Opinion
F075685
08-09-2018
In re G.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. G.M., Defendant and Appellant.
Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Jennifer Oleksa, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JJD070175)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Hugo J. Loza, Judge. Arthur L. Bowie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Lewis A. Martinez and Jennifer Oleksa, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Hill, P.J., Poochigian, J. and Meehan, J.
-ooOoo-
Appellant G.M., a minor, appeals from the juvenile court's dispositional order declaring her a ward of the court. Following a contested hearing on a petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, appellant was found to have committed the crimes of resisting a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148 ) and battery (§ 242). Appellant contends the juvenile court erred because the evidence was insufficient to show she committed either offense. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
All future statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise noted. --------
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The allegations in the petition arise from two separate incidents involving 15-year-old appellant. In the first, the petition alleges appellant resisted a peace officer during a dispute with her mother. In the second, the petition alleges appellant battered her younger sibling, L.M.
With respect to the first incident, on October 26, 2016, Tulare County Sheriff's Department Deputy Christopher George responded to a call regarding a combative juvenile. He arrived at appellant's residence wearing his uniform and identified himself as a police officer. George encountered a situation where appellant was refusing to go to school. He spoke with appellant's mother, explaining that he could not physically force appellant to attend school. Appellant was present during this conversation, but George did not speak to appellant or get her side of the situation.
After George explained his position to appellant's mother, appellant's mother asked appellant to go to school several times before reaching out and attempting to grab appellant's hand. Appellant responded by slapping her mother's hand and, when her mother attempted to touch her again, slapping her mother repeatedly on the arm.
George then attempted to intervene by restraining appellant, resulting in a struggle on a nearby couch. Appellant fought against George's restraint, pulling away from him, refusing to submit both her arms to the deputy, attempting to kick the deputy away from her, and attempting to scratch at George. George eventually subdued appellant, handcuffed her, and placed her in his squad car. Only after placing appellant in handcuffs did George explain she was under arrest or otherwise speak to appellant.
With respect to the second incident, on December 31, 2016, appellant arrived home at around 9:00 p.m. after attending a party. Appellant went to her room to sleep, but was awakened by her mother and told to wash the dishes. This request led to a verbal dispute and, ultimately, to appellant leaving the home. Appellant's younger sibling, 12-year-old L.M., was told to go after appellant. L.M. chased after appellant, ultimately grabbing her arm.
According to L.M., appellant responded by telling him not to grab her and trying to pull away from L.M. a few times. When L.M. did not let go, appellant responded by punching L.M. several times and biting him on the shoulder. After striking L.M., appellant was able to walk away freely. L.M. then followed her until he saw and contacted the police. One of the responding deputies, Deputy Steven Montano testified he observed a fresh bite mark on L.M.'s shoulder and that appellant had the smell of alcohol on her breath, had difficulty standing, and was walking in traffic in the roadway despite being asked to sit in the deputies' patrol car when questioned. Montano noted that L.M. originally reported being hit only once in addition to being bit on the shoulder.
Appellant also testified about her interactions with her brother. According to appellant, after leaving the house, L.M. chased her down and grabbed her arm hard enough that it caused a bruise. Appellant responded by slapping L.M.'s hand, causing him to let go. Appellant claimed L.M. then grabbed her around the neck, hurting her, to which she responded by biting L.M.
In closing arguments, the parties focused primarily on whether appellant's use of force against L.M. was reasonable such that it constituted self-defense. Following argument, the court found true both allegations in the petition. With respect to the resisting offense, the court concluded that George acted appropriately in seeking to stop appellant from assaulting her mother and that appellant resisted George's actions. With respect to the battery offense, the court concluded it was objectively unreasonable for "a reasonable person under those circumstances" to fear for their own safety and, thus, "the minor did not have a right to strike the brother, whether it was one punch or more" and "[c]ertainly didn't have the right to bite the minor in the arm to defend herself."
This appeal timely followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant challenges the trial court's findings that she resisted a peace officer and committed battery on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. Accordingly, we summarize the relevant standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence challenges and highlight the underlying law for each offense before considering appellant's arguments. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Generally, "[i]n reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court's role is a limited one. ' "The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence." ' " (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738-739.) "The applicable standard of review is the same as for adult criminal appeals." (In re Amanda A. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 537, 545.)
The legal elements for the crime of resisting a peace officer "are as follows: ' "(1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties." ' " (Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, 894-895.) "The offense is a general intent crime, proscribing only the particular act (resist, delay, obstruct) without reference to an intent to do a further act or achieve a future consequence." (In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1325, 1329.)
"A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." (§ 242.) "The slightest degree of touching is sufficient. [Citation.] ' "Any harmful or offensive touching constitutes an unlawful use of force or violence" under this statute. [Citation.] "It has long been established that 'the least touching' may constitute battery. In other words, force against the person is enough; it need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave a mark." ' " (In re B.L. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1495-1496.)
Self-defense is the only legal justification for battery. (People v. Mayes (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 195, 198.) To establish self-defense as a justification for battery, " 'the defendant must have an honest and reasonable belief that bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him. [Citation.]' [Citation.] The threat of bodily injury must be imminent [citation], and '... any right of self-defense is limited to the use of such force as is reasonable under the circumstances.' " (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1064-1065.) Sufficient Evidence Supports the Resisting Charge
Appellant contends the evidence related to the resisting a peace officer offense "would not lead a reasonable child under the same or similar circumstances to believe the officer was acting in a lawful manner when he tried to place her in handcuffs." She argues that while she could have handled the situation better, she "simply did not have the requisite mens rea for the commission" of the offense and that such a determination must be made from the perspective of a child similar to appellant. We do not agree that the facts fail to support the trial court's determination.
Courts have routinely upheld criminal statutory language turning on whether a defendant "reasonably should have known" some fact. (See People v. Linwood (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 59, 68 [citing examples for death penalty, elderly victim, and firearm use enhancements while applying principles to intoxication issues in sexual assault cases].) Such tests are uniformly seen as objective determinations based on the facts at hand. (See People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 783 [objective test for criminal negligence asks whether a reasonable person would have known of risk]; People v. Culuko (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 307, 327 [objective test for natural and probable consequences doctrine asks whether a person would have or should have known that charged offense was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of actions].)
As a general intent offense, the evidence only needs to demonstrate that appellant intended to do some act that would resist, delay, or obstruct George under objective circumstances demonstrating she should have known George was engaged in the performance of his duties as an officer. There is no question that appellant's kicking, squirming, and refusal to comply with orders resisted, delayed, or obstructed George. And there is significant evidence in the record that appellant should have known George was acting in the scope of his duties at the time appellant engaged in her resistance. George was called to the house to resolve a dispute regarding appellant's behavior and arrived in full uniform. George then witnessed an escalating physical confrontation that included appellant striking her mother. Such facts are sufficient to demonstrate appellant should have known George's decision to detain appellant after she struck her mother in the deputy's presence was within the scope of his duties. While appellant identifies evidence suggesting she could reasonably believe George did not have the authority to force her to go to school, such evidence has no bearing on whether George could intervene in a physical altercation occurring in his presence nor would such contradicting evidence prevent the trial court from reasonably weighing the full scope of the evidence in the first instance and determining appellant should have known George was acting in the scope of his duties. Sufficient Evidence Supports the Battery Charge
Appellant acknowledges the juvenile court found "that the prosecution met its burden of proving that appellant did not commit the battery in lawful self-defense," but argues the finding was erroneous because "the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to negate her claim of self-defense." We do not agree.
The prosecution presented evidence from L.M. that the extent of his contact with appellant was reaching out and grabbing her hand. L.M. then testified that appellant responded by striking and biting him. After appellant testified she had been more roughly handled by L.M., the prosecution introduced evidence that appellant was likely intoxicated at the time of the incident. The trial court weighed this evidence and reached the conclusion that appellant did not use only that force reasonably necessary to avoid the purportedly minor offensive touching from L.M.
We conclude the evidence presented is sufficient to support the trial court's determination. The court could reasonably conclude any conduct on the part of L.M. created only a minimal risk of harmful or offensive touching, that appellant overreacted to this conduct due to her intoxicated state, and that appellant's response of punching and biting L.M. exceeded any reasonable response to the risk presented. While appellant could present an alternative theory necessitating her conduct, adopting that explanation on appeal would require us to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant as opposed to the light most favorable to the determination, a step we cannot take.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.