Opinion
348865
09-23-2021
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KRISTI MARIE GESCH, also known as KRISTI MARIE GILBERT, Defendant-Appellant.
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 18-007241-01-FH
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and K. F. Kelly and Redford, JJ.
PER CURIAM
Defendant, Kristi Marie Gesch, appeals as of right her jury trial conviction of embezzlement, more than $1,000 but less than $20,000, MCL 750.174(4)(a). On March 27, 2019, the trial court sentenced defendant to three to five years' imprisonment, with 128 days' credit for time served. In February 2020, defendant filed a motion seeking a new trial, a Ginther hearing, and for resentencing. All prayers for relief except resentencing were denied. In the judgment of sentence filed March 25, 2021, defendant was resentenced to 12 months' incarceration, with 814 days' credit for time served.
People v Ginther, 390 Mich. 436; 212 N.W.2d 922 (1973).
On appeal, defendant argues that she was denied her right to present a defense, that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to support her conviction, that her conviction was against the great weight of the evidence, that trial counsel was ineffective, and that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial. We affirm, but remand for the ministerial task of correcting an error in the judgment of sentence filed March 25, 2021.
In Docket No. 348866, defendant appealed her convictions following a separate jury trial of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83; assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84; two counts of felonious assault, MCL 750.82; and four counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. People v Gesch, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 15, 2021 (Docket No. 348866), p 1. This Court affirmed defendant's convictions but remanded for resentencing. Id. at 15. Defendant previously filed another appeal.
I. FACTS
This case involves an employee's embezzlement of funds from her employer. At trial, Thomas Stefani testified that he owned a business, Cincinnati RPT (Cincinnati), which was located in Lincoln Park, Michigan. In January 2015, Stefani hired defendant. According to Stefani, defendant worked for Cincinnati for eight months before she quit. Stefani testified that he believed defendant quit on August 14, 2015. Stefani testified that, during her employment at Cincinnati, she was the office manager, with "responsibility for all the accounting functions as far as entering purchase orders, doing the invoicing, the accounts payable, accounts receivable." Stefani testified that no other employee had responsibility for accounts payable and accounts receivable. Stefani testified that wire transfers were made "from our desktop" and had to be manually entered. He testified that only he and defendant had access to the relevant systems.
Stefani testified that, during defendant's employment, he was not aware of any issues with accounts or vendors. After defendant left his employ, he learned of two wire transfers, which receipts reflected were made to a vendor, Applied Industrial Technologies (AIT). The money never reached AIT. That firm eventually sued Cincinnati, claiming that it was owed approximately $14,000.
The prosecution entered into evidence copies of bank statements reflecting wire transfers from Cincinnati to AIT during July and August 2015. The two transfers reflected a total of $14,715. An investigation by the Lincoln Park Police Department revealed bank records demonstrating that these two transfers were applied to a Fifth Third Bank account that belonged to defendant. After several documents were admitted into evidence, defense counsel successfully objected on certification grounds to the admission of a bank signature card, briefly displayed to the jury, that reflected an account number and defendant's signature.
On cross-examination, defense counsel attempted to impeach Stefani with prior-inconsistent statements he made at the preliminary examination about wire transfers. Counsel also sought to impeach Stefani about a line of credit Cincinnati possessed. In this line of questioning, Stefani admitted Cincinnati had a revolving line of credit with Chase Bank. Defense counsel asked:
And your interest rate that you had to pay Chase depended upon on [sic] the-how financially soluble you were, in other words if you had more debt the interest rate would be higher, if you were more financially secure the interest rate would be lower; is that correct?
After a relevance objection from the prosecutor, defense counsel explained that she believed that Stefani asked or ordered defendant to forge or present false information with regard to receivables and what Cincinnati owed to Chase so that Stefani could get a lower interest rate on his revolving line of credit. Defense counsel maintained that her question, and the theory behind it, spoke to motive. She explained:
The prosecutor argued that this line of questioning was not relevant to whether defendant committed embezzlement, and specifically, whether she sent the two wire transfers in question. The trial court then stated that money was sent to Fifth Third, and then it asked (presumably rhetorically) whether "the question we're here to answer" was "who sent that money and where did that money end up?" Trial counsel maintained that Stefani had "already been caught committing perjury on the stand," pointing to "the amount that was taken" and "the amount he was sued for." The prosecutor argued that Stefani had used rounded or approximate numbers, and she maintained that trial counsel was conflating the amount of the wire transfers and the amount Cincinnati was sued for. The trial court ruled the questioning about the line of credit was irrelevant. It stated that it would have allowed the questioning had Stefani been convicted of a crime of dishonesty, or perhaps if trial counsel had "some type of evidence that he was cooking the books." It stated that defense counsel could not "just ask questions accusing people when it's not even part of the elements that we're looking at."That's with regard to his motive. I've already caught him lying on several what I think are kind of important things with regard to what was going on. If his company's having financial difficulty, if he is being sued for a lot more than what he testified to because he's not paying his vendors and he's asking my client to commit fraud. All of a sudden he makes her the fall guy.
Stefani testified Cincinnati had three employees who had unique alarm codes to the building. He also admitted that, prior to his earlier testimony, he had not checked to see if defendant used her alarm code on the days the wire transfers were made. But he also testified that, after his previous testimony and before trial, he did check; however, he was unsuccessful because the alarm company's records did not go back that far.
During her closing argument, defense counsel heavily focused on a theory that Stefani lied during this testimony. Trial counsel also highlighted that Stefani did not produce the employee alarm code records or employment records to show that defendant was working on the relevant days. According to trial counsel, Stefani's failure to produce these records meant that the jury observed no proof that defendant worked at Cincinnati on the relevant days.
In rebuttal, the prosecutor began by stating that trial counsel was "trying to confuse" the jury about Stefani's testimony. The prosecutor argued that Stefani did not lie. Arguing that her job was to prove the elements of the crime, the prosecutor argued as follows:
The money went to her account. She's the thief. They didn't go to Applied International, they didn't go to another bank. It went to her. Again, look at where the money came from out of his bank account, and where did the money go? You don't need alarm codes to do a wire transfer. Who cares about alarm codes? Who cares that she was even working those two dates? The bottom line is she did a wire transfer to herself.
He testified you don't need alarm codes to do a wire transfer. You don't. It's just a red herring to get you guys off the fact that the she took the money.
The jury found defendant guilty of embezzlement, more than $1,000 but less than $20,000.
On February 2, 2020, defendant moved for a new trial, a Ginther hearing, and for the trial court to correct an invalid sentence. In her brief, defendant argued that the trial court should grant her a new trial because her verdict was against the great weight of the evidence, she was denied her right to present a defense, and because the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct in her closing argument. Defendant argued that the trial court should vacate her conviction because the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction. Defendant also requested a Ginther hearing because, she argued, trial counsel was ineffective when she did not move for a mistrial after the jury was shown the signature card and heard testimony about it.
The trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial, rejecting each of defendant's arguments. However, it granted her motion for resentencing. In a judgment of sentence filed March 25, 2021, the trial court resentenced defendant to 12 months' incarceration, with 814 days' credit for time served.
Defendant now appeals her conviction. There being no merit to any of defendant's assignments of error, we affirm.
II. RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied trial counsel's request to question Stefani about his business practices. We disagree.
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence. People v Benton, 294 Mich.App. 191, 195; 817 N.W.2d 599 (2011). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court reaches a result that is outside the range of principled outcomes. Id. This Court reviews de novo whether a defendant was denied his or her constitutional right to present a defense. People v Steele, 283 Mich.App. 472, 480; 769 N.W.2d 256 (2009).
A criminal defendant has a federal and state constitutional right to present a defense. U.S. Const, Ams VI, XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 13. "[T]he Confrontation Clause only guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Pennsylvania v Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 53; 107 S.Ct. 989; 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 55 (1987) (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis in original).
Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible. MRE 402; People v Vandervliet, 444 Mich. 52, 60-61; 508 N.W.2d 114 (1993). Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." MRE 401; Vandervliet, 444 Mich. at 60. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. See MRE 402; People v Adair, 452 Mich. 473, 481; 550 N.W.2d 505 (1996).
In People v Lueth, 253 Mich.App. 670, 683; 660 N.W.2d 322 (2002), this Court explained the elements of embezzlement as follows:
The elements of embezzlement by an agent, MCL 750.174, are (1) the money in question must belong to the principal, (2) the defendant must have a relationship of trust with the principal as an agent or employee, (3) the money must come into the defendant's possession because of the relationship of trust, (4) the defendant dishonestly disposed of or converted the money to his own use or secreted the money, (5) the act must be without the consent of the principal, and (6) at the time of conversion, the defendant intended to defraud or cheat the principal.
Defendant's argument lacks merit. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's relevance objection because it determined that the questions did not help answer whether the elements of embezzlement were met. This was not an abuse of discretion. See Benton, 294 Mich.App. at 195. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to appellate relief on this ground.
III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Defendant argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct requiring reversal during rebuttal closing argument when she argued that trial counsel's arguments were a red herring. Because trial counsel did not object to the prosecutor's challenged comment, this issue is unpreserved, People v Bennett, 290 Mich.App. 465, 475; 802 N.W.2d 627 (2010), and we review defendant's claim for plain error affecting substantial rights. See People v Gibbs, 299 Mich.App. 473, 482; 830 N.W.2d 821 (2013).
Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee a citizen's right to due process of law. U.S. Const, Ams V and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. Over a century ago, our Supreme Court noted that a prosecutor's duty is to ensure the integrity of the judicial process. People v Evans, 72 Mich. 367, 383; 40 N.W. 473 (1888). Accordingly, a prosecutor "may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones." People v Blackmon, 280 Mich.App. 253, 268; 761 N.W.2d 172 (2008) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The prosecutor must seek justice and not merely seek to procure convictions. See People v Jones, 468 Mich. 345, 354; 662 N.W.2d 376 (2003); People v Lane, 308 Mich.App. 38, 62; 862 N.W.2d 446 (2014).
This Court examines whether a prosecutor's remarks prejudiced a defendant's trial by examining the whole record and evaluating the prosecutor's conduct in context. People v Mann, 288 Mich.App. 114, 119; 792 N.W.2d 53 (2010). This Court has held that, without more, a prosecutor's designation of a defense argument as a "red herring" does not constitute prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal. People v Dobek, 274 Mich.App. 58, 67-68; 732 N.W.2d 546 (2007).
Defendant's argument lacks merit. In her closing argument, trial counsel highlighted that Stefani did not produce alarm codes or employment records demonstrating that defendant was at work on the relevant days. Then during her rebuttal, the prosecutor called these arguments a "red herring," or a distraction from whether defendant stole money from Cincinnati. Because the prosecutor's comment was responsive to trial counsel's argument, it is not prosecutorial misconduct. See id.
IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that the prosecution did not present sufficient evidence to support her conviction. Defendant concedes that the record contains evidence that the money was transferred and that it was deposited "into an account associated with defendant." But defendant argues that the prosecution presented no evidence that she obtained possession or control of the money because of her employment, that she converted it to her own use, or that she intended to defraud the principal. In other words, defendant argues that the prosecution presented no evidence to show that she was "at the scene of the crime," transferred the money, or that she had knowledge of the money being in her account. Defendant highlights that the prosecution did not present employment records or alarm codes demonstrating that defendant was working when the transfers were made. Again, defendant's argument lacks merit.
This Court reviews a sufficiency of the evidence claim de novo. People v Meissner, 294 Mich.App. 438, 452; 812 N.W.2d 37 (2011).
[W]hen determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. [People v Wolfe, 440 Mich. 508, 515; 489 N.W.2d 748 (1992).]
Appellate courts do not hear testimony of witnesses and, therefore, defer to the jury's credibility determinations. People v Henderson, 306 Mich.App. 1, 9; 854 N.W.2d 234 (2014). "Circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences that arise from that evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of the crime." Id.
The elements of embezzlement, MCL 750.174, are set forth above.
In this case, a rational fact-finder could have readily concluded that the prosecution met its burden at trial. The prosecution offered testimony that Cincinnati employed defendant, that only Stefani and defendant had access to Cincinnati's accounting system at the relevant time, that the money was transferred from Cincinnati's account to defendant's account, that Stefani did not know the money had been transferred to defendant, and that the amount transferred was $14,715.
On the basis of this testimony, the jury reasonably found defendant guilty of embezzlement of more than $1,000 but less than $20,000, MCL 750.174. See Lueth, 253 Mich.App. at 683. The jury could have reasonably inferred from the circumstantial evidence that defendant transferred the money to her account with intent to defraud Cincinnati. Defendant's citation to an unpublished case from this Court and an unpublished United States Circuit Court of Appeals case do not aid her argument. Although unpublished opinions are not binding, this Court may consider the reasoning persuasive. People v Green, 260 Mich.App. 710, 720 n 5; 680 N.W.2d 477 (2004); MCR 7.215(C)(1). The same is true for decisions of lower federal courts. See People v Jackson, 292 Mich.App. 583, 595 n 3; 808 N.W.2d 541 (2011).
Defendant is correct that, in People v Kress, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued September 11, 2012 (Docket No. 303838), p 2, an embezzlement case, the prosecution presented the defendant's timesheets to prove that she was working at the relevant times. However, in Kress, multiple employees had access to the victim's computer system and knew how to make the changes necessary to charges in order to perpetrate the alleged fraud. Id. at 2-3. Also, in Kress the defendant was the only person working at the relevant times who knew how to make the fraudulent alternations to transactions. See id. In this case, defendant was the only person besides Stefani who had access to Cincinnati's accounts.
Likewise, defendant correctly points out that, in United States v Stevenson, 509 F Appx 812, 814 (CA 10, 2013), the prosecution presented evidence that fraudulent withdrawals were made from the defendant's employee number. But again, in this case, only defendant had access to Cincinnati's online banking.
V. GREAT WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that her conviction was not against the great weight of the evidence. We disagree.
This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion the trial court's grant or denial of a motion for a new trial based on a great weight of the evidence argument. People v DeLisle, 202 Mich.App. 658, 661; 509 N.W.2d 885 (1993). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome that falls outside the range of principled outcomes." People v March, 499 Mich. 389, 397; 886 N.W.2d 396 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "An appellate court will review a properly preserved great-weight issue by deciding whether the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand." People v Cameron, 291 Mich.App. 599, 616-617; 806 N.W.2d 371 (2011).
"A directed verdict of acquittal is appropriate only if, considering all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime charged were proven beyond a reasonable doubt." People v Mehall, 454 Mich. 1, 6; 557 N.W.2d 110 (1997). "[I]t is not permissible for a trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses in deciding a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, no matter how inconsistent or vague that testimony might be." Id.
A court reviewing whether a verdict was against the great weight of the evidence is required to review the whole body of proofs. People v Herbert, 444 Mich. 466, 475; 511 N.W.2d 654 (1993). A reviewing court may only substitute its view of witness credibility for that of the jury under exceptional circumstances, namely, if witness testimony contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws, is patently incredible, defies physical realities, is so implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror, or was so far impeached that it was deprived of all probative value. People v Lemmon, 456 Mich. 625, 642-644; 576 N.W.2d 129 (1998).
The bulk of defendant's great-weight argument is mostly a repeat of her sufficiency argument and is better examined in that context. The jury heard and considered all the evidence admitted and arguments presented.
Defendant's conviction was not against the great weight of the evidence. See Lemmon, 456 Mich. at 642-644. Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to appellate relief on this ground.
VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant argues that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during two moments at trial: (1) when she failed to move for a mistrial after the bank signature card was shown to the jury, and (2) when she failed to object to the prosecutor's challenged comment denigrating her during closing argument. In both instances, we disagree.
"Whether a defendant has been denied the effective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of fact and constitutional law." People v Solloway, 316 Mich.App. 174, 187; 891 N.W.2d 255 (2016). "Generally, a trial court's findings of fact, if any, are reviewed for clear error, and questions of law are reviewed de novo." Id. However, because no evidentiary hearing has been held, "this Court's review is limited to mistakes apparent on the lower court record." Id.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must demonstrate "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687; 104 S.Ct. 2052; 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich. 575, 578; 640 N.W.2d 246 (2000). In People v Stanaway, 446 Mich. 643, 687-688; 521 N.W.2d 557 (1994), our Supreme Court explained:
In order to succeed on such a claim, the defendant first must show that counsel's performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. The defendant must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's assistance constituted sound trial strategy. Second, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Although "[c]ounsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process," a reviewing "court must indulge a strong presumption" that counsel's challenged action was "sound trial strategy." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-689. "Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential" and include a review of all the circumstances at the time of counsel's conduct. Id. at 689-690. Failure to "advance a meritless argument or raise a futile objection does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." People v Ericksen, 288 Mich.App. 192, 201; 793 N.W.2d 120 (2010).
Additionally, "[t]he fact that defense counsel's strategy may not have worked does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel." People v Stewart, 219 Mich.App. 38, 42; 555 N.W.2d 715 (1996).
Defendant cites People v Ullah, 216 Mich.App. 669, 685; 550 N.W.2d 568 (1996), for the proposition that a failure to move for suppression of inadmissible evidence may amount to ineffective assistance of counsel. In Ullah, this Court concluded that the trial counsel was ineffective for failing to enter a timely objection to "bad-acts testimony" that "was a serious error that prejudiced defendant." The trial counsel failed to:
to place a timely objection, failed to request that the testimony be stricken after the court indicated that it found the testimony more prejudicial than probative, failed to request that a cautionary instruction be given, and failed to move for a mistrial. [Id. at 685-686.]
Notably, this Court concluded that "[t]he prejudice from the bad-acts testimony was so substantial that it could have changed the outcome of this trial involving a credibility contest." Id. at 686.
"A trial court should grant a mistrial only for an irregularity that is prejudicial to the rights of the defendant and impairs his ability to get a fair trial." People v Bauder, 269 Mich.App. 174, 195; 712 N.W.2d 506 (2005) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A. FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL
Defendant fails to demonstrate that it is apparent from the record that trial counsel was ineffective when she did not move for a mistrial after the jury observed the signature card. See Stanaway, 446 Mich. at 687-688; see also Solloway, 316 Mich.App. at 187. Trial counsel effectively argued that the signature card was inadmissible and argued that Detective Hancock's testimony about it should be stricken. Her advocacy resulted in the exclusion of this evidence and a curative instruction, instructing the jury to disregard it and the related testimony. Trial counsel, during her cross-examination of Stefani, appeared convinced that she had successfully impeached Stefani and tarnished his credibility with the jury.
Regardless of whether there was a strategic reason not to move for a mistrial or whether the signature card was otherwise admissible, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard the signature card and any testimony pertaining to it. People v Abraham, 256 Mich.App. 265, 279; 662 N.W.2d 836 (2003) (explaining that jurors are presumed to follow their instructions). Moreover, the certified bank records reflecting that the relevant bank account belonged to defendant were properly entered into evidence, and Detective Hancock testified in regard to these documents. Defendant does not dispute the trial court's statement that the central question of the case was whether the bank account was defendant's and whether defendant transferred the money to her account. Accordingly, defendant cannot demonstrate that, even if trial counsel's performance was deficient, "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Stanaway, 446 Mich. at 687-688.
B. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Likewise, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's challenged comment during closing argument. See id. As discussed earlier, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct when she responded to trial counsel's closing argument. Therefore, because any objection would have been futile, trial counsel could not have performed deficiently. Ericksen, 288 Mich.App. at 201. Moreover, even if an objection were sustained and the comment was stricken, there is not a probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The prosecution presented evidence that defendant worked for Cincinnati and transferred funds from its account to her own, without its consent.
In sum, defendant fails to demonstrate that it is apparent from the record that trial counsel was ineffective.
VII. MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct and the right to present a defense. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial. See People v McCray, 245 Mich.App. 631, 637; 630 N.W.2d 633 (2001). For the reasons discussed earlier in this memorandum, the trial court's decision on both grounds was within the range of reasonable and principled outcomes, and was therefore not an abuse of discretion. See McCray, 245 Mich.App. at 637. The prosecutor did not commit misconduct requiring reversal, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded testimony about Cincinnati's financial health. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion for a new trial.
VIII. AMENDED JUDGMENT OF SENTENCE
Lastly, we note an apparent ministerial error in regard to defendant's amended sentence. As discussed, the trial court originally sentenced defendant to three to five years' imprisonment, with 128 days' credit for time served. In the same postjudgment motion in which she requested a new trial, defendant moved for resentencing to correct an invalid sentence. On March 25, 2021, the trial court apparently entered an amended judgment of sentence, sentencing defendant to 12 months' incarceration, with 814 days' credit for time served. We note that the trial court did not check the box indicating that this document is an "amended" judgment of sentence. Accordingly, we remand this case for the ministerial task of correcting this mistake. See, e.g., People v Shipley, 256 Mich.App. 367, 379; 662 N.W.2d 856 (2003) (recognizing a typographical error in the defendant's judgment of sentence and remanding to the trial court "for the ministerial task of correcting" the error).
IX. CONCLUSION
In sum, we reject each of defendant's arguments on appeal and affirm her conviction. However, we remand for the ministerial task of correcting the judgment of sentence filed March 25, 2021, to indicate it is an amended judgment of sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.