See, e.g., Harrison v. Everett, 135 Colo. 55, 60, 308 P.2d 216, 219 (1957) ("If the description in a deed identifies, or furnishes the means of identifying, the property conveyed, it performs its function."); People v. Ginn, 106 Colo. 417, 428, 106 P.2d 479, 484 (1940) (acknowledging in dicta that a subsequent mortgagee had constructive notice of a prior encumbrance despite an error in the legal description of the encumbrance); Guar. Bank & Trust Co. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank Ass'n, 111 P.3d 521, 524-25 (Colo. App. 2004) (holding that a deed of trust that omitted the block number of a property, but otherwise contained sufficient information to establish the identity of the property, provided constructive notice of an encumbrance on the property); see also Hill v. Taylor (In re Taylor), 422 B.R. 270, 274-75 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2009) (holding that, under Colorado law, a properly indexed deed of trust that contained a correct street address but a legal description identifying the wrong block number for the parcel, nevertheless placed a bankruptcy trustee on inquiry notice of an encumbrance on the property). These cases reflect the general principle that an error in the description of the property does not render the instrument incapable of providing notice to

Most importantly, the failure to index the road petition in the grantor and grantee indices defeated an essential purpose of the recording act to make a recorded instrument part of a body of records accessible to the public through a search of the grantor and grantee indices. Contrast the facts in the present case with those in People v. Ginn, 106 Colo. 417, 106 P.2d 479 (1940), in which a mortgage was held to give constructive notice even though improperly indexed when it had been presented to the recorder to be recorded in the real property records and the mis-indexing was caused by the recorder's error. III.

Our sister states in this area generally adhere to the principle that in this type of case the statutory clock starts running at the time a public official initially and wrongfully fails in his official duty. Plaintiff cites no case to the contrary. People, to Use of Federal Land Bank of Wichita, etc. v. Ginn, 106 Colo. 417, 106 P.2d 479 (1940); Indus. Chrome Plating Co. v. North, supra. As to c) above, that the statute does not start running until damage occurs: The contention may or may not have merit in certain types of negligence, such as where undetectible damages result from surgery, etc., reflected in a case upon which plaintiff heavily relies, having to do with a foreign object left in the body, — but having no application to a case of a wilful, intentional tort, where damages need not be shown except nominally.

The index is necessary as a means of reference to the matters contained in the books of record. See People ex rel. Federal Land Bank v. Ginn, 106 Colo. 417, 106 P.2d 479 (1940). Compliance with the Dedication Statute, supra, does not substitute for the requisite compliance with the recording provisions of Gen. Stat. 1883 § 215 at 175.

The court said: "It might well be held, as illustrating the two lines of cases with reference to time when the statute of limitations commences to run, that had the owner of the deed of trust wrongfully released brought an action against the recorder for any damage to her, such damage would be direct and immediate, and the statute of limitations would commence to run when the wrongful act was committed [citing, inter alia, McKay v. Coolidge, supra], but as to relators no damage was then done, and none was done till they dealt with the property on the false showing that the same was free and clear of this incumbrance." A similar factual situation was involved in People to Use of Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Ginn, 106 Colo. 417, 106 P.2d 479. The distinction between cases where plaintiff suffers an immediate injury by reason of misconduct of a public officer and those wherein no injury is sustained until plaintiff acquires an interest in property is also recognized in State ex rel. Graham v. Walters, 31 Ind. App. 77, 66 N.E. 182, 99 Am.St.Rep. 244. As applied to plaintiffs whose rights are immediately affected by a breach of duty on the part of a public officer, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in McKay v. Coolidge, supra, stated the law in the following language: "The cause of action set forth in the plaintiff's bill is a tort.