Opinion
2012-07-18
Del Atwell, East Hampton, N.Y., for appellant. Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Anne E. Oh of counsel), for respondent.
Del Atwell, East Hampton, N.Y., for appellant. Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Anne E. Oh of counsel), for respondent.
ANITA R. FLORIO, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, L. PRISCILLA HALL, and ROBERT J. MILLER, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the County Court, Suffolk County (Kahn, J.), dated September 7, 2010, which, after a hearing, designated him a level two sexually violent offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6–C.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the Michigan crime of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree ( see Michigan Comp Law § 750.520c[1][f] ), of which he was previously convicted, includes all the essential elements of the New York crime of sexual abuse in the first degree for the purpose of determining whether the defendant was a sexually violent offender ( seeCorrection Law § 168–a[3][b]; Penal Law § 130.65[1]; see also Matter of North v. Board of Examiners of Sex Offenders of State of N.Y., 8 N.Y.3d 745, 751, 840 N.Y.S.2d 307, 871 N.E.2d 1133). Since the New York crime of sexual abuse in the first degree, as defined in Penal Law § 130.65(1), is deemed a “sexually violent offen[se]” for purposes of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art. 6–C), the Supreme Court properly classified the defendant as a level two sexually violent offender (Correction Law § 168–a[3][a]; see People v. Whibby, 50 A.D.3d 873, 855 N.Y.S.2d 250).
The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.