People v. George

6 Citing cases

  1. People v. Gonzalez

    392 Ill. App. 3d 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009)   Cited 2 times
    Finding "[i]t is the constant `public view or awareness' of the child that takes this case out of the kidnapping statute"

    Nor is it the 12-year-old being kept in the offender's house for parts of four days. People v. George, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 762 N.E.2d 1145 (2002). It is not the child taken to a viaduct late at night, with no one else around.

  2. People v. Trotter

    2 N.E.3d 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 3 times

    The term “lure” is commonly defined as “ ‘an inducement to pleasure or gain’ ” and “ ‘enticement.’ ” People v. George, 326 Ill.App.3d 1096, 1102, 261 Ill.Dec. 218, 762 N.E.2d 1145 (2002) (quoting Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 694 (10th ed. II 1998)). In determining whether defendant lured C.G. into his car, we must examine the totality of the circumstances.

  3. People v. Trotter

    371 Ill. App. 3d 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007)   Cited 4 times
    In People v. Trotter, 371 Ill. App. 3d 869, 876-77, 864 N.E.2d 281, 287 (2007), overruled on other grounds by People v. Harrison, 226 Ill. 2d 427, 441, 877 N.E.2d 432, 439 (2007), the appellate court found the defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt where the defendant took a child without the parents' consent, boarded a light-rail train, rode it for a while, disembarked, spoke with a suspicious police officer, walked to a gas station while the police officer kept her in sight, and went to the bathroom where she was ultimately arrested.

    Secret confinement is demonstrated by either the secrecy of the confinement or the place of the confinement. People v. George, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1096, 1101 (2002), citing People v. Mulcahey, 72 Ill. 2d 282, 285 (1978). In cases where the proof of a secret confinement was established, the victim was clearly confined or enclosed within something, usually a house or a vehicle.

  4. People v. Robinson

    2016 Ill. App. 130484 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 9 times
    In Robinson, the defendant telephoned a female acquaintance around midnight and asked if she would" 'like to go out to eat and to the movies.'"

    ¶ 33 In addition, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that defendant had the “intent to secretly confine” B.H. against her will. “Secret confinement is demonstrated by either the secrecy of the confinement or the place of the confinement. [Citation.] ‘Secret’ has been defined as ‘[c]oncealed; hidden; not made public; particularly, in law, kept from the knowledge or notice of persons liable to be affected by the act, transaction, deed, or other thing spoken of.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. George, 326 Ill.App.3d 1096, 1101, 261 Ill.Dec. 218, 762 N.E.2d 1145 (2002) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1352 (6th ed. 1990)). The evidence supported the inference that defendant ultimately intended to induce B.H. to a secluded, unfamiliar location where no one would see or hear her when he sexually assaulted her.

  5. People v. Richardson

    2013 Ill. App. 3d 120049 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii), (2.1) (West 2010). ¶ 23 Our supreme court has construed the language of section 5-8-2(a) as "the legislature intend[ing] that more than one extended-term sentence may be imposed" but only for the offenses within the most serious class of offense of which the accused was convicted. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d at 207; see, e.g., People v. George, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1096 (2002) (providing that defendant was ineligible for extended-term sentencing on his three less serious class offenses, but eligible for extended-term sentences on two Class X felony offenses that were both within the most serious class). Based on existing case law, we conclude the classification of the offense controls in this case, rather than the nature of the percentage of the sentence to be served according to statute.

  6. People v. Richardson

    2013 Ill. App. 3d 120049 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    See 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii), (2.1) (West 2010). ¶ 23 Our supreme court has construed the language of section 5-8-2(a) as "the legislature intend[ing] that more than one extended-term sentence may be imposed" but only for the offenses within the most serious class of offense of which the accused was convicted. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d at 207; see, e.g., People v. George, 326 Ill. App. 3d 1096 (2002) (providing that defendant was ineligible for extended-term sentencing on his three less serious class offenses, but eligible for extended-term sentences on two Class X felony offenses that were both within the most serious class). Based on existing case law, we conclude the classification of the offense controls in this case, rather than the nature of the percentage of the sentence to be served according to statute.