)(1)), and if a defendant does not regain competence within that time, courts must either release the defendant or, if the defendant is gravely disabled, initiate conservatorship proceedings. (Jackson v. Superior Court (2017) 4 Cal.5th 96, 100-101 (Jackson).) Although that period was reduced to two years in January 2019 (see Stats. 2018, ch. 1008, § 2), the parties agreed at the times relevant here the period was three years. (Former § 1370, subd. (c)(1).) Including the periods in between DSH's certifications and the trial court's finding of competence, Gonzalez contended that this period had been exceeded and moved to be released or, in the alternative, referred for a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). Reasoning that the DSH's certifications ended the period of Gonzalez's commitment under section 1370, the trial court disagreed and denied the motion. Relying upon our previous decision in Rodriguez, we affirmed. (Gonzalez, supra, H049335, H049364, at pp. 4-5 .)
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, the parties now agree that Gonzalez's commitments did not end with DSH's certifications and that the periods in between those certifications and the trial court's competency findings should be included in the calculation of the periods of commitment. The parties also agree that these periods must be aggregated and that the aggregate period was 1,908 days, which exceeds the applicable maximum period of three years, or 1,095 days. We agree that the periods of commitment should be aggregated (see Jackson, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 106) and that the aggregate period exceeds the permissible period under former section 1370, subdivision (c)(1). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court must either release Gonzalez or initiate conservatorship proceedings. (Jackson, supra, at pp. 106-107.)
Disposition
The judgment is reversed, the March 9, 2022 order denying Gonzalez's motion to proceed under section 1370 is also reversed, and this case is remanded with directions for additional proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinions in Rodriguez, supra, 15 Cal.5th 472 and Jackson, supra, 4 Cal.5th 96 .
WE CONCUR: GROVER, ACTING P.J. LIE, J.