Opinion
No. 1-15-0893
06-22-2017
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO GONZALEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 11 CR 19499 Honorable Thomas V. Gainer, Jr. Neera Lall Walsh, Judges presiding. JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Ellis and Justice McBride concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant's conviction for delivery of a controlled substance where: (1) his statutory speedy-trial right was not violated because the State did not charge him with a new and additional offense but rather the trial court properly allowed the State to amend the indictment to correct a formal defect; and (2) the State sufficiently proved that he delivered between 15 and 100 grams of heroin. ¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Pedro Gonzalez was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance (heroin) (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(1)(A) (West 2010)) and sentenced to six years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that: (1) the State violated his statutory right to a speedy trial when it charged him with delivery of a controlled substance after he had already served more than 120 days in custody on a pending charge of possession of a controlled substance; and (2) the State failed to sufficiently prove the weight of the heroin he delivered to sustain his conviction for the Class X version of the offense. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Both Judges Gainer and Walsh presided over defendant's case. Judge Gainer presided over the majority of defendant's pretrial proceedings, and Judge Walsh presided over his trial.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On October 26, 2011, the circuit court of Cook County issued an arrest warrant for defendant for allegedly committing the offense of "delivery of a controlled substance." The following day, the police arrested him. Defendant's arrest report states that the "incident" category of his arrest was "possession of controlled subst[ance]." The circuit court subsequently released defendant on electronic home monitoring. ¶ 5 On November 16, 2011, the State commenced special grand jury proceedings against defendant and codefendant Jerry Smith through which it sought true bills of indictment. An assistant State's Attorney informed the grand jury that defendant was "charged with delivery of a controlled substance more than 15 but less than 100 grams of heroin" while Smith was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. The State presented testimony from Chicago police officer Kevin Sellers, who testified that defendant delivered several bags of suspect heroin to Smith. Sellers stated that the police subsequently recovered and inventoried those bags, and to the best of his knowledge, the contents of the bags tested positive for heroin in the amount of 15.1 grams. ¶ 6 The grand jury returned a joint true bill of indictment against defendant and Smith for "possession of a controlled substance." Count 1, the only count of the indictment, alleged that, on February 11, 2011, defendant and Smith "committed the offense of possession of a controlled substance, in that they, unlawfully and knowingly possessed *** 15 grams or more but less than 100 grams of *** heroin, in violation of Chapter 720 Act 570 Section 402(a)(1)(A) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes." ¶ 7 On December 6, 2011, the trial court arraigned defendant, and his attorney waived a formal reading of the charges against him. Over the course of approximately the next two and a half years, defendant's case was delayed for various reasons. During this period of time, various attorneys represented defendant, including multiple public defenders and eventually a private attorney, who appeared on his behalf beginning in March 2014. ¶ 8 On April 28, 2014, the State filed a notice of motion, stating that it intended to file a motion to amend the indictment. On May 20, 2014, the parties appeared in court for the purpose of the State's motion. The State informed the trial court that there was "a [scrivener's] error in the indictment" and sought leave to amend Count 1 to read "delivery of a controlled substance rather than possession of a controlled substance." In support of its motion, the State asserted that it presented a delivery charge to the grand jury, and the grand jury heard evidence of such a charge. Relying on People v. Milton, 309 Ill. App. 3d 863 (1999), the State argued that the indictment suffered from a simple scrivener's error, which was a formal defect, and the court should allow its proposed amendment. ¶ 9 Defense counsel objected to the proffered amendment, attempting to distinguish defendant's case from the facts of Milton. Counsel argued that the State was attempting to "substantially alter[]" the charge against defendant because the offenses of delivery of a controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance had different elements and required different acts. Counsel also observed that the State sought leave to amend the indictment in 2014 yet charged defendant in 2011, positing that it should have discovered the error far sooner. Counsel concluded that the State's proposed amendment was substantive and therefore impermissible. ¶ 10 The trial court observed that "a warrant was issued for [defendant's] arrest on the charge of delivery of a controlled substance" and the State sought "a true bill of indictment" against him for that offense. The court further noted that, during the grand jury proceedings, Officer Sellers testified that defendant delivered several bags of suspect heroin to Smith and the contents of those bags later tested positive for heroin. In light of these facts, the court found it was "clear" that the grand jury "intended to return a true bill on the charge" of "delivery of a controlled substance." The court further found that, under Milton, the State's proposed amendment was "formal rather than substantive" and accordingly granted the State leave to amend the indictment. The case proceeded to a bench trial. ¶ 11 At trial, the evidence showed that, on February 11, 2011, as part of a long-term narcotics investigation, Chicago police officers followed a vehicle driven by Jerry Smith to a high-rise apartment building located at 6700 South South Shore Drive. There, the officers observed defendant appear from a parking garage and walk up to Smith's vehicle. Officer Sellers observed defendant give Smith a softball-sized object while Officer Gerald Lee observed defendant give Smith a softball-sized object with "white down below" and "plastic bags at the top." Smith placed the object either behind his back or underneath his jeans and drove away. Defendant, meanwhile, entered the apartment building. The police subsequently pulled Smith over and had him exit the vehicle. Officer Paul Sznura observed a "bulge" near Smith's waistband, performed a protective pat down of him and recovered nine plastic bags containing numerous smaller plastic bags of suspect narcotics. The police subsequently arrested Smith and inventoried the items recovered from him under Inventory No. 12240709. ¶ 12 Sellers later went into the apartment building and spoke to the building manager. Sellers obtained "keycard log information" based on when defendant had entered the building and security footage from the time in question. Based on a phone number provided to Sellers by Smith, Sellers determined the identity of defendant. Due to the long-term nature of the investigation, the police did not arrest defendant until October 2011. ¶ 13 The parties stipulated that the items inventoried under Inventory No. 12240709 contained 220 "packets of powder" and forensic chemist Lenetta Watson performed tests for ascertaining the presence of a controlled substance on those items. They further stipulated that Watson would testify that:
"[A]fter performing the tests on the contents of 80 of those 220 items recovered, the chemist's expert opinion, within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, is that the contents of the tested items were positive for the presence of heroin and that the actual weight of those items was 15.1 gram[s]."The State subsequently entered People's Exhibit No. 3, a written copy of the signed stipulation between the parties, into evidence without objection from defense counsel and then rested its case-in-chief. ¶ 14 After the defense rested without presenting any evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty of delivering between 15 and 100 grams of heroin, a Class X offense. Defendant unsuccessfully filed a posttrial motion, arguing that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The court subsequently sentenced him to six years' imprisonment. This appeal followed.
The record on appeal does not contain a criminal complaint filed against defendant. --------
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 A. Statutory Speedy-Trial Violation
¶ 17 Defendant first contends that the State violated his statutory right to a speedy trial when it charged him with delivery of a controlled substance after he had already served more than 120 days in custody on a charge of possession of a controlled substance. ¶ 18 Initially, we note that defendant has forfeited review of this claim of error on appeal, as he did not raise it first in the trial court. See People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 38. Consequently, we may only review this claim of error if defendant has established plain error. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). The plain-error doctrine allows review of a forfeited claim of error if the error is clear or obvious, and either (1) "the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error" or (2) "the error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence." People v. McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 48. Defendant has the burden of persuasion to establish plain error. Id. If he fails to meet his burden, his forfeiture will be honored. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. ¶ 19 In neither defendant's opening brief nor his reply brief does he invoke plain-error review. "A defendant who fails to argue for plain-error review obviously cannot meet his burden of persuasion." Id. Because defendant has not attempted to meet his burden of persuasion, and thus cannot establish plain error, we could honor his forfeiture and dispose of this claim of error without further analysis. See id. at 545-47. However, even if defendant had argued for plain-error review, he would not be entitled to any relief, as no statutory speedy-trial violation occurred in this case. See McDonald, 2016 IL 118882, ¶ 48 (absent error, there can be no plain error). ¶ 20 The speedy-trial statute provides, in relevant part, that a defendant in custody must be tried within 120 days from the date he was taken into custody. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2010). If the defendant is not tried within the statutory period, the charges against him must be dismissed. People v. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 10. The speedy-trial period begins automatically upon the defendant being taken into custody on a pending charge (People v. Phipps, 238 Ill. 2d 54, 66 (2010)), and he does not need to file a speedy-trial demand. People v. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d 166, 174 (2006). However, if the defendant contributes to or causes a delay of his trial, his speedy-trial period will be tolled. 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a), (f) (West 2010); People v. Hall, 194 Ill. 2d 305, 326-27 (2000). "Delay shall be considered to be agreed to by the defendant unless he or she objects to the delay by making a written demand for trial or an oral demand for trial on the record." 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2010). Thus, the defendant's speedy-trial term will toll if defense counsel has affirmatively agreed to a continuance and has not re-asserted the defendant's demand for trial. People v. Wells, 2012 IL App (1st) 083660, ¶ 21. ¶ 21 Often, the speedy-trial statute interacts with the compulsory joinder statute. See, e.g., Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 10; People v. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d 191, 197-98, 200 (2003). Under the compulsory joinder statute, the State generally must "prosecute all known offenses within the jurisdiction of a single court in a single criminal case 'if they are based on the same act.' " Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 10 (quoting 720 ILCS 5/3-3(b) (West 2008)). While the application of the speedy-trial statute is "straightforward" when the State charges the defendant with one offense, its application becomes more difficult if the State charges him at different times with multiple factually related offenses. Williams, 204 Ill. 2d at 198. "In such cases the speedy-trial guarantee is tempered by compulsory joinder principles" (id.), meaning all charges arising from the same act are subject to the same speedy-trial period. Hunter, 2013 IL 114100, ¶ 10. Thus, if the State must charge the defendant in a single prosecution for multiple offenses under the compulsory joinder statute, his speedy-trial period for all of those related offenses, charged or uncharged, begins to run upon the commencement of the speedy-trial period on the original charges even if the State brings additional charges at a later time. Id. However, any continuances attributed to the defendant in connection with his trial on the original charges may not be attributed to him in connection with the new and additional charges. People v. Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d 286, 299 (2006). ¶ 22 Defendant argues that his charges for possession of a controlled substance and delivery of a controlled substance were both based on the same act and under the compulsory joinder statute, the State was required to bring those charges in a single prosecution. Consequently, defendant posits that the delivery charge was subject to same speedy-trial period that applied to the original possession charge. He asserts that, because the delivery charge was not pending at the time of the various delays on his possession charge, none of the delays attributed to him on the possession charge could be attributed to him on the delivery charge. According to defendant, when the State charged him with delivery of a controlled substance on May 20, 2014, years after he was charged with possession of a controlled substance, his speedy-trial period for delivery of a controlled substance had already expired and his conviction for the offense therefore must be vacated. ¶ 23 Defendant's argument about a violation of his statutory speedy-trial right presupposes two critical facts: (1) that the State charged him with a new and additional offense, i.e., delivery of a controlled substance and (2) that offense was subject to compulsory joinder with his possession of a controlled substance charge. The State, however, argues that these assumptions are incorrect. According to the State, it never charged defendant with a new and additional offense, but rather amended the indictment to conform to the true intent of the grand jury, which was to charge defendant with delivery of a controlled substance. The State posits that it merely corrected the miswriting of the indictment and thus amended a formal defect. As a result, the State asserts that compulsory joinder is inapplicable and defendant's statutory speedy-trial right was never violated. Given these competing lines of argument, the threshold question that must first be resolved is whether the State charged defendant with a new and additional offense or whether the State permissibly amended the indictment. ¶ 24 Section 111-5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 allows the State, upon its motion, to amend an indictment "at any time because of formal defects," such as "[a]ny miswriting, misspelling or grammatical error," or "[t]he presence of any unnecessary allegation." 725 ILCS 5/111-5 (West 2010). Although section 111-5 lists several formal defects, the list is not exclusive. People v. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d 245, 255 (1996). Amending formal defects in an indictment is warranted "provided there is no resulting surprise or prejudice to the defendant." Id. ¶ 25 An amendment of a formal defect is different than a substantive change to an indictment. People v. Ross, 395 Ill. App. 3d 660, 668 (2009). An amendment is substantive, rather than formal, if "it materially alters the charge in such a way that it cannot be determined whether the grand jury intended such an alteration." People v. Swift, 2016 IL App (3d) 140604, ¶ 32. If the amendment is substantive, the State must return to the grand jury for a further indictment or file an information followed by a preliminary hearing. People v. Kelly, 299 Ill. App. 3d 222, 227 (1998). We review the trial court's ruling to allow an amendment for an abuse of discretion (Ross, 395 Ill. App. 3d at 668), which occurs only when the ruling is unreasonable, fanciful or arbitrary such that no reasonable person would have made the same ruling. People v. Santos, 211 Ill. 2d 395, 401 (2004). ¶ 26 Instructive in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion is People v. Milton, 309 Ill. App. 3d 863 (1999), the decision the court relied on in allowing the State's amendment. In Milton, a grand jury indicted the defendant and returned a true bill for " 'res burglary etc.' " Id. at 864. However, Count 1 of the indictment charged him with burglary, Count 2 charged him with theft and Count 3 charged him with possession of burglary tools. Id. Consequently, prior to trial, the State sought leave from the trial court to amend Count 1 from burglary to residential burglary, arguing that the burglary charge was a typographical error. Id. The court agreed and granted the State leave to amend. Id. ¶ 27 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State's amendment because the change was substantive. Id. at 865. This court disagreed, finding that the grand jury's intent to charge him with residential burglary "was evident from the transcript" of the grand jury proceedings and "the face of the true bill." Id. at 867. We further noted that the facts before the grand jury supported a charge of residential burglary. Id. Accordingly, the State's amendment "merely corrected the indictment to reflect what the grand jury intended to charge" and thus, under section 111-5 of the Code, the amendment corrected a formal, not substantive, defect. Id. ¶ 28 Turning to the present case, as the trial court noted, the arrest warrant for defendant alleged that he committed the offense of delivery of a controlled substance, and during the grand jury proceedings, the State sought a true bill of indictment against him for delivery of a controlled substance. Officer Sellers' testimony during the grand jury proceedings further supported the allegation that defendant delivered a controlled substance. Based on these facts and this court's decision in Milton, it was not unreasonable, fanciful or arbitrary for the trial court to conclude that the grand jury intended to return a true bill for delivery of a controlled substance. Although in this case, unlike in Milton, the true bill listed the incorrect offense, i.e., possession of a controlled substance, we still cannot say that no reasonable person would have reached the same finding as the trial court. Because the court's finding regarding the grand jury's intent was not unreasonable, its further finding that the State's amendment merely corrected a formal defect in the indictment, a "miswriting" (725 ILCS 5/111-5(a) (West 2010)), was likewise not unreasonable. ¶ 29 Although the State's amendment corrected a formal defect, which according to section 111-5 of the Code may be done "at any time" (725 ILCS 5/111-5 (West 2010)), our case law nevertheless requires us to ensure that the amendment did not result in surprise or prejudice to defendant. Benitez, 169 Ill. 2d at 255. As discussed, defendant's arrest warrant alleged that he committed delivery of a controlled substance, and during the grand jury proceedings, the State sought a true bill of indictment against him on a delivery charge and Officer Seller's testimony supported such a charge. In light of these facts, defendant cannot say he was surprised by the amendment. Furthermore, we find no prejudice because defendant's defense would not have changed due to the amendment. At trial, the defense, which presented no evidence, relied on the State's inability to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In closing argument, defense counsel argued that the State failed to sufficiently prove that defendant was the individual who approached Smith's vehicle and the object tendered to Smith by that individual was actually the heroin later found in his waistband. This two-pronged defense would have been utilized by defense counsel regardless of whether the State tried defendant on possession of a controlled substance or delivery of a controlled substance. Moreover, the State amended the indictment on May 20, 2014, and defendant's trial occurred on January 14, 2015, nearly eight months later. Even if defendant's defense had changed, there was ample time for him to prepare a new one. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to amend the indictment. ¶ 30 In light of this finding, compulsory joinder was inapplicable because the indictment did not raise a new and additional charge against defendant. See Wells, 2012 IL App (1st) 083660, ¶ 32. Given that compulsory joinder was inapplicable, defendant's statutory speedy-trial right was only implicated insofar as it affected the original charge of the indictment, of which he does not allege a violation. Accordingly, defendant's statutory speedy-trial right was not violated. ¶ 31 Defendant additionally argues that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a motion to dismiss the delivery of a controlled substance charge on speedy-trial grounds. As defendant's statutory speedy-trial right was not implicated in this case, filing a motion to dismiss based on such grounds would have been futile, and counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to file a futile motion. See People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 331 (2010). Accordingly, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail.
¶ 32 B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 33 Defendant next contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he delivered between 15 and 100 grams of heroin to support his conviction for the Class X version of delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(1)(A) (West 2010)). ¶ 34 At trial, the parties stipulated that the forensic chemist would testify that she received Inventory Number 12240709, which contained "220 packets of powder." They further stipulated that:
"[A]fter performing the tests on the contents of 80 of those 220 items recovered, the chemist's expert opinion, within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, is that the contents of the tested items were positive for the presence of heroin and that the actual weight of those items was 15.1 gram[s]."People's Exhibit No. 3, which the State admitted into evidence without objection, contained a written copy of the stipulation. ¶ 35 Although defendant acknowledges the stipulation established that the weight of the items seized was 15.1 grams, he argues that, based on its wording, this weight included both the heroin and the packets containing the heroin. Defendant therefore asserts that, without weighing the heroin alone, it is impossible to know the actual weight of the heroin and accordingly requests that we reduce his conviction to the Class 2 version of delivery of a controlled substance, which makes it a crime to deliver less than one gram of heroin (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2010)). ¶ 36 When a defendant challenges his conviction based upon the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him, we must ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find all the elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). All reasonable inferences must be allowed in favor of the State. People v. Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 42. While we must carefully examine the evidence before us, credibility issues, resolution of conflicting or inconsistent evidence, and weighing the evidence are all reserved for the trier of fact. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. We will not overturn a conviction unless the evidence is "so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." Id. ¶ 37 In Illinois, "it is unlawful for any person knowingly to *** deliver *** a controlled substance," including heroin. 720 ILCS 570/401 (West 2010). Because the State charged defendant with delivering a specific amount of heroin, i.e., between 15 and 100 grams (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(1)(A) (West 2010)), and there are lesser-included offenses for delivering smaller amounts (see 720 ILCS 570/401(c)(1), (d) (West 2010)), the weight of the heroin was an essential element of the offense that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Jones, 174 Ill. 2d 427, 428-29 (1996). "When the samples of the drug are not sufficiently homogenous—such as packets containing powder—'a portion from each container or sample must be tested in order to determine the contents of each container or sample.' " People v. Lashley, 2016 IL App (1st) 133401, ¶ 27 (quoting Jones, 174 Ill. 2d at 429). The State may not rely on an inference that the untested items also contain the controlled substance unless the items are actually tested. Jones, 174 Ill. 2d at 430. ¶ 38 This court's decision in People v. Lashley, 2016 IL App (1st) 133401 guides our resolution of defendant's contention. In Lashley, a police officer recovered 83 plastic bags containing suspect heroin from a gangway attributed to the defendant. Id. ¶¶ 7-11. At trial, the parties stipulated that a forensic chemist tested the contents of 65 of the 83 items and determined that the contents of those items tested positive for heroin and weighed 15.2 grams. Id. ¶ 12. Following the trial, the trial court convicted him of possession of between 15 and 100 grams of heroin. Id. ¶ 14. On appeal, the defendant contested the sufficiency of the evidence to establish that the weight of the heroin he possessed was between 15 and 100 grams, arguing that the parties' stipulation indicated that the chemist weighed both the heroin and plastic bags in which the heroin had been packaged. Id. ¶ 24. Because, according to the defendant, the plastic bags likely weighed more than 0.2 grams, he contended there was insufficient evidence to prove the heroin alone weighed more than 15 grams. Id. ¶ 39 In rejecting the defendant's contention, this court observed that, from the stipulation, it was "not entirely clear" whether the 15.2 grams represented the weight of both the plastic bags and heroin, or just the heroin alone. Id. ¶ 28. However, we found that it was "more likely that the weight of the bags did not factor into the chemist's calculation" given that he weighed the narcotics "for the express purpose of preparing evidence for the State's prosecution and weighed just enough" of them "to provide the State with enough evidence to prosecute defendant for possessing between 15 and 100 grams of heroin." Id. We concluded that, because the evidence had to be taken in the light most favorable to the State and the defendant had put forward "no contrary evidence," there was sufficient evidence to prove that he possessed between 15 and 100 grams of heroin. Id. ¶ 29. ¶ 40 Following Lashley, we similarly find that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that defendant delivered between 15 and 100 grams of heroin. Critically, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State with all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48; Lloyd, 2013 IL 113510, ¶ 42. A reasonable inference may be made that, when the chemist weighed the items, she did so only weighing the heroin and not the plastic bags containing the heroin. This is so because the chemist weighed the heroin "for the express purpose of preparing evidence for the State's prosecution" against defendant, and she "weighed just enough of the" heroin, 15.1 grams, "to provide the State with enough evidence to prosecute defendant for" delivering between 15 and 100 grams of heroin. Lashley, 2016 IL App (1st) 133401, ¶ 28. Consequently, in light of this reasonable inference, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant delivered between 15 and 100 grams of heroin. ¶ 41 Defendant acknowledges this court's holding in Lashley, but argues it was decided incorrectly. We, however, decline to depart from its well-reasoned analysis. Moreover, defendant invited this alleged error by his stipulation in the trial court. "Under the doctrine of invited error, an accused may not request to proceed in one manner and then later contend on appeal that the course of action was in error." People v. Carter, 208 Ill. 2d 309, 319 (2003). At trial, defendant stipulated to the weight of the heroin and chose, instead, to focus his defense on other aspects of the State's evidence. "A party who agrees to the admission of evidence through a stipulation is estopped from later complaining about that evidence being stipulated into the record." People v. Kane, 2013 IL App (2d) 110594, ¶ 19. The appropriate forum to contest the weight of the heroin was in the trial court (see Lashley, 2016 IL App (1st) 133401, ¶ 29), not on appeal after stipulating to its weight. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 44 Affirmed.