The elements of second-degree murder are "'(1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse.'" Aldrich, supra at 123, quoting People v. Mayhew, 236 Mich. App. 112, 125; 600 N.W.2d 370 (1999), quoting People v. Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 463-464; 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998). Malice is defined as "the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm."
First, we note that the decision to bind a defendant over for trial is not based upon a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but that the evidence is sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that the defendant is guilty. See People v. Justice (After Remand), 454 Mich. 334, 343; 562 N.W.2d 652 (1997). Second, we note that this Court, in People v. Baker, 216 Mich. App. 687; 551 N.W.2d 195 (1996), rev'd 457 Mich. 442 (1998), distinguished between involuntary manslaughter and second-degree murder (based upon the creation of a high risk of death or great bodily harm) by whether death or great bodily harm is the natural tendency of the act (second-degree murder) or whether the defendant merely acted in wanton disregard that death or great bodily harm may follow (manslaughter). We are satisfied that the evidence establishes probable cause to believe that death or great bodily harm was the natural tendency of defendants act. That is, while it would not be unreasonable for a jury to conclude that defendants acted only in wanton disregard that death or great bodily harm might follow, a jury could also reasonably conclude that death or great bodily harm was the natural tendency of defendants act. A fire was set in a building with gasoline, with residences nearby.
"The elements of second-degree murder are: (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse." People v Goecke , 457 Mich. 442, 463-464, 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998). Malice may be established in three ways: by showing (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to cause great bodily harm, or (3) the intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.
"The elements of second-degree murder are: (1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse." People v Gafken, 510 Mich. 503, 511; 990 N.W.2d 826 (2022), quoting People v Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 463-464; 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998) (quotation marks omitted). Malice may be established "by showing (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to cause great bodily harm, or (3) the intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm." Id.
To satisfy the elements of second-degree murder, the prosecution must prove the following: "(1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse."People v Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 463-464; 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998) (citation omitted). The element of malice for second-degree murder has been defined as "the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm." Id. at 464.
Defendant's argument lacks merit. In People v Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 458-459; 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998), our Supreme Court held that circuit courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over felony criminal cases. Further, "[i]n personam jurisdiction is vested in the circuit court upon the filing of a return of the magistrate before whom the defendant waived preliminary examination or before whom the defendant had been examined."
I respectfully dissent. Because there is insufficient evidence of malice as defined in People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442; 579 NW2d 868 (1998), I would vacate defendant's second-degree murder conviction, MCL 750.317. I would, however, affirm her conviction of operating a motor vehicle under the influence (OUIL) causing death, MCL 257.625(4), and her sentence of 10 to 15 years imprisonment on that conviction. Given this result, I would not reach the additional questions presented in defendant's brief on appeal.
"Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm." People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). Thus, "malice may be established even absent an actual intent to cause a particular result if there is wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of a defendant's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm."Id. at 466.
Id. at 514 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917); McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-349 (1971)). In the consolidated case of People v. Goecke, 579 N.W.2d 868 (Mich. 1998), the Michigan Supreme Court held that not all drunk driving cases that result in death support a trial for second-degree murder, but instead should be prosecuted under the offense of OUIL causing death, MICH. COMP. LAWS ยง 257.625(4). See Goecke, 579 N.W.2d at 880.
It was irregular. There were more efficient, standardized alternatives available under the court rules, e.g., moving for reconsideration, applying for leave to appeal the district court decision, and challenging the suppression before the circuit court under MCR 6.110(D)(2) and moving to amend the information under People v Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 455-463; 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998). It remains unclear why the prosecution chose not to use these procedures.