( Jackson , at p. 322, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 386, 376 P.3d 528.) We also approved the corroboration requirement established in Craig, Malgren , and People v. Gonzales (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403, 409, 267 Cal.Rptr. 138 ( Gonzales ) — the need for some independent evidence tending to confirm that a person found at the end of the trail the dog followed was indeed the person who left the scent trail and supplied the initial scent. ( Jackson , at p. 321, 205 Cal.Rptr.3d 386, 376 P.3d 528.)
¶60 None of the authorities on which Bucki relies compel us to accept corroboration of dog scent evidence as a condition of its admissibility. He primarily relies on a trio of foreign-jurisdiction cases: People v. Gonzales , 218 Cal.App.3d 403, 267 Cal. Rptr. 138 (1990) ; McPherson ; and State v. Loucks , 98 Wash.2d 563, 656 P.2d 480 (1983) (en banc). Those cases, however, were sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges to convictions that were obtained solely based upon evidence of canine activity.
The dog's actions in locating an individual require assurance that the person located is the person pursued, as well as being the person who in fact left the initial scent followed by the dog.” (People v. Gonzales (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403, 409, 267 Cal.Rptr. 138 (Gonzales ).) In the trial court, Jackson argued that a hearing under Evidence Code section 402 was necessary to examine the prosecutor's contention that the fifth foundational requirement (i.e., the trail was neither stale nor contaminated) was satisfied.
All of the cases upon which appellant relies are distinguishable on the ground that they involved situations in which a dog followed a scent to the defendant. (See Malgren, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d 234; People v. Gonzales (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403, 409 (Gonzales); People v. Craig (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 905.) The foundational requirements that were established by this line of authority are designed to ensure the reliability of otherwise probative evidence.
" ( Id. at p. 238.) Finally, in People v. Gonzales (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403, as in Malgren, a qualified handler and tracking dog were put on the trail of a burglary suspect within a half-hour after he had fled. The suspect was found hiding in an unplowed vineyard less than a mile from the home he had burglarized.
The theory underlying the sua sponte duty in both instances mirrors that discussed in the text above — i.e., not that the jury needs assistance in performing its assigned role of evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence under the legal rules provided elsewhere in the instructions, but that an extrinsic legal rule renders insufficient what would otherwise be evidence sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilt. (See People v. Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 261 [the rule requiring corroboration of a single witness's testimony concerning the falsity of a perjurious statement is an "exception[]" to the substantial evidence test]; People v. Gonzales (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403, 412-413 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 138] [uncorroborated dog tracking evidence is insufficient to establish identity because of concerns about reliability and the inability to subject the dog to cross-examination].) Although possession of recently stolen property, if uncorroborated, is likewise insufficient to establish the accused's guilt of a theft-related offense, the insufficiency does not derive from an extrinsic legal rule but, rather, is apparent from the general rule governing the jury's consideration of circumstantial evidence.
Foundation was raised in Herring's motion in limine and at the hearing on the motion, although it was not discussed in depth. The court stated it had read the motion and the People's opposition, and the court referred to the foundation issue: "As far as foundational requirements that counsel mentioned, in [People v. Gonzales (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403] it held that a conviction of a crime may not be had where dogs - and that was dealing with dog tracking evidence, I hold the same relating to cadaver dog evidence - is used unless there is some other corroborative evidence. However, the corroborative evidence need not be evidence, which standing alone independently, links the defendant to the crime.
Her testimony about the odor-collection procedure does not undermine our confidence in the verdict. Defendant’s reliance on People v. Gonzales (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403 is misplaced. In Gonzales, a burglary suspect fled on foot after a sheriff’s deputy entered a home where an alarm had been triggered.
[Citations.]" (People v. Malgren, supra, 139 Cal.App.3d at p. 238.) Finally, in People v. Gonzales (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403, 406, a qualified handler and tracking dog followed the trail of a suspect who was found hiding in a vineyard less than a mile from the burglarized home. Our colleagues in the Court of Appeal for the Fifth Appellate District held that although dog tracking evidence must be corroborated, "[T]he corroborating evidence need not, standing alone, link a defendant to the crime, but rather, when considered with all of the other evidence, including the dog-tracking evidence, allows assurance that the inferences we draw from any of the various pieces of circumstantial evidence, including the dog-tracking evidence, are correct."
( People v. Mitchell, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 790.) Testimony showing that a dog pursued a fleeing suspect to the site where he was hiding is a clear-cut case of dog tracking, and — depending on the facts of each case — may be admissible. (See People v. Malgren (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 234, 237-238 [188 Cal.Rptr. 569], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1144-1145 [282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757] [allowing evidence that the defendant was tracked from the victims' house to some bushes less than one mile from the house, with the dog on the trail within a half hour of the incident]; and People v. Craig (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 905, 910-911, 915-917 [150 Cal.Rptr. 676] [allowing use of dog tracking evidence where the suspects were followed from their stolen getaway car to the point inside an apartment complex where they were detained]; but cf. People v. Gonzales (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 403 [ 267 Cal.Rptr. 138] [reversing a conviction where a dog found the defendant in a vineyard less than one mile from a home that was burglarized half an hour earlier].) A more difficult case is presented when the dog is not tracking a suspect but rather is given a scent from a gauze pad some length of time after an incident and is watched to see if the dog "shows interest" in various locales frequented by the defendant.