People v. Gholston

3 Citing cases

  1. People v. Gordon

    498 P.2d 341 (Colo. 1972)   Cited 5 times

    " . . . the evidence, with reasonable inferences therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict; the jury is assumed to have adopted that evidence which supports its verdict; and, the jury having found the guilt of the accused proved beyond a reasonable doubt, this court will neither weigh the evidence nor appraise the credibility of witnesses. Wilson v. People, 143 Colo. 544, 354 P.2d 588; Herschorn v. People, 108 Colo. 43, 113 P.2d 680, 139 A.L.R. 297." See also People v. Gholston, 164 Colo. 58, 432 P.2d 636. When applying the above test to the facts of this case, we find that there was evidence of present ability and sufficient possession and control of the weapon by the defendant to sustain his conviction.

  2. People v. Lara

    224 P.3d 388 (Colo. App. 2009)   Cited 11 times
    In Lara, a case involving a charge of first-degree murder and a charge of extreme indifference murder, the trial court instructed the jury, tracking the language of the fourth clause of section 18–1–704(4), that the prosecution did not bear the burden of disproving self-defense.

    When asserted against charges that require proof of intent, the defense is generally in the nature of confession and avoidance. See, e.g., People v. Gholston, 164 Colo. 58, 60, 432 P.2d 636, 637 (1967). But when asserted against charges that require proof of recklessness or criminal negligence, the defense is an element-negating denial or traverse.

  3. Com. v. Trowbridge

    261 Pa. Super. 109 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)   Cited 21 times
    In Trowbridge we held that the Commonwealth must prove either that the gun was loaded or that the surrounding circumstances were inherently dangerous in order to sufficiently show an actual danger in serious bodily injury.

    Act of June 24, 1939, P.L. 872, § 708; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4708. As the states have statutorily codified the crime of assault, some have retained the requirement of actual present ability, while others have required only apparent present ability to inflict injury. See Casey v. State, 491 S.W.2d 90 (Tenn.Cr.App. 1972) (apparent); Bass v. State, 232 So.2d 25 (Fla.App. 1970) (apparent); People v. Gholston, 164 Colo. 58, 432 P.2d 636 (1967) (actual); People v. Vaiza, 244 Cal.App.2d 121, 52 Cal.Rptr. 733 (Cal.App. 1966) (actual). In our present Crimes Code, simple assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701, requires only apparent ability, i.e., placing the victim in "fear of imminent serious bodily injury."